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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
 
The “Transaction Cost Analysis” Study was commissioned by MoFPED, on behalf of the 
PMA Secretariat's Marketing and Agro Processing Sub Committee. It was carried out 
between the 14th January 2002 and the 11th March 2002 by a consultancy team from the 
NRI (UK) comprising of C.D. Collinson, Duncan Burnett, Uli Kleigh and another from 
IITA –FOODNET (Kampala) comprising of R.S.B. Ferris, John Jagwe and Andrew K. 
Muganga. 
 
The study focussed on the analysis of marketing and transaction costs1 along the 
marketing chain, from farm gate to tertiary markets (domestic and export), of the 
following six key strategic commodities / product groups identified by the PMA; cassava, 
coffee, cotton, dairy products, fish and maize. 
 
The key objective of the study was to recommend implementat on plans that would 
overcome constraints to marketing & processing efficiency and improve farm gate prices 
to smallholders. The improvement of prices received by poor farmers is a specific aim 
related to the PMA's broader strategy, which emerged from the Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP), of encouraging the growth of commercial farming amongst the rural 
poor and halting a shift to subsistence agriculture. 
 
Our terms of reference covered; the baseline assessment of marketing, processing & 
transaction costs; tactics & strategies for improving efficiency; the assessment of 
alternative approaches to reducing costs; the recommendation of an implementation plan 
to the PMA and further technical assistance studies. 
 
Following a review of relevant literature and inception activities in Kampala, we carried 
out field visits in key regions of the country relevant to the study’s six subject 
commodities / product groups. Our analysis, findings and recommendations are the result 
of fieldwork and consultations with key sta eholders in the public and private sector. 
Numerous interviews were conducted with representatives of government, public sector 
monitoring and regulatory bodies, agricultural research institutions, private sector 
businesses, farmers’ groups and individual small-scale farmers. 
 
                                         
1 According to neo-classical economics and more recently, new institutional economics, transaction costs 
relate to the non-price costs of making a commercial exchang .   So, for instance, the expenses incurred in 
finding someone to trade with, time spent negotiating a deal and the costs involved in ensuring that 
contracts are honoured, all fall under the general category of transaction cost.  In the traditional sense, 
agricultural marketing refers to the activities involved in taking a product from the farm gate and delivering 
it in the form, at the time and to the place that the buyer requires.  Such costs are therefore incurred through 
handling, transport, storage, processing, packaging, market fees, risk management, brokerage, export 
handling and others.   
 
The final report contains an introduction, followed by a section on marketing and 
transaction cost issues that are common to two or more of the six commodities covered in 
the study, i.e., “cross-cutting issues.” Commodity specific s tions follow, dealing with 
supply and demand, the marketing chain, marketing cost analysis, constraints and 
opportunities to marketing and transaction cost efficiency, the raising of farmers' 
incomes, a summary of findings, and a recommended implementation plan. The study’s 
key findings and recommendations were presented at a stakeholder workshop held in 
Kampala on the 15th March 2002, and are summarised hereunder. 
 
This rest of this summary is organised as follows:  The next section gives brief overviews 
of the key findings from our fieldwork and analysis.  The final section 
(Recommendations and Action Plans) is presented in the form of a matrix, in which our 
recommendations are prioritised, justified and assigned implementation activities. 
 
Key Findings 
 
Cross Cutting Issues 
 
Those issues affecting transaction cost efficiency and common across the spectrum of the 
commodities covered by the study are, for the most part, the subject of existing action by 
the GOU, and support by the donor community.  Key areas r quiring ongoing and 
additional support are as follows:  
 
Producer bargaining power 
 
Poor farmers can improve their bargaining power by grouping together to pool their 
produce thus achieving economies of scale in their transactions and marketing activities. 
The formation of farmers marketing groups (also known as Farmer Controlled 
Enterprises, or FCE’s) enables the sale of produce to stakeholders further up the 
marketing chain, eliminating at least one level of middlemen and thus achieving better 
net farm gate prices. Furthermore, FCE’s encourage the improvement and standardization 
of quality to meet more onerous contractual quality specifications demanded by larger 
buyers. Research conducted in Uganda and other SSA countries reveals the following 
attributes common to successful FCE’s: 
 
· Groups evolve from within the farming community and are self-selecting.
· Groups are genuinely democratic. 
· Group activities are relatively simple, and within the capacity and capability 
of its members. 
 
We believe that wi hout the development and involvement of FCE’s in the marketing of 
all the strategic commodity and product groups that were the subject of the study, it will 
be very difficult for improved transaction cost efficiencies to result in better farm gate 
prices. 
 
Road infrastructure and transport 
 
Much progress has been made on improving main roads, feeder roads, maintenance and 
administrative efficiency, however further action is required in the following areas: 
 
· Urban and community access roads 
· Maximisation of vehicle operating efficiency 
· The consolidation of institutional changes at district level 
· The introduction of intermediate means of transport to reduce rural transport 
costs 
 
The lack of and poor maintenance of rural access roads to farming communities, together 
with unsuitable and insufficient intermediate transport, particularly during the rainy 
season, can result in post harvest crop losses due to the inability to access markets 
regularly.  
 
 
Inland international freight 
 
Uganda, as a land locked country, faces severe problems in maintaining its 
competitiveness in the export market due to the high cost of inland international freight 
and forwarding costs. This issue particularly affects the transaction cost efficiency of 
commodities such as coffee and cotton. Freight rates to Mombasa have declined 
substantially over the last five years, due mainly to increased competition amongst 
shipping and forwarding companies. However, high internal international freight remains 
a very significant element in export marketing costs. In both the coffee and cotton sectors 
further reductions in internal international freight and forwarding costs will benefit farm 
gate prices. However, progress in this area is largely dependent on greater efficiencies in 
the operation of the Ugandan and Kenyan railway networks. Although the privatisation of 
Uganda Railways is proceeding, cooperation at regional level is necessary to realize 
significant transaction cost efficiencies. The combination of export volumes, and the 
negotiation of j int freight agreements by exporters, also offers the opportunity of 
effecting overall freight reductions in the cotton and coffee sectors. In this context, the 
negotiation of optimal airfreight rates is also the key to transaction cost efficiency in the 
fish sector. 
 
 
Finance for agricultural trade and agribusiness 
 
The high cost of borrowing and the unavailability of long term finance are a severe 
constraint to transaction cost efficiency and to investment in the agriculture / livestock 
and fisheries sectors. The problem of access to finance being most severe in rural areas, 
high interest rates together with high margins between borrowing and lending rates, 
suggest inefficiency in the banking sector, and this is an area requiring further 
investigation. 
 
Market information 
 
It is encouraging that schemes and programmes to improve and disseminate market price 
information to rural areas are currently in place and expanding. For example, IITA – 
Foodnet through its Micro-MIS service, and the recently introduced MTN phone market 
information service both have the aim of providing information to rural areas, and 
farmers in particular. In the case of export commodities such as cotton and coffee, prices 
at the farm gate level are not transparent, and further information should be made 
available to farmers to enable them to understand how bodies such as the CDO and 
UCDA calculate indicative levels.   
 
 
Electricity supplies 
 
Whilst cost and availability of supply were identified as basic problems in many areas of 
the country, the reliability of supply, necessitating the provision of standby generator 
facilities is a major constraint in some sectors. The processing and storage of perishable 
products, such as fish and milk requires reliable cold stores, and the installation of new 
generating capacity in rural areas by both the GOU and the private sector is to be 
encouraged. 
 
 
Local taxation 
 
Systems of rural taxation have been identified in a recent academic paper as a major 
market distortionary factor in primary product trade. This area, whilst undoubtedly a 
contributory factor in transaction cost inefficiency, should not, in our opinion, be 
exaggerated.  Therefore, we have not given it a high priority in implementing the PMA. 
 
 
Contract enforcement 
 
Improved contract enforcement regulations, particularly at rural level, will reduce trading 
risks and encourage greater transaction cost efficiency. The GOU is addressing this issue 
through its medium term competitiveness strategy, and institutional arrangements need to 
be put in place to assist in the spread of contract benefits to rural areas, where adoption is 
likely to be slower than in urban environments. 
. 
 
 
Commodity Specific Issues 
 
The comments above regarding cross cutting issues; findings and recommendations are 
generally applicable to the specific commodity findings detailed below. 
 
Cassava 
 
Cassava is a major staple food in Uganda and consumed either in dried flour or fresh 
form and its importance as a contribution to food security outweighs its role as an income 
generating commercial crop. The current market situation is characterized by glut, with 
very low farm gate prices. Farmers only receive approximately 15 – 25% of the final 
retail price in Kampala, which is the country’s most important urban market. In common 
with other non traditional export agricultural crops, factors that contribute to this situation 
include the lack of economies of scale at producer and retailer levels, marketing and 
transaction cost inefficiencies in transport, processing, and post-harvest handling.  As 
compared to dry cassava, the marketing chain for fresh roots is more streamlined, which 
is primarily due to the latter’s perishability. 
 
 
Coffee 
 
World prices for robusta coffee have been historically low and on a declining trend since 
the collapse of the ICA economic clauses in 1989. This situation has also been 
exacerbated by oversupply caused, particularly, by the expansion of robusta production in 
Vietnam. One result of long-term low prices is that stakeholders are encouraged to make 
greater efforts to improve market efficiency and reduce transaction costs in order to 
maintain margins. This situation is evident in Uganda where, for the most part coffee 
supply chains are reasonably competitive and efficient. The limited time available during 
the study did not reveal any specific areas within the supply chain where potential exists 
for major and significant reductions to transaction costs. However, low producer prices 
near or below cost of production threaten the long-term sustainability of the sector. 
Therefore, the best opportunities for cost reductions come from general improvements in 
internal and inland international transport costs, and a refocus of marketing strategy to 
include the exploitation of the growing specialty (organic, shade/bird friendly, fair trade 
and gourmet) coffee markets, and the potential for washed robustas. Following the 
liberalization of the sector in the 1990’s there are no particular significant policy, 
regulatory and institutional constraints within the coffee sector, and th  UCDA is playing 
a valuable role in monitoring, regulating and promoting the industry. It was found that 
price formation at farm gate level are currently not properly explained or transparent.  
 
 
Cotton 
 
Cotton production at current national average yields and farm gate prices is unprofitable 
for farmers in many parts of the country and future profitability will be dependent on 
improved efficiencies in production, marketing and processing, enabling economically 
viable farm gate prices to be paid. The profitability of the cotton enterprise to farmers is 
essential for the long term sustainability and expansion and we consider that his is the 
key issue facing the sector. Farm gate prices are not transparent and the indicative price 
advised by the CDO remains in force for a whole season despite fluctuations in global 
levels. 
Substantial national ginnery overcapacity  exists and factory units tend to be old with, in 
many cases, outdated technology and a  national strategy for the rationalisation of the size 
and location of ginneries is essential to achieve sustainability and growth of the sector. 
The value-added sector is very small, under financed and unable to take advantage of the 
opportunities presenting themselves in the textile sector and oil-milling sect r. 
 
 
Dairy products 
 
With one or possibly two exceptions, Uganda’s formal dairy processing factories are 
currently unprofitable.  A return to profitability in this sector is dependent on increasing 
the utilised capacity of processing factories. The informal sector’s distribution costs are 
considerably lower than those experienced by the formal sector and lessons can be 
learned by the formal sector in this regard. 
 
Profitability in the informal milk wholesaling sector is restricted to those operators who 
have invested in urban based milk cooling facilities. 
 
Little is known with certainty about dairy consumption in terms of volumes, consumer 
preferences, perceptions and willingness to pay for value added products. 
 
The export of Ugandan UHT milk is constrained by quality problems, which are mainly 
caused by company financial losses and the consequent inability to maintain standards. 
 
Farmer associations that bulk and cool milk can be financially viable in certain 
geographic locations. 
 
 
Fish 
 
Insufficient information exists on domestic and regional trade in fresh and processed fish 
Most fishermen are in weak bargaining positions due to their remote locations and 
inability to store fish and the only sustainable way of improving fishermen’s bargaining 
positions is to encourage marketing associations.   
 
Profits in the transport boat business are high, even when adjusted for risk.  This suggests 
the existence of anti-competitive practices at this level of the supply chain, although how 
practices are maintained is not clear.  However, competition in other parts of the supply 
chain appears to be healthy. 
 
Post harvest rejection rates for export are coming down and are probably not as high as 
generally perceived.  However, there is almost certainly still room for improve ent at all 
levels of the supply chain in terms of fish handling and storage.
 
Several export processors are experimenting with ways of adding greater value to their 
outputs.  In time, all factories will have to adopt similar practices in order to r main 
competitive. 
 
Large amounts of fish, flower and fresh produce export revenues are lost to Uganda 
because of uncompetitive air-freight rates.  Rates can be significantly reduced if 
competition between scheduled carriers can be increased and the cost structure at Entebbe 
can be reduced.   
 
 
Maize 
 
Whilst maize is not the traditional staple food crop for Uganda’s population it plays an 
important part in the rural and  urban diet, and has the potential to become more popular. 
Following the liberalisation of the grain sector, there are no significant policy, regulatory 
or institutional constraints to the development of the sector. However, in order to realize 
the potential to develop a vibrant domestic and export market it will be necessary to 
institute a formal maize marketing structure. This will involve finance for investment and 
working capital, the establishment of national standards, and a suitable regulatory 
framework for the introduction of an authoritative price determination point, e.g., a 
commodity exchange, and warehouse receipt-financing techniques. 
 
 
 
Recommendations and Action Plans 
 
Prioritization of the recommendations is given using the following key: 
 
A:  Highest priority, either because of the direct and large benefit that farmers will experience or because of the recommendation’s 
critical importance to policy making. 
 
B:  Medium priority.  Farmers will benefit from implementation but other initiatives need to be taken before the full impact can be 
felt. 
 
C:  Lowest priority.  The impact on farmers will not be great, at least in the current marketing environment.  
 
 
Cross-cutting issues 
 
Priority 
(refer to 
key) 
Topic Recommendation Purpose and justification Activities 
A Farmer 
organisation 
Government support 
for the creation of 
Farmer Controlled 
Enterprises 
Increased farmgate/landing site prices 
through enhanced farmer/fishermen 
bargaining power and value added 
 
Although difficult to achieve in 
practice, effective farmer organisation 
would have a direct impact on raising 
farmer/fisherman incomes and 
encouraging a more commercial 
approach to production. 
1. PMA, NAADS, UNFA, sub-sector development 
authorities and other responsible organisations meet to 
resolve the apparent overlap in roles and activities 
regarding support to farmer/fisherman organisations.  
The meeting should decide the most appropriate 
approach to co-ordinating support.  The options are: 
· “One size fits all” – one organisation that caters for 
all renewable natural resource sectors and sub-
sectors 
· An organisation for each sub-sector 
· A combination of the above with appropriate 
linkages and defined roles
2. With PMA support, NAADS and sub-sector 
development authorities develop and deliver a 
campaign designed to raise awareness among farmers 
and fishermen of the benefits of group controlled 
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enterprises. 
3. Simultaneously, NAADS and its development authority 
partners seek donor support for a co- rdinated 
programme of capacity building among 
farmer/fishermen controlled enterprises 
4. National and international expert organisations invited 
to tender for a programme that would design and deliver  
capacity building services and fit in with the co-
ordinating structure decided in “1” above.  The 
principle of voluntary association among 
farmers/fishermen would be paramount. 
A Transport Community access 
roads should be given 
priority in future 
investment transport 
infrastructure 
investment 
programmes 
Research conducted in several Sub-
Saharan countries by the UK’s 
Transport Research Laboratory 
eveals that the cost-effectiveness 
(reduction in transport c sts per unit 
investment) of community access 
roads is greater than for any other type 
of road, including trunk and feeder 
roads. 
 
The benefits to farmers of investment 
in community access roads will be felt 
directly through greater market access 
and decreased transport costs.  
1. The PMA commissions research to gather evidence of 
the cost effectiveness of investments in community 
access roads in Uganda. 
2. The PMA uses the research findings to lobby MWHC, 
the World Bank and other donors to give greater 
emphasi  to community access roads in future 
investment plans.  
A Transport Intermediate means 
of transport should be 
encouraged 
At the village level, headloading is 
time consuming and limited in range, 
while four wheeled motorised 
transport is usually prohibitively 
expensive.  The introduction of 
intermediate means of transport (such 
as bicycles, pack-animals, animal 
drawn carts, motorcycles and single 
axle tractors) has the potential to 
increase market access and reduce 
marketing costs to farmers.  
1. PMA sponsors a series of practical IMT demonstrations 
around the country, raising awareness of the 
possibilities of increasing the efficiency of village level 
transport. 
2. PMA and supporting donors create a fund designed to 
support workable business plans submitted by potential 
IMT service providers. 
A Inland Regional co- A seamless rail and ferry network that 1. MoFPED and the World Bank (or possibly the African 
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International 
freight 
operation with Kenya 
and Tanzania on rail 
and ferry policy 
should be established 
will unlock further substantial 
efficiencies in inland freight handling 
and transport. 
 
The purpose for the PMA would be 
increased farmgate prices to producers 
of exported commodities that have 
efficient and competitive domestic 
supply chains (e.g. coffee) 
 
The impact on farmers will be indirect 
but should be feltquickly in the coffee 
and, probably, cotton sectors.  
Development Bank) co-ordinate an inter-organisational 
rail and ferry task force involving Uganda Railways (or 
the private management company) and the Ministry of 
Works. 
2. The task force initially reviews proposals on regional 
rail and ferry integration made in the 1999 consultant’s 
privatisation report (available from Uganda Railways)
3. Task force develops practical proposals for greater co-
operation/integration between Ugandan, Kenyan and 
Tanzanian rail and ferry organisations.  Funding a 
feasibility study may be required. 
4. With the backing of the World Bank HQ in 
Washington, proposals shared with counterpart 
organisations in Kenya and Tanzania under the banner 
of the East African Community. 
5. Senior level conference organised by the EAC and 
backed by the World Bank. 
6. Optional – Issue of privatisation of Port of Mombasa 
raised with Kenyan government (if handled correctly, 
privatisation would lead to further substantial cost 
efficiencies, part of which would be passed back to 
producers)  
A International 
airfreight 
Implementation of 
CAA airfreight cost 
reduction strategy 
Substantial reductions in the cost of 
airfreight in order to make Entebbe at 
least as competitive as other 
international airports in the region. 
 
Applies particularly to the Ugandan 
fisheries industry but also to the 
horticultural industry (which has the 
potential to be a major employer in 
Uganda)  
1. MoFPED, Ministry of Works, the CAA and the “export
competitiveness strategy” donors (World Bank, EC, 
USAID and DFID) meet to discuss how CAA plans for 
reducing air-f eight charges can be implemented.  The 
plans are outlined in a 2002 document entitled 
“Expansion of Exports out of Entebbe International 
Airport” available from the CAA (and are summarised 
in this report). 
  
A Inland 
international 
freight 
Joint Exporters’ 
Freight Agreement 
(JEFA) 
The ability to negotiate reduced 
freight rates with freight forwarders 
and shipping companies through 
pooling exports will increase export 
revenues to Uganda and increase 
1. PMA, UCDA, UCDO and relevant private sector 
organisations meet to discuss co- peration in co-
ordinating JEFA proposals. 
2. Export Promotion Authority approached to assess the 
possibility of using Export Credit Guarantee Funds to 
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farmgate prices for commodities that 
are served by efficient and 
competitive supply chains. 
 
Note that some foreign owned 
exporting companies are unlikely to 
join because of the power they hold in 
negotiating their own concessionary 
freight rates.  
 
The impact on coffee farmers, for 
instance, should be quick because of 
the strong positive correlation between 
export and farmgate prices  
persuade exporters to switch from selling FOT/FOB 
Kampala (or Ginnery, in the case of cotton) to either 
FOB Mombasa or C&F destination port. 
3. PMA, UCDA, UCDO, private sector representatives 
and EPA develop a set of JEFA proposals to put to 
exporters. 
4. Proposals circulated to relevant exporters and shipping 
companies prior to a workshop. 
B Market 
information 
More information 
should be 
disseminated directly 
to farmers.  
Information on 
export commodities 
should be updated 
daily, possibly using 
indicative farmgate 
prices for coffee and 
cotton, based on a 
voluntary, mutually 
agreed and regularly 
updated formula 
covering costs from 
c.i.f. to farmgate. 
Market information helps to enhance 
farmers’ bargaining position.  
However, to have a full effect, 
improved market information must be 
complemented by other actions 
designed to strengthen bargaining 
position, most notably the voluntary 
establishment of Farmer Controlled 
Enterprises. 
 
The information required already 
exists.  The challenge is to deliver it in 
an affordable manner to farmers 
1. Foodnet reviews its Macro and Micro- IS activities 
(already planned), and MTN invited to report on the 
uptake of its subscriber service. 
2. PMA commissions a survey on how farmers use the 
market information, in what form they prefer it to be 
delivered, and what improvements they would like to 
see.  
3. PMA commissions a study on the feasibility of 
introducing farmgate price formulae for coffee and 
cotton 
4. PMA uses outputs from 1, 2 and 3 to develop a coherent 
strategy for government support to market information 
services. 
B Finance for 
agricultural 
trade and 
agribusiness 
Developments in 
warehouse receipt 
financing proposed 
under the Export 
Competitiveness 
Strategy should be 
extended to include 
Warehouse receipt financing (WRF) 
helps to improve liquidity in rural 
areas, which in turn means a greater 
number of business transactions and 
more opportunities for profit making.  
The benefits can reach farmers either 
directly (through the ability to raise 
1. PMA holds discussions with the UN WRF project, its 
contact ministry in Uganda (MTTI), MoFPED and the 
Export Competitiveness Strategy donors (World Bank, EC, 
USAID and DFID), in order integrate approaches to WRF. 
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coffee and cotton finance against their harvested crops 
and the opportunity to sell produce at 
the most remunerative time) or 
indirectly through greater liquidity 
among traders.   
 
One WRF initiative already exists (a 
UN regional project managed from 
Nairobi, principally concerned with 
coffee and cotton) and another is 
proposed (under the Export 
Competitiveness Strategy, principally 
concerned with maize).  These 
initiatives need to be brought together.  
C Rural 
contract 
enforcement 
In the context of the 
MTCS, it is 
important that 
institutional 
arrangements for 
improved contract 
enforcement should 
reach rural levels. 
Improved contract enforcement could 
provide farmers and rural traders with 
the possibility of  using new types of 
transaction that allow exchange to be 
dislocated over time and place.   
 
However, the importance of 
introducing contract enforcement 
should not be overstated.  Many other 
initiatives need to be firmly 
established before rural contract 
enforcement becomes a constraint.  
1. PMA and MTCS implementing bodies should meet 
periodically to monitor the impact of the new contract 
enforcement measures in rural areas. 
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Coffee 
 
Priority 
(refer to 
key) 
Topic Recommendation Purpose and justification Activities 
B Overseas 
marketing 
Ugandan specialty 
arabica and washed 
robusta should be 
promoted in overseas 
markets 
Although not strictly within our terms 
of reference, the creation of strong 
Ugandan brand images within coffee 
consumers’ minds will help to 
promote strong positive price 
differentials for Ugandan quality 
coffee on London and New York 
exchanges. 
 
Efficiency and competition within the 
coffee supply chain will mean that the 
price premia will be passed on to 
farmers proprtionately. 
1. MoFPED and UCDA commission study to investigate 
how other countries/origins promote their coffees in 
Europe and the USA. . 
2. MoFPED and UCDA develop and implement a cost 
effective strategy for promoting Ugandan coffee.  
A Review of 
current 
proposals 
Plans to introduce a 
Ugandan coffee 
auction and 
widespread robusta 
wet processing 
should be subjected 
to critical analysis 
before going ahead 
The intention behind these two 
initiatives is to stimulate market prices 
received by farmers.  However, we 
have so far seen no convincing 
evidence to suggest that this ambition 
will be turned into practice using these 
methods. 
1. UCDA commissions a feasibility study that will assess: 
· The costs and benefits of a voluntary Ugandan 
coffee auction , paying particular attention to a 
realistic assessment of the potential volume of 
transactions and the additional costs that the 
auction would create 
· The international market for washed robustas, 
focussing on the size of the market, price 
differentials premia and the danger that increased 
Ugandan production may influence the current 
differentials. 
  
B Centralised 
pulperies 
The centralised 
pulpery system at the 
village and urban 
levels, widely used 
Ensuring high quality is one of the 
f w ways of getting a higher return 
during current times of depressed 
coffee prices.  Individual farmers are 
1. UCDA commissions cost benefit analysis of 
introducing centralised pulping for arabica wet milling 
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during the coffee co-
operative period, 
should be assessed 
for arabica wet 
milling 
unwilling to invest time in producing 
better quality arabica because other 
activities are more remunerative and 
traders are unlikely to offer price 
premia for small quantities of high 
quality arabica offered at the farm 
gate.  Centralised pulperies may offer 
potential for exploiting economies of 
scale in producing higher quality 
arabica.  Pulperies could be under 
grass root control and hence the 
benefits could fall directly to farmers 
and their communities  
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Cotton 
Priority 
(refer to 
key) 
Topic Recommendation Purpose and justification Activities 
A Ginneries A feasibility study 
should be conducted 
on a national strategy 
for rationalising the 
size and location of 
ginneries 
Our fieldwork and background 
reading revealed that substantial 
under-utilised capacity exists wi hin 
the cotton ginning sector and that it 
uses old technology and is 
inappropriately located in relation to 
production areas.   
 
These causes of inefficiency impose 
costs on the farmer in terms of lower 
farmgate prices.  
 
There may be a case for government 
to incentivise moves towards a more 
rational ginning sector in terms of size 
and location.  
1. MoFPED, MAAIF and UCDO commission a feasibility 
study on the rationalisation of the ginnery sector, 
learning from experiences in other countries (for 
instance, the Sri Lankan tea industry).   If the study 
concludes that rationalisation would bring about 
worthwhile increases in farmgate prices, guidance 
should be given on the nature and value of the 
government incentives that would be required to make 
industry act. 
2. MoFPED, MAAIF, PMA and UCDO review the study 
report and decide whether or not the recommendation 
are PMA compliant in terms of the role of government 
in effecting commercial change. 
A UCDO The role of the 
UCDO should be 
assessed to ensure the 
appropriate level of 
GoU support to the 
sub-sector 
The UCDO was established to 
resurrect the Uganda’s crippled cotton 
industry.  That task has now largely 
been achieved.   
 
The existence of the UCDO involves a 
fiscal burden on the cotton industry 
that ultimately means lower prices for 
farmers.  We believe that the time is 
now appropriate to review the roles 
and responsibilities of the UCDO to 
ensure that they are appropriate and 
that the industry is getting best value 
for money. 
1. MoFPED and MAAIF commission a study an  request 
the co-operation of UCDO. 
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Fish 
 
Priority 
(refer to 
key) 
Topic Recommendation Purpose and justification Activities 
A Domestic and 
regional fish 
trade 
Research on trade 
flows, costs and 
margins should be 
conducted and the 
results disseminated 
to policy makers 
Domestic and regional trade in fresh 
and processed fish is almost certainly 
large and probably supports the 
livelihoods of many poor people.  
However little is known by policy 
makers on this trade, and policy 
designed to curb these activities are 
currently being made in a knowledge 
vacuum. 
1. The EC and DFID ensure that their current fisheries 
projects generate the required marketing information on 
domestic and regional fish trade. 
2. Information is disseminated to policy makers within the 
Department of Fisheries (or the Agency, when it is 
established) 
3. Donor support is given to the process of formulating a 
rational and pro-p or policy towards domestic and 
regional fish marketing.  
C Post-harvest 
rejection rates 
The possibility of 
introducing minimum 
standards for 
transport boats 
should be 
investigated to ensure 
that rejection rates 
are kept to a 
minimum 
The formal fish export industry pays 
considerably more for its fish than 
does either the domestic or regional 
market.  Any move towards increasing 
the proportion of the catch that can be 
exported therefore has the potential of 
generating greater incomes for 
fishermen. 
 
However, competition between the 
transport boat operators is low and 
consequently higher returns may not 
be passed proportionately on to 
fishermen.  Any moves towards 
improving standards of transport boats 
must therefore not impose financial 
barriers to entry to the business, 
thereby further reducing competition 
1. The Department of Fisheries (or the Agency) 
investigates the possibility of creating standards that 
will be cheap to implement and easy to enforce. 
 
B Post-harvest 
rejection rates 
Large European fish 
importers should be 
Purpose and justification as above 1. Department of Fisheries seeks assistance from fish 
exporters in contacting major fish importers. 
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approached to request 
contributions to a 
fund that would be 
used to teach 
fishermen, transport 
boat employees and 
landing site labourers 
good practice in 
storing and handling 
fish. 
2. Fund established to train fisheries industry personnel.
3. Training programme put out to tender 
 24
 
 
Maize 
 
Priority 
(refer to 
key) 
Topic Recommendation Purpose and justification Activities 
A Maize quality 
and contracts 
A national system of 
standardised grain 
quality and contract 
standards should be 
implemented 
Although not a major maize consumer 
itself, Uganda has the natural 
resources required to produce large 
quantities of high quality maize for 
trade within the region.  Unfortunately 
the current situation is typified by 
insufficient quantities of  poor quality 
maize that does not meet regional 
standards. 
 
Farmers and traders need incentives to 
produce better quality maize.  The 
introduction of national maize quality 
standards that reflect regional 
requirements will establish price 
premia for higher quality maize.  It 
will also help to establish Uganda as a 
credible regional maize producer and 
stimulate demand for the Ugandan 
crop.  Maize farmers therefore stand 
to gain considerably from national 
standards. 
 
Maize standards underpin warehouse 
receipt financing (which increases 
rural liquidity) and are a pre-requisite 
for a commodity exchange (which, in 
the case of maize trading, would 
decrease transaction costs).  
1. PMA gives support to the Uganda National Bureau of 
Standards and Uganda Grain Traders to draft a set of 
national maize standards that reflect regional trading 
norms 
2. PMA circulates draft standards within the grain industry 
for comment. 
3. UNBS gazettes agreed grain standards 
4. PMA raises awareness of the new standards and 
provides training to maize traders in grading. 
5. PMA organises maize industry meeting to decide 
whether the trade should be self-policing or needs 
external monitoring and verification. 
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Standardised grain contracts bring the 
same benefits. 
 
 Maize 
commodity 
exchange 
Recommendations  
for a commodity 
exchange recently 
made in the context 
of the Export 
Competitiveness 
Strategy should be 
acted upon and 
possibly expanded to 
include pulses and 
oilseeds 
Once national standards have been 
established, the development of 
Uganda’s fragmented regional maize 
rade would benefit substantially from 
the introduction of commodity 
exchange.  The effects would be to 
increase transparency (particularly in 
terms of quality and price discovery) 
and decrease transaction costs (in 
terms of finding trading partners a d 
negotiation). 
 
The benefits for farmers should be, 
greatly improved market information, 
and higher prices through greater 
demand for Ugandan maize and lower 
transaction costs. 
For an action plan, please refer to Mandl, P. and A. Mukhebi 
(2002) “Commodity Market Information and Risk 
Management:  The case for a commodity exchange and 
warehouse receipt system for Uganda” The European 
Commission:  Uganda Delegation.  
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Dairy Products 
 
Priority 
(refer to 
key) 
Topic Recommendation Purpose and justification Activities 
B Consumption The DDA, with 
assistance from 
donors that have 
traditionally 
supported the sector, 
should commission 
consumer market 
research. 
Growth in domestic consumption is 
the most likely way in which long 
term expansion of the dairy industry 
will occur.  However, dairy product 
promotion is not currently guided by a 
good understanding of consumers.  
Consumer market research would not 
only aid promotion but also help with 
product development. 
1. DDA seeks support from Assistance Francaise or GTZ 
to conduct CMR. 
2. Results used to guide DDA promotional campaigns. 
3. Results also made available to dairy processors to help 
in the development of their products. 
B Distribution The formal milk 
processing sector 
should explore 
further links with the 
informal wholesale 
and distribution 
sectors 
Dairy processors can produce high 
quality healthy milk but usually have 
to rely on cost inefficient means of 
distribution through general grocery 
retailers.  Linkages with the much 
more efficient informal sectors would 
help to reduce costs but would 
probably still not be competitive with 
purely informal sector milk.  
Promotion of healthy, high quality 
milk and improved distribution would 
therefore have to go hand in hand. 
 
In the long term, farmers would 
benefit from selling into a stable 
industry that can invest in improved 
marketing and infrastructure.  
1. Once the impact of the DDA’s regulation enforcement 
activities have become clear, DDA convenes a meeting 
between the dairy processors, relevant donors and 
representatives from the group of informal sector 
traders who have shown willingness to invest in milk 
storage and distribution facilities. 
2. DDA compiles the recommendations from the meeting 
and presents them to MoFPED with the intention of 
getting government backing. 
A Farmer 
associations 
The DDA should 
critically review its 
plans to create 
The DDA’s motivations for 
suggesting these associations seem to 
be a) to give farmers better incomes 
1. The DDA invites external scrutiny of its plans to 
establish vertically integrated farmer associations. 
2. Subject to the results of the review, the DDA supports 
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vertically integrated 
farmer controlled 
milk collection and 
distribution 
associations 
and b) to make the industry easier to 
regulate. 
 
Unfortunately, evidence from around 
Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that 
complicated operations such as the 
one proposed by the DDA are beyond 
farmers’ capacities to manage.  Such 
initiatives tend either to fail or be 
wrested from the control of farmers by 
the management. 
simple milk collection farmer associations in favourable 
areas of the country. 
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Cassava 
 
Priority 
(refer to 
key) 
Topic Recommendation Purpose and justification Activities 
C Agro-industry 
linkages 
Awareness of 
potential agro-
industrial uses of 
cassava should be 
raised, and linkages 
between cassava 
producers and 
potential industrial 
users should be 
encouraged. 
Several industrial cassava uses are 
currently being pilot-tested in West 
Africa.  Examples include its use as an 
animal feed ingredient, as a glue 
extender and as a raw material for 
starch production. 
 
Initiatives in Uganda have thus far 
been few and have had indifferent 
success.  However, there is some 
optimism that, as Uganda’s 
manufacturing industrial base 
expands, demand for domestically 
produced raw materials will grow. 
 
The potential effect on farmers is an 
increased demand for high yielding 
varieties of cassava. 
1. PMA gives support to NARO and/or MAAIF to 
demonstrate potential cassava uses to manufacturers in 
a series of practical displays held in appropriate parts of 
the country. 
2. If genuine interest is shown, PMA gives support to 
NARO and/or MAAIF to create linkages between 
producers and manufacturers.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The motivation for this study comes from the need to implement the Government’s Plan 
for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA).  As one of the strategies that has emerged from 
the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the PMA addresses the broad area of rural 
development by outlining government policy on all aspects of modernising the 
agricultural and agro-industrial sectors.  Progress has already been made in implementing 
some areas of the PMA but thus far, marketing and agro-processing have escaped 
concerted attention. 
 
With support from the World Bank, the PMA Secretariat and Sub-Committee on 
Agroprocessing and Marketing decided to commission a study on six strategic cash 
crops:  Coffee, cotton, fish, maize, cassava and dairy.  The overall objective was to 
recommend plans that the public and private sector could implement to overcome the 
major constraints affecting the marketing and transformation of these crops. 
 
NRI and IITA subsequently won the contract to conduct the study.  We started work on 
14 January 2002 and submitted the first draft report on 11 March.  Throughout our study, 
we were conscious of the PMA objective of improving rural producer incomes.  We 
therefore worked hard to develop implementation plans that would have the maximum 
effect on raising producer prices. 
 
A note on the meaning of transaction costs 
 
We feel that there may be some confusion over the meaning of “transaction costs”.  
According to neo-classical economics and more recently, new institutional economics, 
transaction costs relate to the non-price costs of making a commercial exchange.  They 
can be divided into ex-ante and ex-post costs: 
 
“ex-ante costs and ex-post costs. Ex ante costs involve the costs associated with 
gathering information about the good or service to be exchanged, and about the other 
party/parties to the contract.  They also include the costs of negotiation and of devis ng  
contract in such a way as to maximise the likelihood of the contracting partner meeting 
his/her obligations under the contract.  Ex-post costs are those associated, firstly, with 
monitoring the performance of the contract to ensure that the contracting partner is 
meeting his/her obligations and, secondly, with enforcing  contracts where the 
contracting partner fails to meet the obligations stipulated in the agreement.”  (Jonathan 
Kydd 1996 in a briefing document for DFID, Wye College UK).   
 
We believe that a more appropriate label for the costs referred to in the ToR would be 
“marketing and processing costs”.  In the traditional sense, agricultural marketing and 
processing refers to the activities involved in taking a product from the farm gate and 
delivering it in the form, at the time and to the place that the buyer requires. Such costs 
are therefore incurred through handling, transport, storage, processing, packaging, market 
fees, risk management, brokerage, export handling and others.   
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However, we do not wish to play down the importance that transaction costs (as defined 
above) have in constraining the development of the Ugandan agricultural sector.  We 
have therefore studied marketing and processing costs as well as transaction costs.
 
Overview of the TOR and the report structure 
 
The terms of reference for this assignment covered four basic tasks: 
 
1. Baseline assessment of marketing, processing and transaction costs for coffee, cotton, 
maize, cassava, dairy and fish. 
 
2. Tactics and strategies for improving efficiency 
 
3. Articulation and assessment of alternative business approaches to reducing marketing, 
processing and transaction costs. 
 
4. Recommended implementation plans and technical assistance 
 
In reporting our work, we have used the following scheme: Constraints and opportunities 
that apply to several if not all of the six commodities, are discussed in the next report 
section entitled “Cross-cutting issues”.  This is followed by six sections, one for each of 
the study commodities.  Each report section is designed so that it can be understood in 
isolation of other sections. 
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Section 1.  Cross-Cutting Issues 
 
1.1  Producer bargaining power and the need for grass-roots 
organisation 
 
The importance of farmer/fishermen organisation is emphasised throughout this report.  
In the context of marketing and processing, not only can organised producer groups gain 
better access to services such as finance and capacity building but they can also increase 
their bargaining power by bulking produce and concntrating on product quality.  For 
perishable products like dairy and fish, the ability to prolong shelf life can also confer a 
greater degree of market leverage for producer groups. 
 
Each commodity section of this report describes the specific circumstances under which 
producer organisations of different types can operate.  However, research conducted by 
NRI in the late nineties identified some general conditions for successful “farmer 
controlled enterprises” (FCEs) in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
 
Features of successful FCEs 
 
1) The range of agricultural activities undertaken 
· A close match between the activity and the group’s experience and financial 
capacity 
· Generally involved in relatively simple marketing, input supply and credit 
operations involving liaison with market intermediaries higher up the supply 
chain 
· Tend to begin with a single activity 
· more complex operations, for example involving the operation of jointly owned 
assets or processing often fail (with some significant exceptions in the case of 
women’s groups) 
· Tend to concentrate on relatively high value produce (e.g. seed maize, dried 
fruit, oil palm and cotton) rather than low value staples 
 
2) Internal features 
FCE structure 
· generally built upon pre-existing organisations, where members already share 
considerable trust and familiarity 
· tend to have a small membership, between ten and thirty members, of 
relatively homogeneous characteristics 
Member control and participation 
· a clear member-driven agenda, which tends to occur more in groups of small 
size 
· strong democratic processes 
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· written constitutions and rules, and record keeping, assist in clarifying roles 
and enhancing transparency 
Relationship to external agents 
· absence of political patronage 
· high degree of self-financing; successful cases were not associated with 
interest rate subsidies, but with viable business objectives that made subsidies 
unnecessary 
· external training inputs, particularly when aimed at integrating the group into 
the wider economy through the development of links with financial and market 
intermediaries 
 
(Taken from Coulter et al. 1999) 
 
Among its activities, the recently formed National Agricultural Advisory Service 
(NAADS) lists the following: 
 
· Developing farmer capacity to demand and manage advisory services 
· Developing farmers knowledge skills 
· Developing farmer institutions 
· Capacity enhancement of the private sector 
· Increasing farmer access to technologies 
· Developing information, communication and marketing systems for farmers 
 
NAADS clearly holds the development of farmer organisations and the provision of 
services to them as parts of its primary role.  The only recommendation we make in this 
regard is that NAADS should work closely with industry authorities, trade 
associations and farmers associations because of the specialist sector-specific 
knowledge that is required for assisting farmer organisations to become effective 
operators in different supply chains. 
 
1.2  Road infrastructure and transport 
 
Transport costs figure prominently amongst the marketing costs identified as part of this 
study.  Contributing factors include, difficult condition of feeder and access roads in 
particular during the rainy season, lack of motorised vehicles outside main urban centres, 
high average age of vehicles, and lack of Intermediate Means of Transportation (IMTs) at 
village level.   
 
Road network.  The development of the road network is a key priority of the Government 
of Uganda (PMA, 2000).  In particular, during the second half of the 1990s, major 
improvements of the national road network took place mainly under the Road Sector 
Development Programme (RSDP), which was formulated in agreement with the donor 
community (i.e. World Bank, DFID, DANIDA etc) as a ten-year programme starting in 
1996 with a projected expenditure of US$1.5 billion. (MWHC, July 2001). 
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Major institutional reforms were initiated including the creation of a Road Agency 
Formation Unit (RAFU) in 1998 as a performance orientated, semi-au onomous 
organisation expected to evolve into the Road Agency by 2003.  RAFU is currently in 
charge of most of the new road development projects and policy and management 
studies.  A road maintenance fund is being established mainly with revenues from fuel 
taxes. 
 
Following substantial improvements of the national road network, the emphasis is now 
shifting towards other priorities such as district, urban and community access roads, and 
improved vehicle operation.  There are plans to replace the original 10-year RSDP with a 
new US$2.5billion programme covering the years 2001/02 – 2011/12. Following 
decentralisation, the execution of works on the district and urban roads network is the 
responsibility of the respective Local Governments.  MWHC advises, guides and 
monitors the activities undertaken.  Other institutional changes include the privatisation 
of road maintenance and the decentralisation of the central mechanical workshops. 
 
In the context of agricultural marketing, construction and maintenance of community 
access roads remain a priority.  Issues to be considered include appropriate technical 
specifications (e.g. avoidance of excessive road width, or labour-intensive construction 
methods), and sustainable institutional settings in the light of decentralisation (e.g. 
community participation, adequate funding formulae). 
  
Motorised transport.   Lorries, trucks and pick-ups play an important role in long-distance 
marketing of agricultural produce in Uganda.  Goods vehicles represent 10% of the total 
vehicle fleet (around 123,000 in 1999, excluding motorcycles) of which more than half 
are light trucks (Benmaamar et al, 1999).    
 
Although the capital cost of lorries is highest, they also have the highest transport cost 
effectiveness (i.e. kg.km/$).  Both, capital cost and cost effectiveness are lower in the 
case of smaller modes of motorised transportation uch s pick-up trucks or mini-buses.  
Nevertheless, in terms of effectiveness the latter are still far ahead of any other means of 
rural transport, such as ox-carts or two-wheel tractors and trailers.   
 
Better operational efficiency of motorised vehicles rema ns a major challenge.  The 
average vehicle age is above 10 years in Uganda.  Most vehicle owners opt to import 
secondhand vehicles.  For example in 1999, only 10% of new registrations were new 
vehicles, half of which were imported by Government services (Benmaamar et al, 1999).  
High taxes (i.e. 21 – 31% import duty, and 17% VAT) and the lack of access to credit are 
reasons why vehicle operators opt for lower priced, used trucks.  However, this has 
implications on transport costs in that aged vehicles incur considerably higher 
maintenance costs.   
 
Fuel prices are higher in Uganda than in neighbouring countries such as Kenya and 
Tanzania.  Transportation costs from Mombassa and high fuel taxes contribute to this 
situation.  At the same time, it ought to be mentioned that fuel taxes are the main source 
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of revenue for the Road Agency Formation Unit, and hence road maintenance (also see 
above). 
 
Benmaamar et al (ibid) estimate that a 10% reduction of both, vehicle import duties (i.e. 
from 30% - 20%) and petrol taxes (from 40% - 30%) would lead to a 5% reduction of 
average vehicle operating costs.  This rather small cost reduction shows that duty and tax 
reductions alone are not the answer, and that more integrated approaches are required to 
lower transport costs. 
 
Lorries and trucks often have to drive empty to the more remote areas to collect 
agricultural produce.  This significantly increases the transport cost.  As a consequence, 
transport planning is required to improve the efficiency of vehicle operations.   For 
example, co-ordination between output marketing and farm input supply could be 
improved.   At the same time it needs to be recognised that in some predominantly 
agricultural areas the inbound cargo is always likely to be smaller than the outbound 
cargo.  In this context, some of the more remote areas of the country might benefit from 
the production of less bulky, higher value commodities.  Transport costs play a relatively 
less important role in determining the final sales prices of higher valued commodities 
(e.g. oilseeds as compared to cassava).  
 
Government run tractor schemes, have failed in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa 
including in Uganda (Ellis, 1997).  Amongst other things, this was due to lack of 
profitability of the operations, and management and maintenance problems.  Private 
ownership of two-axle and mono-axle tractors is encouraged in the context of 
modernising agriculture (PMA, 2000).  In particular, tractors will play an increasingly 
important role for producers cultivating on larger farms. 
 
Intermediate Means of Transportation (IMTs).  Transport costs between the farm and the 
point of sale tend to be high (e.g. Sh1,000 per bag of cassava or maize transported over 
five to ten kilometres by bike), in particular when compared with long-distance motorised 
transport. 
 
Head-loading of agriculture produce by women remains common in many Ugandan 
villages.  However, given the limited quantities, which can be transported, the speed 
involved and the maximum distances to be covered, head-loading is one of the most 
expensive means of transportation.  At the other end of the spectrum, motorised transport 
(e.g. trucks, tractor-trailers) is often not profitable in isolated villages.  As a consequence, 
it has been argued that Intermediate Means of Transportation (IMTs) have an important 
role to play in this context.  For example, Sieber (1997) argues that the shift from 
headload to donkey cart can reduce the transport costs by 60%, and the shift to an ox-cart 
by nearly 90%.  The PMA states that more prominence will be given to IMTs such as 
bicycles, donkeys, and ox-carts (PMA, 2000).  Table xx provides an overview of the 
performance and effectiveness of selected intermediate means of transportation, including 
small motorised vehicles, and their key characteristics.  
 
A research project entitled “Improved food crops marketing through appropriate transport 
for poor farmers in Uganda” is due to start with DFID funding in April 2002.  The 
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emphasis will be to analyse farmers’ transport needs and to pilot-test appropriate means 
of transportation.  In addition, an international workshop on animal draught power will 
take place in Jinja in May 2002.  
 
 
 
Table 1.2   Performance of Intermediate Means of Transportation  
 
Mode Max load  
(kg) 
Max speed 
(km) 
Max range 
(km) 
Topography 
Required 
Wheelbarrow 100 5 10 Flat narrow path 
Bicycle 75 20 20 Flat narrow path 
Bicycle and 
trailer 
200 10 –15 15 - 20 Flat wide track 
Bicycle and 
slider 
150 10 – 15 15 - 20 Flat wide track 
Pack animals 100 – 250 5 15 - 20 Hilly, narrow 
path 
Animal-drawn 
sledge 
200 – 400 5 10 Flat 
Animal drawn 
cart 
500 – 1500 5 15 - 20 Flat wide track 
Motorcycle 100 40 – 90 100 Motorable path 
Motorcycle and 
side-car 
250 – 500 30 – 60 60 Flat 
Motorcycle and 
trailer 
250 30 – 60 60 Flat 
Single-axle 
tractor and 
trailer 
1500 15 –20 40 Flat 
Asian utility 
vehicle 
1000 60 60 Motorable road / 
track 
Source: Riverson and Carapetis, 1991, quoted in Gebresenbet et al 1997. 
 
 
To sum up, the transport sector is one of the four priority sectors of the GoU, the others 
being health, education (Universal Primary Education), and agriculture, although the 
latter only gained in importance relatively recently under the PMA.  Nearly the entire 
donor community has provided substantial financial support to the road and transp rt 
sector over the last five years (an estimated USD0.5billion) mainly as part of the RSDP 
(Road Sector Development Programme).  Issues related to the sector are well understood 
by Government and donors, and the sector is likely to receive majorfunding in the future.  
Also, road and transport issues are included in sections of the PMA. 
  
Achievements in the road and transport sector so far, include: 
- Substantial improvement of the national road network (i.e. national as compared to 
feeder, and community access roads); 
- Improvements of the feeder road system in many parts of the country;
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- Institutional changes such as decentralisation of responsibilities from the Centre to 
District level, privatisation of road maintenance, and creation of a Road Agency
Formation Unit (RAFU); 
 
We recommend that future emphasis be placed on the following aspects: 
- Construction and maintenance of urban and community access roads; 
- Improved efficiency of vehicle operations (e.g. improved transport planning, 
better access to finance for vehicle owners, review of vehicle import taxation)  
- Consolidation of institutional changes, (e.g. Road Agency is due to be 
inaugurated in 2003; strengthening of road departments at district level); 
- Introduction of Intermediate Means of Transportation (IMTs) such as animal 
traction, and carts. 
 
1.3  Inland International freight 
 
Competition among freight and shipping companies has reduced the cost of moving 
commodities from Uganda to Mombasa by over 40% in the last five years.  Whereas 
there used to be just five shipping companies serving the whole of Uganda, there are now 
eighteen.  Today, coffee can be moved to Mombasa by truck or ferry/rail at US$75 per 
tonne, and a forty-foot container of cotton costs about US$2,000.  These rates, 
unimagined a few years ago, have arisen through private sector cost efficiencies and 
reductions in profits.   
 
In the international context, these rates should be compared to freight rates observed in 
other parts of Africa.  For example, in early 2002 the cost of shipping maize by lorry 
from Lusaka to Johannesburg is of the order of US$80 per tonne (pers. comm.: G 
Onumah).  However, the distance between Lusaka and Johannesburg (i.e. approx. 1600 
kms) is larger than the distance between Kampala and Mombasa (i.e. approx. 1100 kms). 
 
Even though freight rates have come down in Uganda, they are still large relative to 
current commodity prices.  For instance, FOT/FOR2 Kampala Screen 153 robusta coffee 
prices were being quoted during our assignment at between US$380 to 390/tonne.  As 
noted above, the cost of freight to Mombasa is about US$75/tonne, so by the time the 
coffee reached Mombasa, freight accounted for over 16% of the commodity value.  Put in 
terms of what farmers were receiving, US$75 represented approximately 35% of the 
farmgate parchment-equivalent price.  This comparison is highly relevant:  High levels of 
competition and efficiency in the coffee supply chain mean that increased FOT/FOR 
Kampala prices feed through to proportionately higher farmgate prices.  In other words,
lower freight prices mean higher farm incomes.  The situation in the cotton sub-sector is 
the same. 
 
The haulage business now claims that the cost of road transport to the coast is as low as it 
can possibly go.  Whether this is true or not, the mos  significant constraints to further 
                                         
2 FOT means Free on Truck, FOR means Free on Rail. 
3 Screen 15, which refers to coffee bean size, makes up the majority of Uganda’s coffee exports. 
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reductions in inland freight rates come from inefficiencies in rail transport, both in 
Uganda and Kenya.  In particular, inefficient railway management is reflected in the very 
long turnaround times both in Kampala and Mombasa.  This has three major cost 
implications.  Firstly, it represents a poor use of railway assets, which remain financially 
unproductive for long periods of time.  Secondly, shipping companies charge demurrage 
on their containers that are stuck in railway sidings.  Thirdly, delays in unloading increase 
commodity finance costs.  
 
The privatisation of Ugandan Railways is well underway.  A new private sector 
concession holder has yet to be identified but the process should be complete by the end 
of 2003.  Although current assets will remain in public ownership, railway operations 
will come entirely under private sector management.  The planners behind the 
privatisation process believe that private sector involvement will increase both 
management efficien y and rates of investment.  Despite this, the impact on freight 
movements to Mombasa will be limited unless similar efficiencies are made in Kenya.  In 
1999, when the original consultant’s report on rail privatisation was delivered, a 
suggestion was made that Ugandan, Kenyan and Tanzanian railways should be privatised 
under one company.  Although we recognise the political difficulties involved in such an 
initiative, we recommend that the Government of Uganda gives serious 
consideration to raising the issue of regional railway privatisation at an appropriate 
inter-governmental forum.  Uganda’s commodity producers stand to gain much 
from more efficient regional railways.  
 
1.4  Finance for agricultural trade and agribusiness 
 
The high cost of borrowing and unavailability of long term finance are perennial 
complaints among Ugandan businessmen.  In our view, both problems reflect a 
conservative attitude that prevails within Ugandan banking. 
 
In recent times nominal shilling interest rates have been as much as 24% (May 2001, 
Bank of Uganda Figures).  Even locally available dollar loans can cost as much as 17% in 
over LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate).  Although Uganda is seen as a risky 
lending environment, these interest rates can hardly be justified alone by the incidence of 
loan default and non-performance.  Indeed, an industry insider suggested to us that rates 
of 5 to 6% over LIBOR would be more appropriate for dollar transactions.  A more likely 
explanation is the banking sector’s lack of sophistication, which leads to unnecessarily 
high transaction costs.   
 
The problem of formal loan accessibility is worse in rural areas, where lending risks and 
loan transaction costs are generally higher.  From our field experience, we believe that 
liquidity in Uganda commodity trade where large overseas buyers are involved is not a 
serious constraint, at least not within downstream parts of the supply chains.  Pre-finan e 
is generally found either from within the trade or from international sources.  Of the 
commodities that we studied, these conditions apply principally to coffee, cotton and fish.  
In the cases of coffee and cotton, current low world prices further reduce the problem. 
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Nevertheless, warehouse receipt financing (whereby money is leant against inventory
held in warehouses that are overseen by independent collateral managers) may have a 
role to play in other storable commodities (principally grains) and may also assist local 
coffee traders who do not have access to international finance.  These issues are 
discussed further in the appropriate commodity sections. 
 
1.5  Market information 
 
Since September 1999, the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture’s Foodnet 
project has operated the national market information service (MIS).  The MIS gathers 
prices of 32 agricultural commodities from 16 districts on a weekly basis and collects 
prices and traded volumes for 28 commodities, from three major wholesale markets in 
Kampala, on a daily basis.  The MIS also collects information on weather conditions and 
forecasts, road conditions, import and export activities and regional and international 
markets for products produced in Uganda.   
 
The market information is disseminated to clients across the country on a weekly 15-
minute broadcast via 12 radio stations.  These broadcasts cover virtually the entire nation.  
The market information is also made available to clients by e-mail, fax, t lephone, the 
FOODNET website, newspapers, regular aid project reports and during regular meetings.  
Apart from individual farmers and traders, clients include Government Ministries, FEWS, 
major trading companies, local government, NGOs, farmers’ associations and other 
organisations in the agricultural sector. 
  
To accommodate the revolution in ITCs, the Ugandan MIS has developed  sophisticated 
internet site, which is updated with market information on a daily basis.  The full price 
database can be accessed on line and the website has recently been modified, such that it is 
now possible to query  “Kampala’s Prices Today ” for Kampala district.  This design is 
also fully compatible with the MTN’s new SMS server and once tests have been 
completed, commodity information from Kampala’s markets will be available via mobile 
phones.   
 
Despite the success of the national macro-based service, it is fully recognised that those in 
most need of market information are the millions of small-scale farmers, processors and 
traders who represent the overwhelming majority of participants in the Ugandan 
agricultural sector.  Any organisation wishing to provide an appropriate dose of timely and 
accurate information, designed to strengthen the bargaining position of the small-actors in 
the Ugandan agricultural sector is faced with difficulties.  The major problems are that:- 
 
· there are 33 languages spoken in Uganda  
· the level of literacy is just slightly above 50% and 
· the understanding of how markets operate is lower than may be expected. 
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In addition, different groups of market actors need different types of information 
depending on the crops they grow, their location and the degree at which they co-operate 
with each other.  During the past 2 years, the FOODNET project has also come to realise 
that farmers need more than just price information; they also need to know about quality, 
trade opportunities, why markets fluctuate, and how best they can use market information.  
Because of these problems, IITA-FOODNET has designed and implemented a new model 
for providing market information to Uganda’s many scattered small-scale far ers.   IITA-
FOODNET has established three such “micro-MIS” pilot projects to test the new model. 
The service is decentralised and includes the participation of farmers, traders, processors 
and retailers as well as local government structures, farmers’ unions and NGOs working in 
the target areas. 
 
The micro MIS provides localised information and utilises the information and analytical 
skills available at the macro MIS level.  Information is collected from within the pilot sites 
from the markets in the major towns and agri-business development centres, regional 
networks and NGOs, local and national newspapers and the macro MIS. 
 
In this model, data and market information is collected at least twice a week. Data is 
disseminated in the form of frequent radio broadcasts on FM radio stations, using the local 
language, and in local newspapers and word of mouth. The first site is situated in Eastern 
Uganda and covers the districts of Bugiri, Iganga, Mbale, Jinja, Kamuli, Tororo, Busia and 
Pallisa.  In the second pilot site in Lira district, northern Uganda, many farmers have 
formed themselves into groups but lack the experience to collectively market their 
products. For this reason, the project includes provision for training farmers in these skills. 
  
In the third pilot site, the micro MIS provides trade facilitation in the form of assistance to 
organised farmers and traders linking them with larger traders and new, larger markets.  
The project will concentrate on developing markets for beans and maize in this area. 
  
The success of these projects is being assessed in 2002, with the assistance of CTA, FAO 
and the Natural Resources Institute. 
1.6  Electricity supplies 
 
In the context of our work on agricultural processing and marketing, the constraints 
associated with electricity supplies apply chiefly to processors and cold chain operators.  
Analyses of the various power consuming businesses included in this study revealed 
electricity costs accounted for 10 to 18% of total non-raw material operating costs.  
However, issues related electricity supplies are not just restricted to cost.  Availability 
and reliability are perhaps more important factors. 
 
Taking the issue of reliability first, intermittent power supplies to factories that process 
highly perishable products such as fish and milk necessitate i vestmen  in back-up 
generators.  Although justified by the risk of losing a large amount of working capital 
(tied up in stock), the costs of owning and running a generator are considerable.  For 
instance, for a small rural based milk cooling centre thatw  encountered during our 
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fieldwork, the capital and operating costs associated with its generator are 10% of total 
non-raw material costs. 
 
Electricity availability is not a problem for existing processors but does, rather obviously, 
constrain the development of new productive enterprises in areas where electricity is not 
currently available.  However, for the purpose of rural industrialisation, the issue of 
electrification must be considered alongside investment in other infrastructure, especially 
roads.  Without affordable access to raw materials and markets, no amount of 
electrification will promote new rural based processing industries. 
 
The three problems of cost, availability and reliability have their roots in the history of 
power generation and distribution within Uganda. 
 
“The Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) was established in 1948 as a quasi independent 
vertically integrated monopoly, to generate, transmit, distribute and supply electricity 
within Uganda and other countries in the region.  UEB has long suffered from poor 
financial performance and operating efficiency, low productivity, inadequate funds for 
required investments, low tariffs, poor collection, and high losses.  As a result, UEB is in 
a weak position and, by normal standards, close to insolv ncy” (World Bank 2001) 
 
In March 2001, the Government divided the UEB into three independent companies to 
control electricity generation, transmission and distribution separately.  This move, 
together with substantial investments in extra power generating capacity, is anticipated to 
remove many of the previously encountered inefficiencies. 
 
Rural electrification is receiving particular attention through the World Bank funded 
“Energy for Rural Transformation Project”, which will support private sector investment 
in rural power generation and distribution. 
 
In view of these developments, we do not see any need to recommend any further actions 
relating to electricity supplies. 
 
1.7  Contract enforcement 
 
All commercial transactions involve contracts, whether writt n or verbal, formal or 
informal.  When the terms of a contract are performed over a period of time or over a 
physical distance, institutions that enforce contracts help to reassure the contracting 
parties that the other side of the bargain will be kept.  Where contract enforcement breaks 
down, the risks of doing business severely restrict the number of people willing to make 
anything more than the simplest of spot transactions (where exchange occurs 
instantaneously and in person).  In line with higher risk, transaction costs associated with 
monitoring and enforcing contract performance increase dramatically. 
 
In the past, when business contracts in Uganda have been broken, recourse to the 
commercial courts has involved very long delays, the possibility of corruption, and a very 
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uncertain outcome even when cases are open and shut.  Through its Medium Term 
Competitiveness Strategy, the Government of Uganda is currently taking steps to 
improve commercial contract law and the associated judicial procedures.  If successfully 
implemented in an agricultural context, it will help to: 
· Reduce transaction costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts.  
· Reduce risks associated with contractual transactions for all participants in 
agricultural supply chains 
· Increase the volume of transactions made in rural and urban locations, leading to 
greater income earning opportunities for poor rural producers and informal sector 
traders 
· Permit innovative types of transaction.  Improved contract enforcement will allow 
transactions to be dislocated both in terms of place (for instance, contracting parties 
doing business over the phone) and time (for instance, forward contracts).  The latter 
helps to bring stability and predictability to market prices 
· Increase planning horizons for poor rural producers and informal sector traders  
· Increase poor rural producers’ access to markets for credit, physical inputs and 
agricultural services 
· Expand opportunities for contract farming schemes 
· Underpin the enforcement of emerging commodity standar s 
· Pave the way for effective commodity exchanges, and warehouse receipt financing. 
 
Nevertheless there are some doubts over whether these benefits will spread deeply into 
rural areas, where commercial law is hard to enforce because of poor awareness and 
communications.  We therefore recommend that the Government investigates 
institutional arrangements designed to ensure that the commercial benefits 
envisaged under the Medium Term Competitiveness Strategy reach rural levels.
 
1.8  Local taxation 
 
“… rural families encounter an institutional context that is basically inimical to the 
expansion of monetary opportunities in rural areas.  This is manifested especially by the 
system of rural taxation that has emerged with fiscal decentralisation to local 
governments.  A fundamental contradiction between the goals of PEAP/PMA and 
decentralised rural taxation is revealed” (Ellis and Bahiigwa 2001) 
 
So found a recent academic paper on rural livelihoods in Uganda.  The “system of rural 
taxation” referred to is the series transaction levies and business licences that local 
authorities apply to raise tax revenue.  These, the authors claim, are market distorting and 
act as disincentives to business activity.
 
The authors of the paper take further exception to the system f tax coll ction, which is 
delegated to private businesses who win the right to raise revenue through successfully 
bidding to the local authority, promising to raise a stated amount of tax revenue.  The 
opportunities for corruption in this system are rif, according to the paper. 
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The experience we gained through our fieldwork suggests that Ellis and Bahiigwa have 
identified a genuine problem, although may be overstating its severity.  In the case of 
informal milk trading, transaction levies amount to between 1 and 6% of total costs, 
depending on where the milk is collected.  For a trader taking fresh fish to Kigali, 
Ugandan taxes amount to less than 1% of total costs.  A typical coffee mill pays 1.5% of 
its costs in local taxes, although a total of a further 4% goes to the Ugandan Revenue 
Authority and the Uganda Coffee Development Authority.  With perhaps the exception of 
milk trading, local taxation does not seem to be particularly burdensome to the businesses 
studied during this assignment.  However, the burden may be significantly greater for 
pettier types of trade, where costs and revenues are much lower.  Such businesses and 
transactions are generally the preserve of the poorest members of society. 
 
Ellis and Bahiigwa suggest property based taxes as fairer way of raising local authority 
revenue.  The principal behind such taxes is that wealthier individuals – those who own 
more property – should shoulder a greater tax burden.  Although we concur with this 
more equitable taxation system we nevertheless point out that raising revenues in this 
way requires a substantial initial investment in identifying and valuing individuals’ 
property.  In practice such a system may be unworkable in many parts of rural Uganda. 
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Section 2.  Coffee 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Overview 
 
Coffee, after petroleum, is the largest valued commodity in international trade.  The 
annual value of export revenues exceeds $10 billion while annual retail sales of coffee are 
estimated at approximately $50 billion. It is a highly labour intensive industry employing 
an estimated 100 million people in over 60 developing countries. It is often a vital ource 
export revenues and income to producers, many of whom are smallholders. It is 
particularly important to African economies and rural livelihoods, where there are some 
25 coffee exporting countries. 
 
Two major types of coffee enter world trade, arabica and robusta. Arabica is mainly 
grown at high altitudes in Latin America and northeastern Africa, and is differentiated 
from robusta by having more aroma, a less bitter taste, and less caffeine. It is primarily 
used in roasted and ground blends, and forms the bulk of the small, but developing 
premium specialty market. Robusta is primarily grown in Asia and SSA, at low altitudes 
and in humid conditions. It is used as a “filler” in roasted and ground blends, and in 
instant coffee. Robusta have traditionally been discounted against arabica, and, since the 
1970’s robusta prices have averaged 15% less than those of arabica. Uganda has 
traditionally been a robusta exporting coffee country; however, arabica production is on 
the increase and currently accounts for around 15% of production. 
 
Latin American and Caribbean countries account for around 57% of world exports, 
mainly arabica, and African countries for about 14%, mainly robusta, with Uganda’s 
share being around 3%. Three countries dominate global production; Brazil, Colombia 
and Vietnam, with over 50% of total output. 
 
Global coffee prices are determined by levels on the two major coffee futures and options 
markets, New York, for arabica, and London, for robusta. The coffee trade buys and sells, 
mainly at price differentials to futures levels, ie, at premiums and discounts for various 
origins and qualities. The nature of the trade necessitates sophisticated price risk 
management techniques, such as hedging on the New York and London futures and 
options markets. This aspect of the trade makes price discovery and price transparency 
difficult to ascertain for small producers and traders in countries such as Uganda.
 
Currently coffee is in a position of oversupply and prices are forecast to continue at low 
levels for the foreseeable future. Global production was around 112 million bags in 
2000/2001, with consumption at about 102 million.  
 
 45
Finally, a feature of the coffee trade is price volatility due to the size of the markets, the 
huge daily traded volumes of coffee futures and options, and the involvement of 
speculators such as computer generated funds. 
 
Background to Uganda Production and Marketing 
 
Following Uganda independence an Act of Parliament (The Coffee Act, 1962) gave the 
parastatal Coffee Marketing Board (CMB) monopolistic access to the procurement of all 
the country’s dry-processed robusta, about 85% /90% of total production. Some private 
exporters operated pulperies and exported washed robusta, and, the Bugisu Cooperative 
Union processed and exported washed arabica. However, in 1969 a new Coffee Act was 
passed giving the CMB a total monopoly of coffee processing, quality control, export 
marketing, and promotion. Apart from some hulling activity and internal trading, the 
private sector's activities were extremely limited. 
 
The pre liberalization system was based on fixed producer prices and processing margins 
with smallholders delivering coffee to primary cooperatives or private traders. The coffee 
was then transported to either cooperative unions or private traders for hulling. The 
hulled coffee was then sold to the CMB, who sold to exporters overseas. 
   
In the years preceding Uganda liberalisation of the sector coffee provided over 90% of 
the country’s foreign exchange and in some years, up to 50% of government revenue. 
The pre liberalization coffee system was characterized by delayed payments from the 
CMB to cooperative unions and private traders, and little consideration for world market 
prices. The difference between the export price and the producer price was an important 
source of revenue for the government. Producer prices were kept deliberately low in 
order to minimize crop-financing requirements and reduce the budget deficit and 
inflation. A major deficiency of the system was that it imposed a heavy tax burden on 
growers and did not reward them according to the quality of coffee produced. 
 
The inefficiencies and inequities inherent in the monopolistic, state-c ntrolled system 
were compounded by the abolition of the ICA’s quota system in 1989, which resulted in a 
collapse of coffee prices. The potential impact of historically low and declining world 
prices on real producer prices rendered Uganda’s marketing system unsustainable. 
Therefore, plans to liberalize the market, with the support of the W ld Bank, were 
initiated in 1990. 
 
The main effects of liberalization were the abolition of the CMB’s monopoly, a more 
equitable producer price through an increased percentage of world prices, and growing 
private sector involvement. The regulation and monitoring of the coffee industry were 
invested in the Uganda Coffee Development Authority, set up by an Act of Parliament in 
1991. At the same time the Bank of Uganda was divested of its responsibility for crop 
and trade financing, which functions were assumed by the commercial banking sector. 
 
Following liberalization, the involvement of the private sector in the industry increased 
dramatically, with around 50 exporters by 1998, many being joint ventures with foreign 
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companies. The early euphoria has waned and currently there are around ten significant 
exporters, with a trade volume of in excess of 100,000 bags p.a. 
 
Current Contribution to the Economy 
 
Coffee has traditionally been a major contributor to the economy through the provision of 
rural and urban employment, and its position as the country’s leading foreign exchange 
earner ( apparently, its position as the country’s leading export is now challenged by the 
fish sector). In 2000, coffee exports totaled 150,000 mt (2.5 million bags of 60 kg) 
representing US$125.316 million in foreign exchange earnings. The importance of coffee 
to the economy is illustrated by the fact that its foreign exchange earnings in 2000 were 
over three times that of the second largest agricultural export, tea, which contributed US$
37.048 million. However, it is, perhaps significant, that coffee export volumes and 
earnings are on a declining trend, whereas tea has shown significant volume and, in most 
years earnings, increases since the early 1990’s. 
(Source: UBS- key Statistical Indicators, Jan 2001) 
 
Poverty Eradication 
 
Coffee is Uganda’s most important agricultural cash crop and export with an estimated 
around one-eighth of the population of 20 million earning all, or most, of its income from 
coffee activities. There are an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 small coffee farms with an 
average size of less than one hectare. Coffee’s traditional role as a major rural employer 
gives it a pivotal role in many areas of the country, in poverty alleviation and sustainable 
livelihoods. Therefore, the sectors long term sustainability, given declining producer 
prices consequent to low world prices, is a major issue for the sector. 
 
It should be noted that the World Bank has established that coffee growing areas have a 
low incidence of relative poverty and are less prone to famine. Therefore the UCDA are 
promoting coffee growing through the provision of high quality and early maturing 
materials to rural households. The mid north, Eastern and Southwestern regions have 
been specifically targeted in this context. These activities have also been supplemented 
by the Coffee Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF), undertaken by the GOU. 
(Source: UCDA Annual Report, 1999/2000)  
 
Supporting institutional framework 
 
The pivotal institution supporting the coffee sector is the UCDA, created following 
liberalization in 1991 with a statutory mandate to promote, improve and monitor the 
coffee industry. Its main functions are to license processors and exporters, control 
quality; monitor prices, support research and development and promote Ugandan coffee 
on both the local and international market. Its activities performed by four departments, 
viz: 
(i) Administration and Finance.  
(ii) Monitoring and Statistics.  
(iii) Regulatory (licensing) and Quality Control.  
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(iv) Research and Development 
  
Initially Government representatives dominated the UCDA’s Board however, in 1994, by 
amendments the Act, the board’s structure was changed to include a majority of industry 
representatives, two from each of the Uganda Coffee Trade Federation (representing 
exporters), the Uganda National Coffee Association (representing the processors), and the 
Coffee Growers’ Association.  
 
The UCDA is funded from a 1% cess which is levied on the value of all coffee exports, 
with 40% of the cess is allocated towars research and development. 
 
The CMB’s role has been considerably reduced and is now virtually defunct, and on offer 
for privatisation. 
  
Primary cooperatives and cooperative unions played an important role in the production 
and processing of coffee prior to liberalisation their importance has drastically declined. 
 
The following Industry Associations have been established to represent the interest of 
private sector traders, processors and farmers operating in the coffee sector. 
 
· The Uganda Coffee Trade Feration (UCTF) was established in 1996 and 
superseded the Coffee Exporters’ Association. It members include exporters, hullers, 
bankers, insurers and transporters and it aims to provide a common forum for sharing 
ideas, views and experiences and to lobby G vernment on areas of concern to the 
coffee industry.  
 
· The Uganda National Coffee Association (UNCA) was established in the 1970s to 
promote the interests of the private sector processors. The Association acted as an 
important coffee industry pressure group prior to liberalisation but its influence has 
since waned. 
 
· A number of growers’ associations are being developed three of potential significance 
being: 
 
(1) Uganda Commercial Farmers’ Association (UCFA) 
(2) Uganda National Farmers’ Association (UNFA) 
(3) Uganda Coffee Farmers’ Association (UCFA)  
 
None of the above organisations have great influence in the sector, but they need to be 
encouraged. For example, The UCFA, primarily with funding from the UCDA cess, is 
encouraging farmers to organise and focus on micro finance as a means to access inputs 
and improve quality. 
 
The newly formed Government National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) have 
initiated capacity building programmes among farmer groups, particularly with regard to 
marketing. 
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Sectoral Issues 
 
Given the free market in coffee following the liberalisation of the sector, and the pivotal 
and essential role of the UCDA, the main issues do not concern policy, institutional and 
regulatory matters. 
 
The following major issues were identified during the study: 
 
· The need to ensure sustainability and development through improved yields, disease 
(coffee wilt) resistant varieties, producer net prices and consequent profitability to 
farmers. 
· The expansion of the high elevation area under arabica and the development of 
arabica varieties suitable to lower elevation, humid traditionally robusta regions.  
· The need to attract investment, both domestic and foreign, to the sector, in order to 
promote large scale commercial farming sector, alongside smallholder growers. 
· The need to address Uganda’s competitive position on the world market due to its 
status as a land locked country and consequent high transportation costs from 
Kampala to Mombasa, for onward shipments to world markets. 
· The perceived need for a domestic price determination point through the institution of 
a coffee auction in Kampala. 
· Exploitation and promotion of Ugandan coffee in the “gourmet,” specialty and 
washed robusta markets. 
· The need to develop value addition in the sector. 
 
2.2  Supply 
 
Uganda’s robusta coffee production is concentrated in a broad belt around the shore of 
Lake Victoria, hardly a surprise given that robusta has its indigenous origins in these 
areas.   Districts with the highest output are Masaka, Mpigi, and Mukono.  Luwero, 
Rakai, Jinja and Iganga also produce large quantities, and production spreads as far as 
Masindi in the north and Rukungiri in the west.   
 
In 2000/2001 season, Uganda produced 3.3 million bags4 of robusta coffee, an increase of 
0.8 million bags over 1999/2000, despite a continued decline in export prices.  Climatic 
factors probably account for the majority of the increase.  
 
                                         
4 One bag contains 60kg of coffee. 
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Figure 6.1 gives annual robusta production over the last six seasons. Whilst  world prices 
have been on a downward trend since 1989 , theappearance of Vietnam as a major 
robusta supplier in the mid 1990’s has exacerbated the  oversupply situation and no doubt 
contributed to dramatic price declines Although we can not be sure about direct 
causation, there is a likelihood that Ugandan supplies of robusta have consequently 
reduced. Furthermore, at least one of the causes of lower production is likely to be higher 
post harvest losses. Given the lower returns, farmers have reportedly been putting less 
effort into drying their red cherry.    
 
Arabica production is concentrated in highland areas to the east, in Mbale and 
Kapchorwa, to the north-west, in Nebbi, and to the south-wes  in Bundibuyo, Kasese and 
Kabale.  Production in 2000/2001 was just under 400,000 bags, compared with 500,000 
bags in 1999/2000 
 
Figure 6.1.  Annual production of robusta 
coffee in 60kg bags
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Figure 2.2  Annual production of arabica 
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Figure 2.2  indicates that, despite decreasing arabica prices over the period, Ugandan 
production has risen.  This may well be the result of the success that the Uganda Coffee 
Development Authority has had in pursuing its policy of promoting arabica production, 
and the realization of the premiums that good quality arabica can achieve over robusta.   
2.3  Demand 
 
Around 85% of Uganda coffee production is robusta, which is used mainly in instant 
coffee production and as a “filler” in roast and ground blends. Ugandan robusta has 
traditionally commanded a premium over the London futures market, the price 
determinant point for robusta coffee, in view of its superior quality relative to other 
African and Asian origins. In recent years the world market for robusta has become 
dominated by Vietnam, which currently produces over 13 million bags of average quality 
robusta. 
There is undoubtedly a premium to be obtained for washed robusta, but the size of the 
potential market and the value to buyers relative to implem nting washing facilities was 
not available to us at the time of the study. 
Uganda’s main market is Europe, and in 1999/2000 over 94% of Uganda’s exports were 
absorbed by the EU with Spain (11.9%) and Germany (5.4%), and Belgium (5.4%) being 
the largest buyers. 
2.4  The Coffee Marketing Chain 
 
Robusta 
 
After harvest, farmers usually sun-dry the red cherry on the farm.  In very few instances 
they may be able to sell red cherry for wet processing into washed robusta.  However, the 
vast majority of coffee that comes off farms is kiboko (dry cherry).  This is usually sold 
in small quantities to kiboko traders who bulk the dry cherry and transport it coffee mills 
for hulling.  At this point in the past, coffee mill owners bought the kiboko, dehulled it 
and sold the rough hulled green bean (referred to as “FAQ” or fair average quality).  This 
practice has now ceased in most instances because mill owners generally do not wish to 
take the price risk involved in trading on low margins (the result of low world prices) and 
high price volatility.  Instead, most mills provide dehulling services to kiboko traders at a 
fixed fee.  After milling, the kiboko traders occasionally sell directly to exporters but 
more often they sell at the mill to  “FAQ” traders, who then sell t  t  exporters’ district 
depots or to the exporters’ yards in Kampala.   
 
Given that the distance between mills and the exporter depots is often not far, it may 
seem curious why these extra intermediaries are required.  Our fieldwork suggested two 
reasons.  Firstly, the buying process at the exporter depot takes some time to complete.  
Consignments have to be tested for moisture content, defective beans and extraneous 
matter.  Once any deductions have been made from the standard price, payments are 
often made through bank transfers.  Apart from not having bank accounts in the majority 
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of cases, kiboko traders currently operate on small profit margins (refer to section 2.6 for 
evidence of this) and consequently wish to turn over their working capital as quickly as 
possible in order to maximise their season’s profits.  Delays in payment at the exporter 
depot would decrease the rate of turnover.  Secondly, and perhaps more tellingly, in order 
to reduce their transaction costs, most exporters have a minimum buying quantity, which 
is usually 300 to 500kg of rough-hulled coffee.  Most kiboko traders are very unlikely to 
be able to collect this minimum quantity.  “FAQ” traders are able both to assemble 
sufficient quantities to sell to exporters, and to wait for payment. 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Robusta coffee supply chain 
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 Once a sufficient quantity of green bean has been bought at the depot, the export 
company dispatches a truck to take it to Kampala.  The rough-hulled coffee then 
undergoes export processing which involves cleaning, sorting, grading, and drying.  In 
the majority of cases, where exporters do not have their own export transport, freight 
companies are contracted to send the export green bean by truck or ferry/rail to M mbasa 
and thence by sea to export destinations.  
 
Most coffee is exported in 60kg bags, which are stuffed into 20 ft or occasionally 40 ft 
containers.  Some exporters have bulk handling facilities, which they use to blow coffee 
into lined containers.  The cost advantages of exporting coffee in this way are significant 
because of the greater quantity of coffee that can be stuffed into a container and the 
reduced expenditure on packaging material.
 
Competition at all levels of the supply chain is intense.  We could see no instances of 
where supply chain participants were not playing a crucial and economic  role in at least 
one of the following essential activities; bulking, transporting, product transformation, 
financing and risk taking. 
 
Arabica 
 
Whilst the arabica coffee marketing chain is generally similar to the robusta wet 
processing procedure, the different market orientation for arabica gives it special features. 
For example, in the case of specialty and fair trade arabica coffees the chain tends to be 
shorter, with more direct overseas marketing links than that for robusta. The chain is 
illustrated in Figure 2.4 and is based on that in the major arabica growing districts of 
Kapchorwa and Mbale.  
 
The various stages shown in diagrammatic representation of the marketing chain may be 
defined as follows: 
 
Producer: The farmer who produces and sells ripe cherry and/or parchment. Parchment is 
often produced at farm level in small-scale pulperies, where the cherry is washed, the 
pulp removed, and the resulting parchment sun dried. 
 
Pulperies: These are larger scale pulperies, located in rural areas, often operated by 
traders or groups of traders. They sell parchment usually direct to “dry” millers, but 
sometimes to other traders. 
 
Traders: Parchment traders, selling to dry millers. 
 
Millers (dry): Located in urban centres, such as Mbale and Kapchorwa, millers, further 
dry the parchment, remove the “silverskin”, clean, sort and grade the coffee into 
exportable quality green beans.
 
Kampala Traders: Kamp la based traders, often international trading company’s Ugandan 
representatives. 
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Overseas Importers: Roasters and grinders located in overseas countries with direct 
relationships with Ugandan millers. 
 
Merchants: Overseas located traders with direct contact with Ugandan millers. 
 
 
Figure 2.4  The Arabica Marketing Chain 
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2.5  Transactions   
 
Transactions are appear free from any obvious signs of cheating which would  indicate 
that competition is comparatively healthy at all levels of the supply chain.  Coffee 
production, marketing and transformation are well established and understood by all 
participants in the chain.  Likewise, quality standards are widely known and are rarely the 
subject of argument, although there is plenty of scope for improving quality at farm level.  
The only main area of contention is price, especially in current times of very low market 
price quotations.  Being in the unfortunate position of knowing least, farmers often 
suspect that they are being cheated by traders who they accuse of adding little real value 
to the product.  The analysis in section 2.6 reveals that this is not the case in the coffee 
industry but nevertheless transactions are often fraught with frustrations for farmers.   
 
As one would expect from a marketing system that collects small quantities of 
occasionally indifferent quality product from many scattered locations, the upstream 
transaction costs per unit of product are high.  Distances traveled to assemble sufficient 
quantities of coffee are often large and each small amount of coffee offered for sale needs 
to be inspected for quality.  
 
2.6  Marketing chain players’ costs and margins  
 
Robusta supply chain 
 
 
Table 2.1  Evolution of prices and costs in the robusta supply chain 
 
 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/2001 
 USh/kg 
Farmer price (rough hulled equivalent) 1200 1111 743 491 
Kiboko collection costs (rough hulled equivalent) 110 87 68 67 
Factory hulling costs 224 182 138 142 
Rough hulled price 1450 1400 950 640 
Export processing and marketing costs 210 241 286 263 
Export price (parchment) 1700 1870 1286 945 
 
Source:  UCDA annual reports 
 
 
Table 2.1 gives the evolution of prices and costs over the last four coffee seasons.  
Although we have a few queries over the way in which UCDA has calculated some of the 
costs5, we nevertheless believe that the figures give a reasonably accurate picture of how 
costs and prices have changed. 
 
                                         
5 There seems to be confusion over fixed and working capital costs and how to treat them in the 
calculations. 
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Perhaps the most striking feature of table 2.1 is the way prices collapsed over the period6 
(with a slight anomaly in the 98/99 period when the USh exchange rate weakened enough 
to compensate for lower dollar prices).  As one would expect, the margins between prices 
in the chain also decreased and in response, the kiboko traders and hulling factory owners 
have obviously worked hard to reduce costs.  From the information in the table, the 
exporters appear to have performed less well in making cost efficiencies.  We do not have 
a complete explanation for this but it is clear that the UCDA has changed the way it 
calculates its figures over the period.  The increase in costs may therefore be misleading.  
 
Kiboko trader 
 
 
Table 2.2  Kiboko trader costs and margins 
 
 USh per kg of green 
bean 
US$/kg of green 
bean 
%  of costs 
Cost of sales    
  Raw material                        364                       0.21 85% 
  Consumables                             6                       0.00 1% 
Total cost of sales                        369                       0.21 87% 
Trading costs    
  Local taxes                           -                           - 0% 
  Processing fee                        25                       0.01 6% 
  Transport                          32                       0.02 8% 
Total trading costs                          57                       0.03 13% 
Cost of working capital                         0.1                     0.00 0% 
    
Total costs                        427                       0.25 100% 
    
Revenue                        450                       0.26  
    
Profit (loss)                          23                       0.01  
Source:  Authors’ fieldwork 
 
Table 2.2 gives our estimated costs and margins for a typical Kiboko trader.  All 
assumptions and workings appear in appendix A1 but the important assumptions are that 
the trader buys kiboko from farmers at USh364/kg (rough hulled eqivalent price) and 
sells his rough hulled green bean for USh450/kg after having paid for milling.  Clearly 
this trader is not making a lot of money, especially when one considers the low volumes 
in which such traders deal (typically two to four 70kg bags of kiboko). 
 
Coffee hulling factory 
 
Table 2.3 gives our estimated costs and margins for a typical robusta coffee hulling 
factory.  All assumptions and workings are in appendix A1.  Most importantly, the 
                                         
6 Prices for rough hulled coffee during our fieldwork in February 2002 were USh450 to 460/kg. 
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factory is assumed not to trade coffee: It merely mills d y cherry for a service charge.  
The figures are worked on the assumption that the factory processes 5,000kg of green 
bean per day and operates for five months of the year.
 
Given that virtually all costs are fixed, throughput is a major determinant of profitability. 
At a daily throughput of 2,500kg, the factory would make a loss but at 10,000kg, the 
factory would be making a healthy profit.  However, the average daily throughput is 
likely to be much less than 10 tonnes due to strong competition between factories.   In the 
2000/2001 season, the UCDA registered 223 coffee mills.  Total output amounted to 3.3 
million bags, and so, assuming a five month operating period per year, the average daily 
throughput for a factory would have been 4.9 tonnes per day. 
 
 
Table 2.3  Coffee hulling factory costs and margins 
 
 USh per year USh per kg 
of green 
bean 
US$ per 
year 
US$ per kg 
of green 
bean 
%  of costs 
Operating costs:      
  Management and labour              3,000,000                 4           1,734          0.002 30% 
  Electricity              1,400,000            1.87              809          0.001 14% 
  Repairs and maintenance              1,300,000            1.73              751          0.001 13% 
  UCDA levy                 150,00            0.20                87          0.000 1% 
  Council tax                 150,000            0.20                87          0.000 1% 
  Revenue authority                 300,000            0.40              173          0.000 3% 
Sub-total operating costs              6,300,000            8.40           3,642          0.005 62% 
Miscellaneous                  315,000            0.42              182          0.000 3% 
      
Total operating costs              6,615,000            8.82           3,824          0.005 66% 
Capital costs              3,465,429            4.62           2,003          0.003 34% 
Total costs            10,080,429          13.44           5,827          0.008 100% 
      
Revenue           16,875,000          22.50           9,754          0.013  
      
Profit (loss)              6,794,571            9.06           3,927          0.005  
 
“FAQ” traders 
 
These individuals generally buy rough-hulled green bean from kiboko traders at th  mill, 
and assemble sufficient quantities for sale to exporters.  If they deliver to an exporter’s 
district depot in the same town as the mill, their margin (the difference between buying 
and selling price) is usually about USh10/kg.  If they deliver over longer distances, the 
margin will allow for transport costs. 
 
Arabica 
 
Farmers usually de-pulp their ripe cherry at farm level using hand operated pulping 
machines costing around Ush 300,000 each. We have recommended in this report that the 
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costs and benefits of the reintroduction of centralised pulperies should be studied to 
analyse whether they would have a positive effect on improving parchment quality and 
reducing  transaction costs through economies of scale.  
 
As an example of costs we have used fig r  obtained during a visit to Mbale and the 
surrounding area including meetings with Bugisi Cooperative Union (BSU) senior 
management. BSU claim to export over 30% of all Uganda’s arabica production and have 
direct links with importers in Europe and th Fair Trade movement. 
 
Prices & costs: 
 
Farm Gate Price of Parchment – Ush 915 /1000 per kg, depending on quality 
Transport to dry mill - Ush 35 per kg 
Trader Margin – Ush 50 / 100 per kg 
Delivered mill price – Ush 1050 / 1100 per kg depending on quality. 
 
Dry milling and marketing costs were unavailable at the time of the visit but, UCDA has 
estimated these to be (Source UCDA Annual Report – 1999/2000) around Ush 407.00 per 
kg. 
 
2.7  Constraints and opportunities 
 
Uganda’s robusta coffee supply chain is highly competitive and relatively efficient.  On 
top of the general constraints that affect all agricultural export supply chains (roads, 
international freight, power, finance etc.), there are no specific major issues of marketing 
and processing inefficiencies that specifically affect robusta coffee marketing. However, 
the improvement of quality at farm level, particularly through easier and cheaper access 
to inputs was mentioned by several stakeholders as an area that requires encouragement.  
In particular, the UCDA is doing a good job of regulating the industry, reporting on it and 
providing market information. However, we believe that there is scope for improving the 
flow of  market information and price indications to farm gate level, and in this context, 
as an aid to transparency, we have recommended that consideration be given to 
introducing  a voluntary indicative price formula covering costs from cif to farm gate. 
 
The major constraint suffered by the industry is historically low prices, which have 
squeezed trader margins to an average of less than 1% of revenue, and grower price 
levels to close, or less than the cost of production. Additionally, Uganda suffers from 
being a land locked country, with the consequent high transportation costs involved in 
exporting its coffee to world markets, and this issue is examined below, and in the section 
covering cross cutting issues. 
 
So if there is only limited scope for cost reduction, are there any gains to be made on the 
revenue side?  The UCDA and the COMPETE project have recently been promoting the 
idea of exporting washed robusta.  They claim that premiums are as much as 
US$1000/tonne over the London futures prices.  The information that we have obtained 
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from the international trade suggests that premiums would be much lower at perhaps $50 
to $200 / tonne over screen 187 prices.  UCDA and COMPETE optimism is, apparently, 
partly based on just one shipment of washed robusta (which, rumour has it, remains in a 
Hamburg warehouse waiting for a buyer).  Further optimism is ga ned from the plans of 
one of the world’s largest coffee traders, Neumans, to establish a coffee plantation 
specifically for the production of washed robusta.  However,it would appear that 
Neumans’ plans should be viewed as part of a global stratey to exp nd its international 
portfolio of coffees in order that that it may provide its clients with a fuller range. As 
Neuman is is one of the top coffee traders in the world their prognosis regarding the 
future demand and premium levels needs to be ascertained. 
 
Another feature of the washed robusta market is its current small size.  Whether a 
substantial expansion of supplies through a major Ugandan initiative could c ause effect 
premiums Should be investigated in an international market study, which we have 
recommended. 
 
Although premiums for washed robusta clearly do exist, the costs of producing washed 
robusta are substantially greater than those for ordinary robusta.  While we are aware that 
Ugandan plans for producing washed robusta are well advanced, we nevertheless 
recommend that the UCDA conducts a careful review of world markets for washed 
robusta and feed the information into rigorous and objective cost- enefit analysis of 
washed robusta production.  
 
Linked to the plans to develop washed robusta p d ction is the opportunity presented by 
the expanding premium specialty market. This market, which is particularly vibrant in 
North America, covers organic, shade (including bird friendly) and fair trade coffees, for 
which, market research proves that healthy premiums exist. Linked to the specialty 
market is the market for gourmet coffee which has been in existence particularly in the 
USA for some years, and relies on identified coffee origins, regions and sub regions, and 
are characterized by unique marks, eg, Guatemalan Blue Volcano, Costa Rica San 
Antonio, Guatemalan Genuine Antigua, Hawaiian Kona, and, the world famous Jamaican 
Blue Mountain, probably the most expensive coffee in the world This market is almost 
exclusively an arabica market, as robusta, in view of its main usage in instant coffee and 
as a filler in roast and ground blends, do not lend themselves to differentiation, other than 
in origin terms. Connected with the development of the specialty coffee market is the 
current concept of  “appellations” which seeks to emulate the success of certain wine 
producers, eg in Australia, Chile and South Africa. Whilst we would support attempts to 
differentiate Ugandan coffee on the world market and gain access to the premiums that 
are available, thefollowing important points should be borne in mind: 
 
· Uganda is still primarily a robusta coffee producing country (> 85% of production) 
and already has a reputation for producing good quality which attracts premiums 
over other origins such as Vietnam. Opportunities exist in expanding washed robusta 
production, but the limitations of the market should be fully understood before 
embarking on extensive investment programmes in washing facilities. 
                                         
7 The largest and most valuable robusta coffee grade. 
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· The specialty coffee market is overwhelming an arabica market in the roast and 
ground sector, and whilst it is a significant and expanding, it is still a relatively small 
in volume terms. 
· Virtually every coffee producing country in the world has plans to shift market focus 
from that of being a bulk commodity producer to that of a producer of premium 
specialty coffees. Therefore, the competition in this sector is fierce. 
 
Notwithstanding the above cautionary remarks, we believe that Ugandan arabica, with 
the right marketing skills could achieve success in this sector. Good quality coffee is only 
a part of the formula for success, name recognition in this context is equally important. 
For example, Uganda has a number of evocative place names, which could be exploited, 
eg, Source of the Nile, Mountains of the Moon, Lake Victoria etc. 
 
The establishment of a Uganda coffee auction as a medium for the sale of arabica and 
washed robusta has been mooted by the GOU and supported by recent consultancy 
studies. The success of the Nairobi Auction in attracting premium prices for its coffees 
has been cited as an example to follow. However, it should be noted that Kenyan coffee 
producers are currently compelled to sell all coffee through the auction system, whereas 
the Ugandan proposal envisages a voluntary system, which is essential in a fr e, 
liberalized market. The key function of an auction is price discovery, and it is perhaps 
significant that apart from Nairobi, the only other sizeable coffee auction in the world is 
Bangalore, India. Since Indian liberalization, when producers were no longer compelled 
to sell their coffee in the auction, its importance and volumes have diminished. The 
auction system is still the main price discovery point for the tea trade, however, 
significantly, there are no future markets for tea. In the case of coff e, the New York and 
London coffee futures markets will remain the primary price discovery points for the 
forseeable future.  
 
Whilst a strategy for promoting and marketing quality arabica, and, possibly washed 
robusta, is essential, we would recommend caution before embarking on what could 
become an expensive “white elephant” The following key questions need to be 
addressed: 
· An auction would offer mainly, arabica. The volume and number of Ugandan 
producers of arabica is small, and they seem to have market ccess to the 
international trade already, and some have already made limited inroads into the 
gourmet, organic and fair trade markets. Therefore who would use the auction? 
Furthermore, around 60% of Ugandan coffee exports is controlled by about seven 
exporter, mostly internationally linked companies, with the facility of hedging on 
the New York and London futures markets. Would they patronize a Ugandan 
auction, when they have the option of buying direct from arabica millers, which is a 
more efficient marketing method for traders? 
· An auction involves additionally transaction costs and lengthens the marketing chain. 
A network of brokers and authorised warehouses will be involved. Cataloguing and 
sampling of lots for sale takes time, and results in delayed receipt of proceeds by 
sellers. Therefore, does cost / benefit analysis justify setting up a coffee auction? 
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· Are there may be more efficient methods of promoting Ugandan arabica and washed 
robusta, for example the idea of establishing overseas promotion offices, eg in the 
EU, have been mooted? Furthermore, if Kenyan regulations do not forbid the sale of 
outside origins, would it be worthwile, as a trial, offering Ugandan arabica and 
washed robusta in the Nairobi Coffee  Auction, which is denominated in in US 
dollars and attracts bids from quality buyers worldwide? In this context it should be 
noted that Uganda currently sells the majority of its tea production throught the 
Mombasa Tea Auction. 
· Those coffee producing countries that have achieved some success in promoting their 
quality coffee to the specialty market have not found it necessary to introduce 
auctions at origin, eg Costa Rica, Guatemala, PNG, Ethiopia. Their marketing 
strategies should be studied and lessons learned. 
 
We appreciate that the future of the Ugandan coffee sector is a sensitive issue and the 
above comments are not intended to pour “cold water” on current initiatives which we 
understand to be well advanced. We trust that our remarks will be read in the spirit 
intended,which is to draw attention to questions that need to be answered before 
substantiasl investments are made. We concur with the reasoning that new initiatives 
must be mooted in order to increase the competitiveness of Ugandan coffee in world 
markets, improve net prices, particularly to farmers. Such results should  also have a 
positive impact on reducing transaction costs. 
 
A constraint to transaction cost efficiency is the availability of adequate finance, 
particularly at small-scale farmer and trader level. The international trading houses 
normally have sufficient funds to finance their activities, through their overseas 
connections. An opportunity exists to examine whether warehouse receipt financing 
could increase liquidity in the coffee marketing chain. This issue is being nvestigated in 
the context of other Ugandan commodities, such as grain and beans, and we support these 
initiatives. 
 
A major constraint to transaction cost efficiency results from Uganda’s location as a land 
locked country. The transport costs between Kampala and Mombasa are a burden on the 
industry and reduce net prices to producers, as Uganda must remain competitive on world 
markets in relation to other origins which do not have to bear such high internal costs. 
Freight costs from Kampala to Mombasa, currently around US $75/tonn, have come 
down from about US $ 120/tonne five years ago. However this figure still represents a 
high percentage of the current value of Ugandan coffee. We would suggest that smaller 
exporters consider combining their volumes for off r to freight companies with a view to 
obtaining discounts in return for making larger volumes available. 
 
Low producer prices and how to protect farmers from the vagaries of the World market 
are a particular concern currently of donor organisations. The World Bank and CFC have 
recently funded studies on price risk management and how tools such as futures and 
options can be utilised to protect farmer’s incomes from adverse price movements. We 
have seen recent studies relative to Tanzania and the UCDA should endeavour to obtain 
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access to current knowledge and plans in this regard to assess their relevance to Uganda 
coffee.  
 
2.8  Raising farmer incomes 
 
Post harvest handling and farmer associations 
 
Farmers are not currently maximizing their coffee revenues because their post harvest 
drying is not as careful as they could be.  The suggestion is that simple and inexpensive 
drying techniques would improve quality, increase saleable volumes and therefore raise 
farm revenues.  We believe that the problems with this argument are twofold.  Firstly, 
smallholder coffee farmers grow more than just coffee.  They are currently paying less 
attention to coffee because they are putting more effort into other, more lucrative 
activities.  Widespread improvements in post harvest handling are therefore unlikely to 
occur until coffee prices recover.  The second factor acting against improvements in on-
farm post harvest quality is the small quantities of coffee that each farmer produces.  If a 
farmer takes unilateral action to improve quality, it is highly unlikely that he will receive 
quality premiums.  His small quantities of coffee will be bought by a trader who, in 
assembling tradable quantities, mixes the good quality kiboko with indifferent quality 
kiboko bought from other farmers.   Any advantage of high quality is therefore lost both 
to the trader and the farmer. 
 
This suggests that farmers could benefit from grouping together in order to sell tradable 
quantities of higher quality kiboko and receive higher prices.  One of th  most famous 
examples of such an organisation is the Kyibinge Coffee Farmers’ Association, which 
has become a “must see” stop-off on the coffee consultant’s itinerary.  Without doubt, the 
Association has enjoyed considerable success in marketing its coffee.  As a result of 
careful post harvest quality practices, the high proportion of screen 18 beans that its 
kiboko yields and its ability to assemble kiboko in tradable quantities, the Association has 
been consistently able to negotiate premiums of 20 to 25% over the market price.  
However, critics characterize the Association as an outgrower scheme that is based 
around one particularly large coffee farm.  Most members, we were told, are passive 
participants who merely supply small amounts of coffee.  While our first hand 
impressions of the Association suggest that its operations are more democratic than this, 
we nevertheless believe that its success largely rests on the strength that the key large 
farmer lends to the organisation.  Replicating its success n most other places, where large 
farms don’t exist, may therefore be difficult.   
 
The history of farmer organisation in the coffee industry is not auspicious.  The collapse 
of the government imposed co-operative system has left coffee smallholders with a bitter 
attitude towards organised groups.  Despite this, farmer associations are apparently 
beginning to emerge.  But to avoid mistakes of the past, we believe that the best form of 
government support will involve promoting the possibilities and benefits of organisation 
and then building the capacity of those groups who volunteer for assistance.  Clearly, the 
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UCDA, the Uganda Coffee Farmers’ Association and NAADS would have crucial roles 
to play in creating this nurturing type of support.  
 
2.9  Summary of findings 
 
· Uganda’s coffee supply chains is competitive and efficient.  There is little that can be 
done specifically within the supply chain to reduce marketing and processing costs in 
any major and significant way.  
 
· The best opportunities for cost reductions come from general improvements in roads 
and from efficiency improvements in railways. 
 
· There are no particular major  policy, regulatory and institutional constraints to 
transactions within the marketing chain and the UCDA is playing a valuable role in 
monitoring, regulating and promoting the industry. 
 
· Low producer prices near or below cost of production threaten the long-term
sustainability of the sector. 
 
· Prices and price formation at the farmer level of the supply chain are not currently 
transparent.  
 
· Freight rates from Kampala to Mombasa, although having reduced in recent years, 
represent a heavy burden on the industry and reduce prices to farmers. 
 
· Processing and marketing washed robusta may have some net benefit but may not be 
as large as commonly predicted. 
 
· Market focus should include exploiting the growing specialty (organic, shade/bird 
friendly, fair trade and gourmet) coffee markets and maximizing arabica production. 
 
· The creation of coffee farmer associations is hampered by the unfortunate history of 
farmer co- peratives in the sub-sector.  Nurturing new associations will require a 
careful approach of awareness raising and capacity building. 
 
2.10  Recommended Implementation Plan 
 
(1) Nurturing and building the capacity of farmers groups:  We recommend the 
encouragement of farmers groups as the key to improving coffee quality, profitability 
and marketing efficiency. We commend the initiatives that are currently being 
undertaken by the UCDA and Uganda Coffee Farmers’ Association (UCFA) and 
recommend that assistance is sought from appropriate donors such as the World Bank 
and the EC.  Support to farmers’ groups should be guided by the general conditions 
for succesful Farmer Controlled Enterprises outlined in section 1.5 of this report.  
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(2) The development of rural finance through warehouse receipt financing:  We 
recommend that developments in warehouse receipt financing being proposed under 
the Government’s Export Competitiveness Strategy should be extended to include 
coffee.   
 
(3) Re-assessment of the case for centralised pulperies:  We recommend that the 
centralised pulpery system at village and urban levels, widely used during the coffee 
co-operative period, should be re-assessed for arabica wet milling.  The 
reintroduction of such a system should improve parchment quality but its financial 
cost:benefit ratio should be carefully analysed. The UCDA, the Uganda Coffee 
Farmers’ Association and private sector participants (perhaps through the Uganda 
Coffee Trade Federation) are the most appropriate bodies to support the necessary 
feasibility study. 
 
(4) The promotion of improved marketing information at rural level:  C rent initiatives 
such as UCDA’s marketing information service, through its daily coffee price and 
market analysis report, are disseminating coffee prices (world levels for robusta and 
arabica, and local prices for FAQ, Kiboko and Parchment) to exporters. We suggest 
that this service be made more widely available at farm level through current 
initiatives such as FOODNET’s micro-MIS (described in section 1.7) and MTN’s 
new price information service. To promote transparency in rural locations, we also 
recommend that the UCDA and the industry use published formulae for the 
calculation of indicative prices at farm gate and delivered mill levels. Exaples of 
how such a system could work are given under the cotton section of this report. 
 
(5) Joint Exporters Freight Agreement:  We recommend that exporters combine their 
coffee volumes and negotiate a joint exporters’ freight agreement with shippers for 
the transport of coffee from FOT mill/Kampala basis to overseas markets. We suggest 
that this task be coordinated by the Uganda Coffee Trade Federation.  We recognise 
that this initiative may not be appropriate for large foreign owned exporting 
companies, who already benefit from concessionary rates with shipping companies. 
 
(6) Use of Export Credit Guarantee Funds:  The Joint Exporters’ Freight Agreement 
would require exporters to change from selling FOT/FOR Kampala to either FOB 
Mombasa or C&F destination port.  This will require increased access to financing.  
We believe that currrently available Export Credit Guarantee Funds should be used in 
this context.   
 
(7) The promotion f the specialty arabica and washed robusta premium markets: We
recommend that plans to introduce a Ugandan Coffee Auction and widespread 
washed robusta wet processing facilities should be the subject of further studies on: 
 
· The costs and benefits of a voluntary Ugandan coffee auction for arabica and 
washed robusta.  The study should make a realistic ssessment of potential 
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transaction volumes, and estimate the additional transaction costs that the auction 
would create.  
· Alternative strategies for promoting Ugandan coffee abroad, including trial 
placements on the Nairobi Coffee Auction 
· The international market for washed robusta 
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Section 3.  Cotton 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This section addresses the specific issues relative to the transaction costs of Cotton 
marketing. 
 
On the advice of sector stakeholders, the following cotton producing districts (cotton 
ginneries visited shown in brackets), exhibiting representative, yet contrasting, features of 
the country’s cotton trade, were visited: 
 
Pallisa / Mbale (Iki-Iki Ginnery, Pallisa, and Bugema Ginnery, Bunghoko, Mbale - 
North Bukadi Cotton Company) 
 
Iganga – (Busembatia Ginnery, Bugweri, Iganga – Pramukh Agro Industries) 
 
Kasese – (Kasese Ginnery, Kasese town -Nyakatonzi Growers Co Op) 
 
Additionally, cottonseed crushing facilities in Jinja (Nile Agro Industries Ltd) were 
visited. 
 
Consultations were held with the CDO, DAO’s / DCO’s, cotton farmers, cotton farmer’s 
groups, agents, cotton collection centres, cotton ginners, cooperatives, and cottonseed 
milling companies. 
 
During the course of the study the following recent reports and papers were consulted for 
reference purposes: 
· Compete Project, Cotton Sector Position Paper – April 2001 (USAID) 
· Compete Project, The Path Forward for Uganda’s Cotton & Textile Sector – January 
2002 (USAID) 
· PMA – Brief on the Cotton & Textile Industry in Uganda (undated) 
 
Background to Production and Marketing 
 
Cotton was introduced into Uganda in 1903 as both a cash and poverty alleviation crop 
and the roles remain the same after almost 100 years. It is almost exclusively an export 
oriented crop with no value added, apart from some cottoneed crushing into oil and cake 
and a small textile sector. It is also an annual crop which distinguishes it from Uganda’s 
other important agricultural export crop, coffee. 
 
Prior to the 1970’s Uganda ranked third among African cotton producing countries, after, 
Egypt and the Sudan. Production peaked in 1970 with a record output of 87,000 mt 
output from 900,000 hectares. Most cotton related activities were controlled by 
monopolistic public sector enterprises. The Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for 
research and seed multiplication, the Lint Marketing Board was responsible for supplying 
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seed material to farmers for planting, oil milling, lint marketing, both export and 
domestic, and generally regulated all aspects of the sector. Cooperative unions, ach with 
its own network of producers and ginning operations, were responsible for primary 
marketing and processing. 
 
From the 1970’s onwards, political instability and inappropriate macroeconomic policies 
devastated the Ugandan economy. Inefficient ginning and marketing activities, the 
inability of cooperative unions to pay cash to farmers for their cotton and a lack of 
research and development, extension services and seed multiplication activities 
engendered the collapse of the cotton sector. By 1987 cotton production had declined to 
an all time low of 2000 mt. 
 
In 1992,with the assistance of the World Bank, Uganda embarked on a major reform 
programme designed to resuscitate the cotton sector by reducing and redefining the 
GOU’s role, encouraging private sector participation and investment, and liberalizing 
ginning and marketing. Following a transitional period, the sector has gradually 
recovered to its current level of production of over 20,000 mt p.a. 
 
Today, GOU participation in the sector takes place largely through the Cotton 
Development Organisation (see comments below). 
 
Contribution to the Economy 
 
Cotton lint is currently Uganda’s fourth largest agricultural foreign exchange earner, 
behind coffee, tea, and tobacco, with 21,130 mt, valued at US dollars 21.94 million 
exported in 2000, about 5.5 % of the total export value. (Source: UBS Key Economic 
Indicators, January 2001). The sector has the potential to increase, dramatically, its 
contribution to the economy through greater foreign exchange earnings, value addition 
and rural and urban employment creation. The potential scale of the sector is illustrated 
by the fact that in the 1960’s, cotton contributed some 40% of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings.  
   
Poverty Eradication 
 
Cotton is an important cash and poverty alleviation crop in many districts of Uganda, 
providing rural employment, particularly in remote areas, at both the farm and ginnery 
level. The sector is currently estimated to contribute to the employment of about 10% of 
the population in the East, North and West of the country, numbering around 2.5 million 
people. It has been forecast that the continued revival of the sector could have a positive 
impact on around 15% of the rural population, and contribute significantly to the 
alleviation of poverty. Furthermore, the development of domestic value addition activities 
such as textiles, oilseed crushing, soap and cooking oil manufacture, and compound 
feedstuff formulation, would enhance urban employment opportunities. Industries serving 
the sector, such as transport, packaging and financial services would also benefit. 
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Supporting Institutional Framework 
 
Since the reforms of 1992/93, the cotton sector has operated through an institutional 
framework almost entirely controlled by th  Cotton Development Organisation (CDO). 
The CDO was initiated by statute and has a mandate to represent the cotton industry as a 
whole, including the textile and cottonseed sectors. It monitors the production and 
marketing of cotton, including the registration of new entrants, and can charge for its 
services, borrow, manage property and levy cess. Whilst the CDO is the key sector 
institution, it collaborates with other public sector bodies such as the MAAIF, MFPED 
and the PMA Secretariat. The GOU’s policy for the cotton industry is embedded in its 
overall broader policy for the agricultural and industrial sectors.  
 
Most cotton related activities are now controlled by the private sector, which is 
represented by the Uganda Cotton Exporters Association (UGCEA). The cooperative 
union movement, which played a major role in the sector prior to liberalisation, is now 
largely defunct, with only seven unions identified amongst the 34 ginneries registered by 
the CDO in the current season. 
 
Sectoral Issues 
 
The major issues identified during the study are: 
· The need to ensure sustainability and development through improved yields, net farm 
gate prices, and consequent profitability to farmers
· The need to attract investment, both domestic and foreign, to the sector, in order to 
promote large scale commercial farming and the rehabilitation of old and outdated 
technology in the ginnery operation. 
· Inadequate market information at farmer and ginnery level and the need to develop 
price risk management techniques. 
· The need to develop value addition in the sector. 
· The need to review GOU support for the sector and the ongoing role of the CDO. 
 
3.2  Cotton Supply 
 
Cotton is an annual crop and world production varies between around 16 and 20 million 
p.a. The largest producers are China, USA, India, Pakistan and Uzbekistan. The largest 
exporters are the USA (27%), Uzbekistan (17.63%), and Australia (9.65%). Other 
important exporters are Syria, Greece, Argentina and Mali. Much of the world’s cotton is 
grown on large commercial farms, and yields are considerably higher than those achieved 
in Uganda. The world’s average yield is estimated at 592 kgs per hectare, which is 
equivalent to 1460 kgs per acre, whereas the highest yield quoted during the study was 
1000 kg per acre, with national aver ges around 350/450 per acre. The above statistics 
relate to the 1997/98 season, and it is assumed that the overall global cotton situation has 
not changed radically since then. 
(Source: ICAC Cotton Review – August 1998)  
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Cotton is grown in Uganda by small-scale farmers, on average holdings of one acre, in 31 
of Uganda’s 45 administrative district. The dominant production areas are the Eastern, 
Northern, West Nile, and South Western regions. 
 
The main cotton seasons in the dominant production areas are as follows: 
 
(1) Eastern Districts – plantings in June/July and harvesting /ginning from 
December/April. 
(2) South Western Districts – plantings in August/September and harvesting / ginning 
from January/April. 
 
The season’s production is estimated at around 120,000 bales (of 185 kg) or about 22,200 
mt, which is a considerable recovery from the low production point reached in 1993/94 
(the season following the reform of the sector) of 27,000 bales, or 5000 mt.     (Source: 
ICAC). However, the sector has far to travel to reach the production levels achieved in 
the 1960’s, which were around 450,000 bales p.a, or about 84,000 mt 
 
3.3 Cotton Demand 
 
Uganda has a very suitable soil and climatic conditions for cotton cultivation and has 
good quality seed producing qualitycotton with a low level of trash (<0.02)), which has 
traditionally commanded a premium on world markets. 
 
Uganda’s cotton sector is overwhelmingly export oriented, with less than 10% being 
absorbed by domestic value addition enterprises, primarily the textile industry. In 
addition to the demand from the domestic textile industry, cottonseed is crushed into 
cottonseed oil, which is used for the production of cooking oils and soap, and cottonseed 
cake, which is used in the compound animal feedstuff industry. 
  
Price Discovery: The CDO advise indicative farm gate prices, per kg of seed cotton 
around at the beginning of the season, during 15th November/31st December. The prices 
remain in effect for a season and the current season’s indicative price is Ushs 255 er Kg.
Prices are worked back from CIF main European port (EMP), Europe being a major 
market for Ugandan cotton. Details of how the CDO calculate the indicative price to 
farmers were not made available. Fierce competition between middlemen (traders), and 
agents representing ginneries is considred a feature of the market, although during the 
two month elapsed time taken for the study, farm gate prices do not appear to have 
moved from the Ush 255/260 per kg level. 
 
The key price reference point for the Ugandan cotton sector is the Liverpool index, which 
according to information published in “the Public Ledger”, a UK daily commodity 
journal, is a composite of cif main European prices, in US cents per lb., for the following 
cotton origins: 
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USA / Australia / African French franc zone (Nb: now the Euro?) / Uzbekistan / Syria / 
Greece 
 
Traditionally, Uganda has enjoyed a premium against this index, for example in 1999, 
when the index was at US Cents 44 per lb. (cif EMP basis) traders were bidding US 
Cents 42 per lb. (FOT ginnery) for Ugandan cotton. Currently, with the index standing at 
US Cents 42 per lb, we were informed that traders are bidding only around US Cents 33 
per lb. These levels are based on FOT Kasese ginnery. If the figures advised to us are 
correct, there has been a decline in the Ugandan premium, of around US Cents 7 per lb., 
over the last three years. Some stakeholders attributed this decline to: 
 
- Declining quality. 
- Incorrect grade classification. 
- Contract default. 
- Non payment of ginnery pre finance. 
 
Therefore, it is essential that good business practice and ethical standards be maintained 
and followed by all exporters to regain Uganda’s reputation as a premium quality and 
reliable cotton shipper.  
 
Uganda is a small producer in global terms, with its current output of around 18,500 mt 
representing only about 0.1% world production of around 20 million mt, and about 0.3% 
of world exports, of 6 million mt. Therefore, Uganda’s production and export levels do 
not affect, significantly, the global supply and demand equation, and hence world price 
levels. 
 
World cotton prices are volatile and, for example, in 2001 New York futures (NYCE – 
2nd position)) levels ranged from highs of around US Cents 60 per lb. to lows of around 
US Cents 30 per lb. Whilst it is appreciated that farmers need stable prices throughout the 
season and, should not be subjected to daily changing levels, a more direct and 
transparent link to the world market should be considered. 
 
Farmers prices, as a percentage of world prices have ranged, between the 1994/95 and 
1999/00 season, from a high of 60% in 1997/98 to a low of 42% in 1994/95 (Source: 
CDO). The maximization of farmer’s incomes as a percentage of world prices, and price 
transparency, should be a major objective of the sect r, and our proposals in this regard 
are contained in the “Recommended Implementation Plan” section of the report, below.
 
3.4  The Cotton Marketing Chain 
 
The marketing chain for cotton is illustrated below. Regional differences in the marketing 
chain are minimal. 
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Figure 3.1  Cotton marketing flow diagram 
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Transactions 
 
The Transactions involved in the marketing of cotton are relative simply, and the various 
stages in the supply / value chain are shown in the diagram above. 
 
3.5  Marketing Cost Analysis 
 
Seed Cotton Cost of Production 
 
Although outside the strict TOR of the study we consider that the farmer’s cost of 
production is a key element in analysing transaction costs within the sector, and has 
important implications for the future of Uganda cotton. The CDO stressed that production 
costs have great bearing on rural incomes, particularly as farmers do not retain their seed 
for planting. The farmer sells his seed cotton with lint to a ginnery, that retains and owns 
the seed.  
 
The current and future profitability of the cotton production enterprise to the small scale 
farmer will determine whether the cotton sector continues to recover to levels last sen in
the 1960’s, when it contributed around 40% of Uganda’s foreign exchange earnings.  
Therefore, the following cotton costs of production, based on smallholdings in the 
Western Region (Kasese) have been ascertained. 
 
Assumption: 
· Average yield: 800/1000 kgs per acres (Kasese) / 350/450per acre (national average) 
 
(Nb: the Pallisa district only achieves around 175 / 225kgs per acre due, mainly, to poor 
soils) 
 
Table 3.1  Costs of Production:  Seed Cotton per Kg
Unit cost 
Ush / kg 
    Cost item 
 
Cost 
Yield: 
900 
kg/acre 
Yield: 
450 
kg/acre 
Comments 
Bush clearing 10,000 / acre 11.10 22.20 Slashing/burning/tree uprooting 
Farm rent 15,000 / p.a / 
acre 
16.65 33.30 If , hired, and not owned 
Ploughing 35,000 / acre 38.85 77.70  
2nd Ploughing 25,000 / acre 27.75 55.50 On virgin land only 
Planting 10,000 / acre 11.10 22.20  
Thinning 5,000 / acre 5.55 11.10  
1st Weeding 15,000 / acre 16.65 33.30  
1st Spraying 3,000 / acre 3.35 5.70  
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2nd Weeding 10,000 / acre 11.10 22.20  
2nd Spraying 3,000 / acre 3.35 5.79  
3rd Weeding 8,000 / acre 8.90 17.80  
3rd Spraying 3,000 / acre 3.35 5.70  
4th Weeding 8,000 / acre 8.90 17.80  
Picking 50 /kg 50.00 50.00 Picking average = 40 kgs per 
day 
Cost of 
baling/bagging 
Ush 500 per 
bag  
12.50 12.50 Farmers use 40 kg 
polypropylene bags 
TOTAL COP  1129.1
0  
392.79  
     (Source: Nyakatonzi Growers Cooperative, Kasese) 
 
Nb: 
· The COP (Ush 229.10 / kg) above is based on a high yield in national average terms 
and in this case the first season seed cotton production is on a rented farm on virgin 
land. With planting taking place on non-virgin land (ie, a second ploughing is not 
required), on a hired farm the COP would be Ush 201.35 / kg, and Ush 185.70 / kg if 
the farm is owned. 
· The above COP levels should be viewed against the current farm gate price for seed 
cotton in Kasese of Ush 260 /kg. 
· Although the above figures need further research and analysis, they give some 
indication of the profitability of the cotton enterprise to a small farmer, eg. an owner 
of a 2.5 acre farm, selling to a Kasese ginnery, on a farm gate basis, would expect a 
net income this season of around Ush 167,175 (ie, 260 – 185.70 x 900 x 2.5). 
· At current price levels cottonseed production seems to be a loss making farming 
enterprise at national average yields of 350/450 kgs per acre. However, cotton is a 
part of the farming system for smallholders as the crop cleans and weeds the soil, 
prepares seed beds, and adds and fixes nitrogen and other nutrients. It is usually 
grown within a crop rotation scheme and if farmers lose on their cotton crop they can 
usually gain on the next season’s rotated crop, eg beans. Despite, this factor, unless 
yields, and net unit prices to farmers can be improved the long-term sustainability of 
the Ugandan cotton sector is under threat. 
 
Farm inputs: The cost and lack of credit for key farm inputs, viz, planting material, 
pesticides, fertilizers, spray pumps, spraying chemicals has a major effect on yields and 
cost of production, and hence farmer profitability. The current UGCEA l vy on ginners 
of Ush 35 per kg (payable after seed cotton is weighed, and before export) to cover the 
provision of seed to farmers, is factored into the farm gate price. This levy, which is paid 
into a fund held by the UGCEA, dates from a CDO programme started in, around, 
1998/99, to assist farmers in obtaining inputs. In season 1 the levy covered seed, spray 
chemicals, pesticides and spray pumps. In season 2 it covered only seeds and pesticides. 
In season 3 only seed is covered by the levy, as current CDO philosophy, in accordance 
with free market theory, is that farmers should retain the bulk of the farm gate price and 
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obtain inputs themselves. Consequently the levy has been reduced progressively from 
around Ush 150 per kg to the current Ush 35 per kg. Exact figures were not available. 
 
From Farm Gate to Ginnery 
 
Table 3.2  Seed Cotton – From Farm Gate to Ginnery 
Cost item /Price Pallisa Iganga Kasese 
Farm Gate Price (seed cotton) 255/kg 255/kg 260/kg 
Transport (to ginnery) 20 to 
25/kg 
20 to 
25/kg 
20/kg 
Agents commission (includes labour 
costs/bagging/security ) 
30/kg 20/kg 20/kg 
Delivered Ginnery Price (a) 315/kg 320 /kg 335/kg 
 Source: Farmers / Agents / Transporters / Ginneries 
 
· The delivered ginnery price is before the deduction of a Ush 35/kg levy payable to the 
UGCEA to cover the distribution of seed to farmers for the following season’s 
planting. The levy is factored into the farm gate price received by farmers. 
· If farmers bring seed cotton to the ginnery, either head loaded, or by bicycle, they 
receive a lower price than agents delivering by pick up truck, ie Ush 290 / 295 per kg, 
presumably, due to small quantities delivered in polypropylene bags. Polypropylene 
bags are discouraged by ginneries, due to their adverse effect on quality. 
· Agents may be local traders, commercial farmers or farmers groups. 
· The ginnery provides gunny bags (Hessian cloth), the desired mode of seed cotton 
packing, through their agents, to farmers.  
· Information gained in Kasese was given by a Cooperative, and their mode of 
operation differs from private ginnery companies who have no direct interest in seed 
cotton production. 
· An important issue arising from the study seems to be that the private ginneries will 
raise their purchase price of seed cotton (eg, the recent rise f om 305/kgs to 315/320 
per kgs in Iganga/Pallisa districts), delivered ginnery, but the farm gate prices have 
remained the “one off” seasons indicative price given by the CDO. Additional 
margins seem to go straight to agents, as there is no indication of higher internal 
transport/labour/packing charges. 
· Location is an important cost factor, particularly the location of the buyer (ginnery) 
relative to the farmer which, influences transport costs. 
 
Processing (Ginning) 
 
The stages of the ginning process and operational considerations are as follows: 
 
Ø Delivery of seed cotton to ginnery by: 
 Farmers (by head loads and bicycles) 
 Agents (by pick up trucks /lorries) 
 74
Ø Weighing / offloading 
Ø Sorting (Agents pay casual labour costs) / Grading (according to moisture / foreign 
matter – stones, sand etc / colour) into: 
AR – 1st Grade 
BR – 2nd Grade 
Ø Temporary storage 
Ø Pre cleaning / Drying 
Ø Seed cotton transferred to elevated platform 
Ø Gin feeders (more foreign matter removed) 
Ø Ginning operation (lint is separated from seed) 
Lint is transported by conveyors to condensers where it is pressed (hydraulic) for 
baling 
 Seed is transported by conveyor to seed store 
Ø Lint grading (100% sampled) and cleaning 
Ø Baling – every bale is weighed (185/190 kgs) by bale clerk (CDO representative 
permanently present to allocate numbers
Ø Each Bale wrapped in a cloth and tied and marked 
Ø 1 lot = 50 bales 
Ø Processing losses: < 2 % 
Ø Ginneries work up to 2x12 hour shifts during the season, depending on throughput of 
seed cotton. 
Ø Ginnery operations operate for 4/5 months of the year from Dec/Jan to April, with 
about a month for servicing, repair and maintenance of machinery and equipment.  
 
        Table 3.4  Cotton Lint: Ginning & Sales/Marketing Costs  
Unit Cost 
Ush per kg Lint 
Cost Item 
60% 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
90% 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
Comments 
Cost of raw material  1005.00 1005.00 Ush 335/kg seed cotton 
converted to lint at 3:1 
Fixed Costs    
Depreciation  50.00 50.00 on plant & machinery 
Long term loans 
interest 
20.00 20.00 for ginnery plant, machinery & 
equipment 
Permanent staff 15.00 15.00  
Cess 32.00 32.00 Payable to CDO  
Crop finance 40.00 40.00 Interest at 12% p.a, US$ based, 
for 2 months. 
Baling materials 50.00 37.50 Hessian cloth & metal ties 
Variable Costs   
Electricity 30.00 22.50 
Casual labour 35.00 25.25 
Marketing Costs   
(1) Classification 10.00 7.50 
(2)Documentation & 
Communication 
30.00 22.50 
 
 
Increased throughput of seed 
cotton will reduce the unit costs 
of these items 
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MARGIN on ginning 
costs 
30.00 30  
Total Lint Cost 1317.00 1290.75  
LESS Realized 
Cottonseed sales 
130.00 130.00  
TOTAL LINT COST 1187.00 1160.75  
      (Source; interviews with ginners) 
 
Nb: 
· National average capacity utilisation appears to be around 60%/70% and costs have 
been calculated at 60%and 90%. 
· Ginning losses of around 2% have been ignored. 
· The margin on ginning costs is based on estimates included in contract ginning 
charges of around 180 per kg. 
· The current national ginnery capacity is 800,000 bales p.a and as current production 
is only around 100,000 bales p.a, there is overcapacity in the country. Those 
companies with more than one ginnery, located in relative proximity, can adopt a 
policy of closing one ginnery, and, perhaps, use it as a buying and collection centre 
eg, the North Bukedi Cotton Company. Such policy enables a company to operate 
their active ginneries at optimal capacity. 
· Current ginning technology is old, and although considered by stakeholders to be 
appropriate for Uganda, investment in new technology would doubtless reduce 
processing costs through enhanced efficiencies. 
 
Major constraints to ginning efficiency: 
 
· Insufficient good quality seed cotton to operate the ginnery at optimal capacity. 
· Poor quality seed cotton with a high percentage of admixture (stones, sand etc) 
· High electricity costs. 
· In some areas, inconsistent power supplies from the national grid.
· High cost of fuel to operate standby generators. 
 
Cottonseed (for sale) 
 
The cost of cottonseed sales has been taken at Ush 130 per kg, although prices vary in 
accordance with distances from cottonseed mills. Ginneries near Jinja, Mbale and 
Kampala are likely to obtain around Ush 130 per kg, ex ginnery, whereas in the Kasese 
region prices are around Ush 80 per kg, due to high transport costs to the nearest oilseed 
crushing  mills. However, we were advised that the CDO will pay Ush 130 per kg, ex 
ginnery, for cottonseed for planting material, regardless of location. 
  
Cottonseed (for planting material) 
 
As it is important that the ginnery retains enough seed to satisfy farmer  planting 
requirements each ginnery must retain a quota of 300 mt at the beginning of the season 
(Dec/Jan) for treatment (significant costs associated with this operation are dressing / 
delinting / /bagging) by the CDO (at designated ginneries). The treated seed is distributed 
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to farmers for the new season’s plantings. On every bale (185 / 190 kg) over 5600 bales 
produced in a season a ginnery must retain, and make available to the CDO, 15% of 
recovered cottonseed for planting purposes. Whilst the ginnery owns the resultant 
cottonseed separated during the ginning process, the Ush 35 per kg levied by the UGCA 
to cover the cost of supplying the farmer with planting material, is factored into the farm 
gate price. Therefore, the farmer, in reality is not being supplied with free seed. 
  
Security at the time of seed storage and transport is also a cost in this operation as 
untreated seed is valuable for crushing. Furthermore, the obligation to retain seed at the 
beginning of the season affects the time of its availability to cottonseed millers.
 
Cotton Lint Marketing and Sales Costs / Profitability 
 
Marketing and sales costs of lint have been included in the above table at Ushs 40 per kg 
with output based on 60% capacity utilisation. 
 
The total marketing a d sales cost of lint is calculated at Ush 1187 per kg, FOT ginnery, 
which converts to US Cents 69 per kg, or US Cents 31.30 per lb. (the cotton lint 
international trading currency and weight unit) 
 
Nb: 
Exchange rate – Ush 1720 = US$ 1.00 
Weight conversion – Kg /lbs = 2.2046 
 
The market price was quoted at US Cents 36 per lb, ex ginnery, the reference point for 
transport costs being Kampala /Tororo. On this basis ginneries in areas such as Kasesi are 
at a disadvantage and prices quoted by buyers in this instance deduct transport costs of 
US Cents 3 per lb, ie, US Cents 3 per lb, ex ginnery Kasesi. Therefore, on the current 
market profitability seems marginal at around US Cents 1.70 per lb (US Cents 3.75 per 
kg / Ush 64 per kg). At current indicated cost and price levels, a ginnery producing 
10,000 bales p.a, also making an additional margin on ginning of Ush 30 per kg, would 
achieve a profit of around US $ 100,000 p.a. 
 
It should be emphasised that the above calculations are based on secondary information 
of a very small sample of the ginning sector and are merely indicative. Additionally, 
market prices can be volatile and those quoted were those pertaining at the time of field 
visits. 
   
Ginneries consulted all sold lint sales on a FOT Ginnery basis mainly to Nairobi and via 
Mombasa to Asia and Europe, with companies such as ACE and SGS handling 
documentation, inspection etc. 
 
Although ginneries are not involved in onward freight and forwarding costs, shipping 
companies consulted in Kampala, eg, Maersk / Transami quoted freight and forwarding 
rates, with through bills of lading at US$ 2300 per 40 ft container (100/108 bales) via 
Mombasa to the Far East. 
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Processing (Cottonseed) 
 
Vegetable oil millers based in Kampala, Jinja and Mbale purchase cottonseed from 
Ginneries for milling into RBD cottonseed oil, used primarily in cooking oil, and 
cottonseed cake, used in the compound animal feed industry. 
  
The oil content recovery from crushing cottonseed is 13%, with 55% oilcake recovery 
and 32% losses (husks which can be used as fuel for firing boilers). 
The major companies involved in the business are Nile Agro Industries and Madvani 
(Jinja), Mukwano and Kengrow (Kampala0 and Rafiki (Mbale). Cottonseed oil is refined, 
bleached and deodorized (RBD), usually blended with other oils, eg, sesameseed oil, 
packaged and sold primarily in the domestic market as cooking oil. There is a small 
regional trade to Kenya, however, as Uganda imports about 80% of its vegetable oil, 
mainly palm oil from Malaysia, quantities availabledomestically can easily be absorbed 
locally. 
 
The stages in the cottonseed milling process are as follows: 
 
Ø Unbagging of cottonseed. 
Ø Decortication. 
Ø Seed transportation to presses by elevator 
Ø Crude oil extraction by screw presses.  
Ø Crude oil movement to the oil refinery stage. 
Ø Neutralising. 
Ø Bleaching. 
Ø Deodorising 
Ø Oil cooling. 
Ø Oil blending if required. 
Ø Gerrycan/bottle/tin filling station/packing/labeling.     
 
Major cost elements: 
· Steam (fired by husks for cottonseed – sesameseed/soya have no husks, 
therefore sometimes buy fuelwood. 
· Electricity (from national grid) to drive elevators/motors for conveyors & 
presses etc. 
· water (own bore hole) 
· labour 
· packing materials 
 
Processing costs at 50% and 100% capacity utilisation are as follows: 
(Nb: due to seed shortage most mills can only attain around 50% capacity utilisation) 
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                       Table 3.5  Cottonseed: Processing Costs 
Cost item / Prices 
(Ush per kg) 
50% 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
100% 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
From ex Ginnery to Oil Mill  
Cost of seed, ex Ginnery 140.00  
Bagging 
Labour 
Transport 
Other (taxes etc) 
 
 
20.00 
 
Cost of seed, delivered  Mill 160.00  
Milling costs   
Fixed 
Depreciation 
Permanent Staff Labour (eg, 
Management/security) 
Licence fee  
Financing (interest) 
 
2.00 
9.00 
- 
1.00 
2.00 
 
2.00 
9.00 
- 
1.00 
2.00 
Variable 
Electricity 
Fuel 
Labour (non 
permanent/casual) 
 
Water 
Effluent treatment? 
Weighbridge costs 
Plant & machinery 
maintenance 
Administration 
 
12.00 
1.00 
 
4.00 
2.00 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
 
10.00 
5.00 
 
6.00 
0.50 
 
2.00 
1.00 
0.50 
1.00 
0.50 
 
5.00 
2.50 
Cost of RBD cottonseed oil, 
FOT Mill (excluding packing 
and taxes) 
213.00 195.00 
            (Source: interviews with cottonseed millers)
 
Cooking oil, usually a blend of cottonseed oil and sesameseed oil is currently sold at Ush  
28,500 per 20litre gerrycan, plus 17% VAT.
 
Cottonseed cake is sold at Ush 120/130 per kg, in 50/60 kgs bags, delivered feedmill: 
120/130 per kgs. 
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3.6  Constraints and Opportunities 
 
The following constraints and opportunities to increasing production, transaction, 
marketing and processing efficiency have been identified: 
 
Poor yields, productivity,  net prices and farmer profitability 
 
The average size of cotton holdings in Uganda is one acre, which prevents the 
introduction of economies of scale at farm level. This factor, coupled with lack of 
agricultural input credit, low production technology, post harvest losses, lack of on 
far/rural storage facilities, and poor marketing information and efficiency, results in low 
yields and profitability. Furthermore, these constraints to increased production have 
limited the area planted to cotton, which is unable to realize its full potential, estimated to 
be 1 million bales p.a (185,000 mt) The liberalisation of the cotton sector in the 1990’s 
removed much of the support mechanism that farmers had received from the cooperative 
unions and other public sector bodies during the 1960’s and 1970’s, and which had 
served the industry well. Whilst political instability, corruption, lack of finance and 
inefficiency had driven the sector to the point of collapse, and reform was essential, the 
previous support mechanism to farmers has not been replaced by the private sector, 
which had been predicted by liberalization theory. 
 
With cotton production on the increase, there exists the opportuni y to encourage efficient 
and capable farmers groups to access credit for inputs and to pool their crops to achieve 
marketing efficiency, and better quality and net prices. Further more, the monopsonistic 
(one buyer – many sellers – no buying competition at processing level) structure of the 
cotton ginning sector lends itself to the introduction of contract farming / outgrower 
schemes. Such developments would assist in improving farmer profitability by 
developing farmer/ginnery cooperation to their mutual benefit. 
 
The inflexibility of the  farm gate price
 
The CDO publishes an indicative farm gate price only once per season, at the beginning 
of the season. This encourages ginneries to treat the indicative price as a maximum farm 
gate price. Where deliverd ginnery prices have improved, as seen during the course of 
the study (from Ush 305 to Ush 315/320 per kg), the farm gate price has remained 
unchanged at Ush 255 per kg, and the additional margin accrues solely to the 
Agent/Trader. 
 
In order to establish price transparency, and link farm gate prices more closely to market 
prices the CDO and the UGCEA should consider introducing a mutually acceptable, but 
voluntary, regular, fluctuating indicative price, based on an agreed formula calculated 
from world prices, with cost deductions at each stage of the marketing chain. Such 
formulae work well for smallholders in other crops in other parts of the world, and an 
example is given in Annexe II (PNG oil palm smallholders’ formula). The formula 
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system lends itself particularly to contract farming/outgrower schemes and nucleus 
estates.  
 
Through the pooling of crop, farmers can achieve economies of scale for transportation 
purposes and assume the role of ginnery agents themselves, thus improving their net 
prices. At present only larger scale commercial farmers are able to assume this role. 
 
Economies of scale / Diversified production systems 
 
The CDO wishes to encourage the development of estate / block farming production 
alongside smallholder enterprises. The liberalisat on nd privatisation of the sector lends 
itself to investment in commercial plantations on the nucleus estate concept, which has 
proved successful in other crops in other parts of the world. (see note below).  
 
 
NOTE ON THE NUCLEUS ESTATE CONCEPT 
 
An extensive literature exists on the nucleus estate concept with the original model 
accredited to the work of Phillips (“Nucleus Plantations and Processing Factories – their 
place in the development of organized smallholder production – 1965) The original 
model allowed for the provision of (by the nucleus estate to smallholders) controlled 
credit, technical assistance, management and processing, and marketing facilities. The 
model assumed that smallholders would use advanced planting techniques and material, 
fertilizers, spray chemicals, on farm quality processing and storage methods where 
appropriate (eg, cocoa and copra) and the market outlet provided by the nucleus estate. 
The model promoted the thesis that nucleus estate schemes would provide a method of 
concentrating scarce resources (capital, credit, management and extension workers) in 
order to obtain optimum results for all stakeholders. It was also envisaged that 
smallholders could supply both their own food subsistence requirements and sell to the 
estate and factory workforce. This model and theory of the nucleus estate concept has 
been generally accepted, with some modifications in the intervening years since 1965. 
 
The concept is a development of outgrower schemes / contract farming and in successful 
models, eg, PNG oil palm, has involved the introduction of price formulae to determine 
an equitable price for the smallholders raw material to be supplied to the nucleus estate 
processing facility. 
 
High rural transport costs  
 
Transport costs between farm g te and ginnery appear relatively standard in the 
production areas visited. Poor rural access roads in remote areas inhibit farmer 
accessibility to the market, and coupled with high fuel costs, wear and tear on vehicles, 
high vehicle maintenance costs, all contribute to transaction cost inefficiency. 
 
The issue of poor rural roads is addressed in the section of the report on cross cutting 
issues. 
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Processing inefficiencies 
 
With some 800,000 bales of ginning capacity available in the country, and a forecast 
production this season of around 120,000 bales, substantial over capacity exists. Many 
ginneries are only able to operate at around 60%, which results in sub optimal processing 
unit costs. Furthermore, many ginneries are old and use outdated technology, an whilst 
the CDO and other stakeholders take the view that existing technology is appropriate for 
Uganda’s existing cotton sector structure. However, old outdated technology inevitably 
results in processing inefficiency, and if the sector is to expand this issue should be 
addressed sooner rather than later. 
 
The opportunity exists to study and implement a ginnery  rationalisation plan, taking into 
account ginnery locations relative to production areas, larger ginnery units to promote 
economies of scale, nd the introduction of “state of the art” technology. It is 
acknowledged that such a rationalisation plan will involve substantial financing, and 
incentives (eg, fiscal) and cooperation within the private sector. 
 
High electricity costs, and, in some areas, inconsistent supply from the national grid, 
necessitating the use of standby generators, with consequent high fuel costs, are other 
constraints to ginning efficiency. These issues are addressed in the section of the report 
on “cross cutting” issues. 
 
With regard to the cottonseed milling sub sector, insufficient seed to run the mill at 
optimal capacity, high electricity costs, and old inefficient equipment (> 50 years old in 
some cases) are major constraints. 
 
The high cost in foreign exchange of imported vege able oils presents an opportunity to 
encourage the development of the oilseed crushing sector, to meet local demand for 
cooking oil and soap from domestic production. 
 
Market information and access to world markets 
 
Ginneries tend to sell their lint to ternational traders on an FOT ginnery basis, partly 
due to the inability to fund freight and forwarding costs to Mombasa and beyond. 
Therefore, access to, and knowledge of, international markets and end-us r  is very 
limited. 
 
The opportunity should be taken by ginners to explore the potential of combining to 
negotiate an annual freight agreement with international shipping and forwarding 
companies for the entire cotton output available for export from Uganda. Such initiatives 
have worked well for exporters in other commodities in other parts of the world, and 
would have had a twofold positive effect, viz: 
  
(1) A reduction in rates by through the attraction to shipping companies of capturing 
a larger share of the country’s freight business. 
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(2) The encouragem nt of exporters to sell on a FOB and CIF basis enabling greater 
market access. 
 
The role of Government in the cotton sector
 
The role of the GOU was redefined at the time of reform in the 1990’s and the CDO 
created as the sole medium of direct public sector involvement in the cotton industry. 
Some ten years later, there is a need to examine the role of the CDO in the context of the 
GOU’s support to the sector. 
 
3.7  Raising Farmers’ Incomes 
 
The poor profitability of cotton at farm level is due, primarily to low yields and prices. 
Raising farmers’ incomes is absolutely essential to ensure the long term sustainability and 
growth of the sector. Global cotton price levels are beyond the influence of the Ugandan 
industry, therefore, farmers incomes must be raised through efficiencies within the 
internal production and marketing system. 
 
Both production and marketing efficiencies can be improved by encouraging farmers 
groups to enhance their ability to access input credit and improve net farm gate prices. 
Past experience in Africa and other developing countries, particularly related to the 
cooperative movement, warrants caution in this regard. Successful farmers groups should 
be formed from within the farming community owned by farmers themselves have a clear 
objective and eschew commercial activities, which are beyond their capacity. Whilst 
external assistance is required as a catalyst to formation and capacity building, such 
outside involvement such be minimal with a view to disengagement when long term 
sustainability is achieved. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, many donors have a 
particular interest in sustainable livelihoods in the rural sector and should be 
recommended to act as a catalyst in this context. 
 
3.8  Related Topics 
 
The TOR of the study do not i clude an analysis of value addition in the cotton sector, 
which is being addressed in work being undertaken by the COMPETE project and others. 
As a general comment, we believe that enormous opportunities exist for the textile 
industry, which is currently small, under financed and burdened by old and outdated 
technology. Furthermore, Uganda should take advantage of its regional comparative 
advantage in the production of high quality cotton of the opportunities presented by the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), passed by the USA in May 2000, and 
allowing duty free and quota free access to the US market for over 1800 African 
products. Whilst textiles do not automatically qualify under AGOA rules, if certain 
conditions are met, access will be given. 
 
 83
It is significant that Kenya’s textile industry is currently undergoing resurgence, despite 
the parlous state of its cotton production sector. During the course of the study it was 
noted that lint exports to Nairobi were on the increase. 
 
Other value addition activities related to the cotton sector that require encouragement are, 
vegetable oil and cake production for use in consumer goods, such as cooking oil and 
soap, and the compound animal feed industry. 
 
3.9  Summary of Findings 
 
· Cotton production at current national average yields and farm gate prices is 
unprofitable for farmers in certain areas of the country. 
· Farmer profitability will be dependent on improved efficiencies in production, 
marketing and processing, enabling economically viable farm gate prices to be paid. 
· The profitability of the cotton enterprise to farmers is essential for the long term 
sustainability and growth of the sector. This is the key issue facing the sector. 
· Direct measures to achieve this objective include the formation of farmers groups, 
greater price transparency and flexibility, R & D and improved extension services. 
· Small-scale farmers are unable to assume the role of ginnery agent and benefit from 
the commission paid in this context (Ush 20/30 per kg). They receive only the farm 
gate price whether their crop is collected, or they transport it to the ginnery by head 
load or bicycle.  
· Farm gate prices are not transparent; the indicative price advised by the CDO remains 
in force for a whole season despite fluctuations in global levels. 
· Transaction cost efficiency is also particularly hampered by high transport costs 
between remote rural farms and ginneries, high electricity costs and inconsistency of 
supply, and insufficient seed cotton availability relative to ginning capacity. 
· Substantial ginnery overcapacity exists and factory units tend to be old with outdated 
technology. 
· A national strategy for the rationalisation of the size and location of ginneries is 
essential to achieve sustainability and growth of the sector. 
· At current prices and processing efficiency levels, ginneries appear to be only 
marginally profitable. 
· Exporters lack market information, knowledge and market access and are constrained 
to sell on an FOT ginnery basis, which limits knowledge of end user requirements, an 
optimisation of net prices. 
· The value-added sector is very small, under financed and unable to take advantage of 
the opportunities presenting themselves in the textile sector and oil-milling sector.
· Following the liberalisation of the sector in the 1990’s policy, regulatory and 
institutional constraints to the development of the cotton sector have largely been 
removed. However, the role of the CDO needs to be reassessed to ensure the 
appropriate level of GOU support to the sector. 
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3.10  Recommended Implementation Plan 
 
(1) The encouragement and capacity building of farmers groups: We recommend the 
encouragement of farmers groups as the key to improving cotton growing 
profitability. W e suggest that initiatives in this context are undertaken by the CDO / 
NAADS / MAAIF and that assistance is sought from donors under their various 
sustainable livelihoods programmes. 
 
(2) The development of contract farming: We recommend that initiatives to encourage 
contract farming be undertaken by the CDO, NAADS and the priv te secto  through 
the UGCEA. 
 
(3) The promotion of commercial plantations / block estate farming and nucleus estates: 
We recommend the promotion of nucleus estate concept through dialogue with 
private sector entrepreneurs and overseas investors, and suggest th t the MTTI, CDO, 
UGCEA, UIA and PSF undertake initiatives. 
 
(4) The introduction of a voluntary smallholder indicative seed cotton price formula: We 
recommend that the introduction of a voluntary formula, drawing lessons from similar 
schemes in other parts of the world be studied. W e suggest that this initiative be 
undertaken by the CDO and UGCEA. 
 
(5) Rationalisation of ginning capacity: We recommend a study on a national strategy for 
the rationalisation of ginning capacity throughout the country, involving all 
stakeholders, and, led by the CDO and UGCEA.
 
(6) Joint Exporters Freight Agreement: W  recommend that exporters combine their lint 
exportable volumes and negotiate of joint exporters freight agreement with shippers 
for the transport of cotton from FOT ginnery basis to overseas markets. We suggest 
that this task be coordinated by the UGCEA.
 
(7) GOU support to the cotton sector: We recommend that the role and mandate of the 
CDO be reassessed to ensure the appropriate level of GOU support to the sector in the 
current circumstances and future development plans of the industry. 
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Section 4.  Fish 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The Ugandan fisheries sector rose to national prominence in the late eighties and early 
nineties when fish exports to Europe and the Far East became established.  Several years 
behind developments in Kenya, the Ugandan and Tanzanian fish processing industries 
emerged roughly simultaneously.  All three countries’ export industries have relied upon 
capture fisheries (rather than aquaculture) and consequently the shared resource provided 
by Lake Victoria is of vital importance.  Attempts to manage this resource on a regional 
basis are now emerging through the efforts of the East African Community and its Lake 
Victoria Fisheries Organisation.  
 
With access to a large part of Lake Victoria and numerous other water bodies including 
Lakes Kyoga and Albert, Uganda’s fisheries were of significant importance in domestic 
and regional trade long before the rise of the new, capital intensive export industry.  This 
importance remains intact, although its relative size is impossible to state accurately due 
to an almost complete lack of hard information on trade flows, volumes and prices.  
Evidence gained during our fieldwork suggests that significant quantities of fresh fish 
(certainly of the magnitude of tens if not hundreds of tonnes) are exported every week to 
Kigali.  Ugandan salted fish is also sold in large quantities in DRC.  Domestic marketing 
concentrates on supplying fresh fish to areas close enough to the lakes, and processed fish 
(sun-dried and smoked) to areas away from the lakes where fresh fish is unknown8.   
 
The importance of Uganda’s fisheries to the national economy is significant.  At the time 
of our fieldwork, the Department of Fisheries and the fish exporters were proudly 
announcing that fish had surpassed coffee as the number one export revenue earner in the 
last part of 2001.  While this statistical victory may soon be reversed, it nevertheless 
indicates the extent of the wealth generated by an industry that directly and indirectly 
employs fewer people than the coffee industry (an estimated 1,000,000 vs 2,000,000).  
Furthermore, revenue generated by regional trade doubtlessly adds significantly to the 
overseas export sector earnings.  If convincing regional figures can ever be establish d, 
the combined earnings may reveal that Uganda’s fisheries regularly outperforms the 
coffee sub-sector. 
 
In 2000, over 15,000 tonnes of factory processed fish were exported, generating 
substantially more than US$30 million of export revenue (customs figures).  In 2001, an 
estimated 23,000 tonnes were processed and exported, earning more than US$70 million 
(industry data).   
 
Export fisheries development has been hampered by a series of health scares that have led 
to the imposition of one voluntary and two EU imposed export bans over the last five 
years.  Substantial efforts made to improve facilities at landing sites and hygiene in 
                                         
8 Interestingly, when fresh fish has usually failed to sell in areas where previously only processed fish has 
been consumed.. 
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processing factories paid off last year when the EU declared that Ugandan fish exports to 
the EU were to be harmonised or, in other words, allowed to enter any EU state without 
recourse to the bilateral arrangements between exporter and importing country – the 
arrangement that had existed previously.   
 
Regulation and development of the Ugandan fisheries is overseen by MAAIF’s 
Department of Fisheries.  The Department has statutory powers to tax and licence the 
fisheries industry and has in the past imposed quotas on factories’ output.  It is also 
entrusted with managing the fisheries sustainably.  Under its current Commissioner, the 
Department is seen as a dynamic institution that has ambitious plans for the future of the 
industry.  One such plan is the establishment of a new fisheries agency that will take over 
regulatory and development responsibilities from the Department.  Plans for the agency 
are well advanced and Parliament’s approval will soon be sought. 
 
Another key institutional player is the Uganda Fish Processor and Export Association 
(UFPEA), which emerged as an industry response to the EU and government imp s d 
export bans.  The Association is well supported by its members and has been effective in 
raising quality standards and representing members’ views. 
 
Other important organisations involved in fish processing and marketing are: 
· USAID’s COMPETE and SPEED projects (covering aspects of export 
competitiveness)  
· DFID’s Integrated Lake Management Project (covering capture fisheries on water 
bodies other than Lake Victoria) and its Aquaculture Project 
· NARO’s Fisheries Resources Research Institute (FIRRI) 
· The East African Community’s Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO) 
· The European Commission’s Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project 
 
During our investigation of fish marketing and processing we deliberately avoided the 
debate on the sustainable management of Uganda’s fish resources.  While we  
recognise that this is a very important issue and probably eclipses the marketing and 
processing issues highlighted in this report, we feel that we are not competent to add to 
the debate and, in any case, believe that th issue of fish capture lies outside our terms of 
reference.  
 
4.2  Fish supply 
 
The vast majority of Uganda’s fish is caught on Lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Albert.  In 
1999 an estimated 210,000 tonnes was caught on these three lakes and only 14,000 
tonnes on all other water bodies (Fisheries Department figures).  While capture figures 
are somewhat controversial and based to some extent on guesstimates, Lake Victoria 
clearly  supplies at least 50% of the total fish catch by weight and considerably more by 
value.  A very large proportion of export factory processed fish comes from Lake 
Victoria – indeed during our fieldwork around Lake Kyoga we found no evidence that 
processing factories source from the lake. 
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The major commercial fish species are nile perch, nile tilapia and mukene.  Nile perch 
almost entirely dominates formal sector exports and also contributes to regional and 
domestic trade.  Mukene, a sprat-sized fish, is sundried and sold both as an animal feed 
ingredient and for human consumption.  Tilapia has traditionally been the favourite fish 
of Ugandan consumers, but also has potential for overseas markets.  
 
An estimated 250,000 artisanal fishermen (136,000 on Lake Victoria) crew Uganda’s 
fishing fleet.  These figures may represent a significant overstatement of the truth.  The 
Lake Victoria Frame Survey of 2000 found that only 34,889 crew manned all types of 
fishing industry related boats.  
 
A large proportion of Lake Victoria’s fishermen live on and operate from the islands that 
are typically ten to thirty kilometres offshore.  While some fishermen are able to bring 
their own catch to shoreside landing sites, the majority sell to traders who operate 
transport boats specifically designed for bringing fish from the islands.  Despite the 
relatively high earnings among fishermen, living conditions in fishing communities are 
generally poor (LVFRP 2001).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that fishermen tend to spend 
freely in response to the high risks they face on the water.  The occurrence of fishermen 
drowning on the lake is apparently not uncommon. 
 
Fishing technology is simple.  Fishermen almost exclusively use small, plank constructed 
canoes from which they cast their nets and set their lines.  Of the 15,544 canoes found to 
be operating on Lake Victoria in 2000, 12,848 were manually powered, 2,031 were 
mechanically powered and 665 were sail powered.  Although outlawed, beach seining 
(using nets of small-mesh size from the beach) is also practised. 
 
The fishing fleet has grown in line with the rise of the export processing factories.  In 
1990, at the beginning of the export industry, just 8674 serviced the Lake Victoria 
fishery.  In 2000, as noted above, the figure had increased to 15,544.  
 
Fish is landed at numerous landing sites around the shores of Uganda’s lakes.  On Lake 
Victoria alone, there are 597 landing sites, although of these, only eight have been 
gazetted as landing sites of sufficient quality for landing fish destined for export 
processing factories.  Despite the restrictions on where export fish can be landed, 
processing factories regularly buy from non-gazetted sites. 
 
A highly relevant feature of the supply of fish from Lake Victoria is that it is highly 
inelastic, at least in the short term.  This means that, correcting for seasonal variations, 
the quantity of fish coming off the lake remains roughly similar regardless of what price 
is paid to fishermen. 
 
Aquaculture has yet to contribute significantly to national fish output.  Its annual 
production has amounted to just a few hundred tonnes for local consumption.  The 
Fisheries Department foresees aquaculture contributing significantly to export and 
domestic production and indeed there is some interest from the fish processing industry.  
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Apart from augmenting what are perceived to be dwindling supplies of nile perch, the 
processors see advantages in the type of fish that aquaculture can supply.  Export prices 
are higher for fillets from fish of about 1kg in size.  Such fish are well below the 18 inch 
legal minimum length allowed for trade but is the size of fish that could be produced on 
fish farms, providing certain technical constraints can be overcome.  There are mixed 
feelings about the likelihood of success.  Detractors point to the difficulty of finding 
sufficient quantities of affordble fish feed and the lack of success of aquaculture in any 
other part of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Promoters of the idea point to the ready export market 
for the fish and the will among private sector players to make it work.  Whatever point of 
view is expressed, both sides agree that aquaculture will at best only supplement fish 
from the capture fisheries.  The future of the export industry therefore largely rests on 
fish caught from the lakes. 
 
From a poverty perspective, commercial aquaculture is not for poor pr ducers.  The fixed 
and working capital requirements are far too high.  However, according DFID’s 
Aquaculture Project, some potential exists in small scale fish farming sited away from the 
major lakes and far enough north to take advantage of higher temperatur s (which 
increase yields).  The chief obstacle to success seems to be local preference for dried and 
smoked fish and the general dislike for fresh fish.  The DFID project believes that tastes 
will change over time.  
 
4.3  Fish Demand 
 
60 to 65% of factory processed fish exported from Uganda is sold chilled and is air-
freighted principally to the EU (95%) but also to Japan, Australia and the USA.  These 
chilled fish markets are more lucrative than those for frozen fish (30 to 35% of exports), 
which is generally transported to importing countries by sea-fr ight.  Regular importers 
of Ugandan frozen fish are Australia, the EU, the USA, the Middle East, the Far East and 
Japan. 
 
Chilled fish exporters are currently receiving about US$3.50 per kg of nile perch fillet 
FOB Entebbe.  Industry observers often query why export prices should be so low when 
retail prices in Europe are as high as US$9.  A large part of the difference is made up by 
freight and distribution costs.  Air-freight from Entebbe to Europe currently costs about 
US$1.50/kg of fish.  Handling, customs clearance and distribution costs in Europe 
probably add as much as another US$0.50 to US$1/kg, mostly because of the need to 
move the product quickly over large road distances and to maintain an unbroken cold 
chain.  Such logistics are expensive.  Added to this, the importer expects to make an 
adequate return, which includes compensation for the risk of product spoilage in transit.  
Finally, retailers are notorious for adding as much as 50% to the delivered price to cover 
their large overhead costs and to protect their profit margins.  European supermarkets are 
generally powerful organisations and can dictate terms to suppliers.  It is therefore 
unlikely that fish importers are making excessive profits.  From this rough analysis, it 
should be clear how costs and margins build up to create the final retail price.    
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Overseas demand also exists for nile perch swim bladders, which are dried and exported 
to the Far East.  We were unable to discover mu h about this trade but it is safe to assume 
that, while important, the revenue from these sales is a fraction of the revenue from 
frozen and chilled fillet exports. 
 
Kenyan processing factories are in the frustrating position of enjoying higher export 
prices (the result of lower airfreight charges to Europe) but only being able to source fish 
legally from just 6% of Lake Victoria9.  P ocessing capacity substantially outweighs 
supply and consequently large quantities of Kenyan processed fish is caught by Ugandan 
(and, one has to assume, Tanzanian) fishermen, after which it is transported illegally to 
Kenya.  Kenyan factories and their water-borne agents can pay higher prices to Ugandan 
fishermen not only because of their higher export prices but also because the c st of the 
petrol to power their outboard engines is cheaper than in Uganda.  Reportedly, Kenyan 
traders also tempt Ugandan fishermen with supplies of ice, which allow the fishermen to 
wait for the higher prices offered by Kenyan traders rather then being forc d to sell at 
lower prices to Ugandan transport boat operators for fear of spoilage.   
 
There are no good estimates of how much Ugandan fish is sold to Kenyan fish factories.  
However an indication can be surmised from an occasion when the Ugandan Fis ries 
Department and Police imposed a strictly enforced ban on illegal cross-border 
movements of fresh fish.  According to the Fisheries Department, a substantial glut of 
fresh fish appeared at Ugandan landing sites, prices collapsed and the Departme t was
forced to cease its border patrols.  
 
As noted previously, demand for fresh whole fish exists in Kigali.  We suspect that 
current estimates of the quantity of fish that Uganda exports to this market are pure 
guesses.  Regardless of what the Ugandan Authorities wish to do with this trade – o curb 
or promote it – we believe that a thorough analysis of costs, margins and volumes should 
be conducted before government intervenes.  Our justification is that the livelihoods of 
many poor people could either be harmed or enhanced through government action and 
there is therefore a considerable need to understand the trade and revenue flows.  Similar 
studies should be conducted for processed fish that is exported to Kenya, Sudan and 
DRC. 
 
                                         
9 Measured on the basis of surface area.  Kenya does however possess particularly fertile fishing grounds. 
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4.4  Marketing chains  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Fresh fish supply chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In most cases, fishermen (or more likely, the owners of the boats that the fishermen crew) 
sell their catch to transport boat operators.  Where fishermen operat  from the shores of 
Lake Victoria or from islands near enough the shore, sales are either made directly to the 
factories or their land-based agents.  Competition among fishermen appears to be high. 
 
Fishing and water-borne transport is often vertically integrated.  It is not uncommon for 
owners of transport boats to also own fleets of fishing canoes, thereby capturing profits at 
both levels of the supply chain.  
 
The transport boat operators provide the important link between the majority of 
fishermen on Lake Victoria and the factories.  In many cases, factories value the strong 
relationships they establish with the transport boat operators, who they see as having in-
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depth knowledge of their supply and quality requirements.  Factories supply ice to 
transport boat operators as a way of cementing trading relationships.  There is some 
reason to believe that competition between the transport boat operators is not particularly 
high.  Our evidence is that the traders’ margin between their buying and selling prices is 
approximately Ush300/kg, yet on average costs are less than Ush100/kg.  Greater 
analysis of this is provided in section 4.6.   
 
In the past, some factories have used their own transport boats to source fish directly 
from fishermen (pers. comm. Greenfields Ltd10).  All such initiatives have failed because 
of the complicated logistics involved in gathering large quantities of fish from scattered 
locations, and because of the opportunities for cheating among water-borne factory staff.  
On the whole, the job of transporting fish from the islands is best conducted by small 
operators who have much better control over costs and their employees. 
 
A proportion of fish is rejected by the factory buyers at the landing sites.  This fish is sold 
to local traders who sell into the domestic market. 
 
Export quality fish is sold at the landing sites to factory employees or to factory agents.  
Agents come under two categories; those that cover their own expenses and those that are 
tied to specific factories who supply tr cks, fuel, drivers and ice.  In both cases, agents 
are expected to provide their own working capital.  The insulated trucks that factories and 
agents use arrive at the landing sites laden with ice.  Some ice of off-loaded onto the 
transport boats (which ave insulated fish holds), while the remainder is used to pack the 
purchased fish in the trucks.  
 
There are nine fish processing factories currently operating in Uganda but a further two 
are about to be commissioned.  Operating licences are likely to be granted f r a further 
three factories, two of which would be strategically located next to the borders with 
Kenya and Tanzania in an attempt to reduce the leakage of Ugandan fish to foreign 
factories. 
 
Competition between factories seems to be fairly intense.  Ther  is no evidence of 
cartelisation over setting prices for fish at the landing sites.  On visiting Kasenyi landing 
site near Entebbe, we discovered that prices offered by factories the previous day had 
ranged from USh1750 to 1850 per kg.  Our assumption was that factories offering higher 
prices had pressing export orders to fill.  Another indication that prices are not fixed by 
agreement is that factories operate at between 50 and 70% capacity.  Factories must 
therefore strike a balance between paying too much for fish and paying enough to ensure 
an adequate throughput that will keep per unit costs in check.  Each factory has to find its 
own balance in a fishery where fish is becoming more scarce, and consequently price 
fixing is unlikely.  
 
After processing fish into fillets and packaging, the factories have a number of options.  
They can either sell to fish exporters FOB Entebbe (FOT/FOR Kampala for frozen fillets) 
or arrange freight for themselves and sell C&F to overseas importers.  In reality, th 
                                         
10 Greenfields has never engaged in this form of sourcing. 
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chilled fish exporters are in-
so the advantages to factories of selling C&F European airports over selling FOB 
Entebbe are not substantial.  
 
We assume that European importers operate in Uganda t
fish exports.  This in itself is an indication of the value that European buyers attach to nile 
perch.
 
4.5  Transactions in the Lake Victoria export supply chain
 
In cases where fishing and waterborne transport is not vertically integrated, transactions 
al 2001) or, in some cases, on the basis of credit extended by fishermen to their buyers.  
We discovered some instances of interlock
provided by transport boat operators to fishermen in the form of fishing nets.  The 
fishermen are then obliged to sell fish to the credit provider, who recovers his money 
hermen. 
During our research, we heard anecdotal evidence from the Fisheries Department that 
transport boat operators cheat fishermen through the use of underweighing scales, 
-declaration of the quant
rejected for export (in cases where transporters buy on credit from fishermen).  While we 
were unable to verify any of these claims, it is certainly the case that fishermen have a 
esh fish, they are usually 
obliged to sell to the first buyer that comes along.
 
Transactions in other parts of the supply chain appear straightforward and free from any 
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4.6  Supply chain costs and margins 
 
The overseas export chain 
 
We have concentrated our analysis of costs and margins on two parts of the supply chain; 
the transport boat operators and the processors.  This was for two reasons:  Firstly, 
Uganda’s ability to influence post harvest activities in the overseas export sub- ctor is 
largely limited to these two levels.  Secondly, confidentiality meant that we were unable 
to gain access to costs and margin information at the export/import level. 
 
 
Table 4.1  Transport boat operators costs and margins 
 
 USh per year USh per kg of 
fish 
US$ per kg of 
fish 
%  of costs 
Operating costs - variable:     
  Raw material         448,695,000               1,500                0.87 94% 
Sub-total variable costs         448,695,000               1,500                0.87 94% 
     
Operating costs - fixed:     
  Labour             8,190,000                   27                0.02 2% 
  Fuel and oil           12,909,000                   43                0.02 3% 
  Repair and maintenance                500,000                    2                0.00 0% 
  Licence                500,000                     2                0.00 0% 
Sub-total fixed costs           22,099,000                   74                0.04 5% 
     
Capital costs             3,124,805                   10                0.01 1% 
     
Total costs         473,918,805               1,584                0.92 100% 
     
Revenue         533,962,007               1,785                1.03  
     
Profit (loss)            60,043,202                 201                0.12  
Source:  Authors’ fieldwork 
 
Table 4.1 gives costs and margins for a typical transport boat owner who operates a boat 
of 6 tonnes of fish capacity.  On average such a boat will gather approximately 3,800kg 
of fish per trip, which takes three to four days to complete.  All assumptions and 
workings supporting the summary information in table 4.6 are given in appendix A3. 
 
The most striking feature of table 4.1 is the profit that the transport boat operators make.  
The annual profit of  Ush 60 million (US$35,000) is just under four times the total fixed 
and working capital investment that the operator has to make.  This represents an 
extraordinary rate of return on investment.  Against this however, one has to consider the 
risk that the ice boat operator takes.  Piracy, foul weather and spoilage all play their part 
in making the trade more risky than many land based operations.  Put in terms of 
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potential monetary loss, there is perhaps a 1% chance of losing an entire cargo, which 
translates into an average of about once every year and four months.  In such cases, the 
entire sum of the operator’s working capital will be lost – a sum of about USh 6 million.  
Of course, worse things could happen.  In the case of a pirate attack, no  only could the 
working capital be lost but also outboard engines and, in extreme cases, people’s lives.  
However, according to the information that we could gather from the Ugandan Police, 
such incidents are rare and on the decline. 
 
Even if working capital and an outboard engine are lost (a combined value of 
approximately USh 12 million), annual profits would appear to be easily capable of 
absorbing the loss. 
 
We can only speculate as to why the transport boat business is so profitable.  On the face 
of it, the 900 plus transport boats that operate on Lake Victoria should provide enough 
competition to ensure that profits are not excessive.  Not only does table 4.1 belie this 
notion but we also found evidence to suggest that the transport boat operators’ margins 
do not change in proportion to the landing site price (prices and margins should change 
roughly proportionately in a truly competitive market).  This finding needs to be verified 
but if true, it probably indicates that ice-bo t operators ae using their strong bargaining 
position over fishermen (the power that ice confers) to protect their margins.   
 
We are not aware of any anti-competitive practices that exist between transport boat 
operators.  As one fish processor put it, if the nine proc ssing factories can not combine 
to form a buying cartel, what chance do 900 ice boat operators have?  Despite this we 
believe it is possible that transport boat operators informally agree individual rights over 
fish caught by specific groups of fishermen.  If this was not the case, it is unlikely that the 
system of transport boat operators providing input credit to fishermen would work.   
 
Although these suggestions are highly speculative and merit further research, the 
inescapable conclusion is that for fishermen to gain better prices, transport boat 
operators’ bargaining position must be weakened by improving the bargaining position of 
fishermen.  Ways of achieving this are discussed in section 4.8.  
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Table 4.2  Fish Processing Factory Costs and Margins 
 
 USh per annum USh per kg 
of fillet 
US$ per 
annum 
US$ per kg of 
fillet 
% of total 
costs 
Operating costs – variable:      
  Raw material     8,810,100,000       4,500    5,107,304        2.61 76% 
  Packaging       506,580,750         259      293,670        0.15 4% 
  Energy       360,000,000         184       208,696        0.11 3% 
  Direct labour       289,314,600         148       167,719        0.09 2% 
  Fuel         44,201,028           23         25,624        0.01 0% 
Sub-total variable costs   10,010,196,378       5,113    5,803,012        2.96 86% 
      
Operating costs – fixed:      
  Management       276,000,000         141       160,000        0.08 2% 
  Lab expenses       139,200,000           71        80,696        0.04 1% 
  Admin expenses       177,600,000           91       102,957        0.05 2% 
  Fixed asset maintenance         67,200,000           34         38,957        0.02 1% 
  Capital costs (interest and depreciation)       549,600,000         281       318,609        0.16 5% 
Sub-total fixed costs     1,232,400,000         629       714,435        0.36 11% 
      
Sub-total operating costs   11,242,596,378       5,742    6,517,447        3.33 97% 
Miscellaneous   416,290,873         212       240,865        0.12 3% 
      
Total operating costs   11,636,087,251       5,943    6,745,558        3.45 100% 
      
Annual revenue*   12,783,147,447       6,529*    7,410,520        3.79*  
      
Profit (loss) before tax     1,147,060,196         586       664,962        0.34  
      
*  Includes revenue fillets and fish parts.  The weighted export value of fillets is assumed to be US$3.48 
Source:  Authors’ fieldwork 
 
The information in table 4.2 was compiled from data given by several fish processing 
factories.  We therefore believe that it gives a reasonably accurate financial picture of an 
average processing factory in an average year.  All assumptions and workings are 
contained in appendix A3. 
 
The key assumptions are that the factory is working at 70% of full capacity, has an 
average landing site buying price of USh 1,800/kg (US$1.04) of fish, has a fillet yield of 
40% and receives a weighted average price for fillets (chilled:frozen) of US$3.48/kg 
(USh 6,020). 
 
Under these assumptions, the processing factory is making fairly respectable profits, 
although with a total cost of US$3.45/kg of fillet and revenue of US$3.48/kg, it is clear 
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that profitability depends on sales of “by-pr ducts” such as swim-bladders and fish 
frames (the bones, head and tail, which are sold onto the local market).  
 
Another feature of fish processing profitability, is its sensitiveness to factory throughput, 
and, unsurprisingly, to the cost of raw material and the export price of fillets.  While the 
export price remains fairly static, raw material prices (the price paid for fish at the 
landing sites) is highly variable.  At the time of our fieldwork, fish was scarce and the 
factories were paying as much as USh2,200/kg of fresh fish.  At this price, our “average” 
processing factory would be making a loss of US$0.26/kg of fillet.  This loss can be 
borne in the short run in order to keep overseas customers happy.  However, if there was 
a structural shift in the price of fresh fish that increased the average price from 
USh1,800/kg to US$2,030/kg, the factory would make a long term loss if overhead costs 
could not be reduced. 
 
Similarly if, from the average scenario, throughput declined from 70% of capacity to 
43%, the factory would again make a loss. 
 
We were unable to gauge the extent to which factory overhead costs can be reduced.  
However, a large part of these costs is incurred through the stringent quality procedures 
and testing that access to the EU market requires.  There is a limit to which such costs 
can be reduced before quality standards suffer and Uganda’s harmonised access to the 
EU market is put in jeopardy. 
 
Costs and margins in the fresh fish trade to Kigali 
 
The following analysis is presented as a very rough indication of costs and margins 
involved in the trade of fresh fish from Lake Kyoga to Kigali.  It is based on the 
experience of just one exporter and is therefore open to the criticism that it is not 
representative.  All assumptions and workings appear in appendix A3. 
 
Profitability is sensitive to the price of fish both at the lake and in the market.  Given that 
both tilapia and nile perch are traded and both have different prices, the average cost of 
raw material depends heavily on the relative availability of these species.   
 
The trip to Kigali takes about one week to complete, including time spent collecting fish 
at Lake Kyoga.  In this light, profitability does not seem excessive, especially in the light 
of the possibility that fish may spoil in transit and fetch lower pri es in Kigali.  On 
occasion, the trader is able to pick-up a backload of freight from Kigali to Kampala, 
thereby substantially increasing his profits.  
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Table 4.3  Fresh Fish Exporter to Kigali Costs and Margins 
 
 USh per trip USh per kg of  
fish 
US$ per kg of 
fish 
%  of costs 
Operating costs - variable:     
  Raw material              3,825,000                        850                       0.49 68% 
Sub-total variable costs              3,825,000                        850                     0.49 68% 
Operating costs - fixed:     
  Vehicle hire (including driver)                 600,000                        133                       0.08 11% 
  Fuel                 520,000                        116                       0.07 9% 
  Labour                 100,000                          22                       0.01 2% 
  Local Ugandan taxes                   50,000                          11                       0.01 1% 
  Ice                 350,000                        78                       0.04 6% 
  Import duties                 160,000                          36                       0.02 3% 
Sub-total fixed costs              1,780,000                        396                       0.23 32% 
     
Total operating costs              5,605,000                     1,246                       0.72 100% 
     
Revenue              5,760,000                     1,280                       0.74  
     
Profit (loss)                 155,000                          34                       0.02  
Source: Authors’ Fieldwork 
 
4.7  Efficiency constraints and opportunities  
 
Our constraints and opportunities analysis was confined to the factory processed fish 
supply chain.  This should not be taken as an indication of the unimportance of other 
supply chains but merely reflects the lack of documented information on regional and 
domestic trade.  In the time available to us, we were unable to add substantially to this 
base of knowledge and therefore felt unable to conduct a well-founded analysis of 
constraints and opportunities in these supply chains.   
 
For the factory processed fish export supply chain, we concentrated our investigations on 
what we saw as three crucial areas: 
 
· Reducing post harvest los es 
· Increasing value added 
· Reducing air-f eight charges 
 
Post harvest losses  
 
Care should be taken when defining post harvest losses in the context of the export 
supply chain.  Very few if any of the fish caught on Ugandan lakes do not reach 
consumers in o e form or another.  A better term would be “post harvest rejection” 
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because the fish that is rejected by factory buyers is almost always sold onto the local 
market, albeit at a substantial discount.  The financial loss involved in not being able to 
export all the fish offered to factory buyers is felt particularly keenly because it represents 
a loss of export revenue. 
 
Post harvest rejection is said to occur at every level of the supply chain in Uganda.  
Estimates for total losses rates range from 15 to 40%.  Our own fieldwork suggests that 
rates may be even lower than the lowest estimate, and that the highest estimate almost 
certainly presents an out-of-date picture.  At the transport boat level of the chain, where 
the major losses are said to occur, operators have been investing in larger and better 
insulated boats.  Furthermore the availability of ice provided by the factories to the 
transport boat operators has increased.  Evidence now suggests that, apart from isolated 
incidences of very high losses, rej ction rates at this level are less than 2% (a figure of 
1.5% is likely).   
 
A more serious problem might lie at the capture level.  Fishermen do not generally have 
access to fish lockers and ice, and therefore the catch is prone to being left in the open 
sun for extended periods.  The problem here might not be a lack of cheap methods to 
reduce quality deterioration but may simply be a lack of knowledge of storage practices.
 
Other losses simply occur through poor handling.  One member of our team visibly
winced each time he saw a sack of fish being dropped with a bone crunching thud onto 
the concrete inspection platform of a gazetted export landing site.  Simple training and 
enforcement of standards would reduce losses caused by rough handling. 
 
Whatever the level of post harvest rejection, it is likely that significant improvements can 
be made before the costs outweigh the benefits.  The Government of Uganda is soon 
likely to receive an African Development Bank loan of approximately US$35 million in 
order to upgrade landing sites and improve Uganda’s capacity to prevent illegal exports 
of fish to Kenya and Tanzania.  Plans for upgrading landing sites include the provision of 
ice-making plants at several locations on lakes Victoria and Kyoga.  Providing these 
facilities have been planned and located with commercial justification, and that 
competent private sector players are available to run the installations, we believe that the 
loan will make a positive contribution to reducing post harvest rejection rate. 
 
Simple fish handling training provided to fishermen, transport boat operators and 
processing factory operators would also help to reduce rejection rates.  A source of 
funding could come from the largest overseas importers, particularly those in Europe who 
showed considerable commitment to the Lake Victoria fishery at the time of the last EU 
export ban.  These companies have an interest in ensuring that the maximum sustainable 
quantity of fish is exported from the region and they therefore might be willing to 
contribute jointly to a training fund.  We recommend that the Fisheries Department or, 
when it is established, the new Fisheries Agency should approach suitable importers with 
a request for help. 
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Allowing fishermen access to ice would also have an impact o  reducing post harvest 
rejection.  In practice this will be hard to achieve, particularly as transport boat operators 
have vested interests in ensuring that ice does not reach fishermen. 
 
Finally, the Fisheries department could consider introducingminim m standards for 
transport boats to ensure that rejection rates are kept to a minimum.  While existing 
transport boat operators appear well able to afford further investments, the introduction of 
standards would have to be handled carefully in order to e sure that competition between 
operators is not restricted by discouraging new entrants to the business. 
 
Value addition 
 
Processing profits have decreased over recent years largely because of investment in 
raising quality standards and increases in raw mate i l prices.  As profit margins have 
narrowed, factory owners have been increasingly concerned to maximise the revenue that 
they receive from fish fillets and by-products.  This has involved increasing the size of 
fillets through more skilful filleting and is now concentrating on further processing of 
fillets into consumer sized portions.  The export of nile perch swim bladders is well 
established but there are probably other fish by-products that can be cost effectively 
processed into higher value products for the domestic and export markets.  The Common 
Fund for Commodities has granted money to the EAC’s Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organisation to research value adding opportunities.  The project has only just begun but 
will investigate market potential for new fish products and assess the financial and 
technical feasibility of producing and marketing the products.   
 
With the current private and public sector initiatives underway, there appears to be little 
point in recommending further action on increasing value addition.    
 
Although the fish factory owners recognise that they have to increase the value gained 
from fish in order to remain competitive, there is a view that the innovations will have 
little effect on profitability because the benefits will b  passed upstream through stiff 
competition between factories for fish.  Whether the full benefits of innovations will 
reach fishermen is a moot point and depends on how competitive the transport boat 
business becomes.   
 
Air-freight 
 
At US$1.40 to 1.50/kg, the cost of air-freighting fish from Entebbe is considerably more 
expensive than from Nairobi, where rates range from US$1.00 to 1.10.  Uganda’s Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) believes that there is no reason why freight rates from Entebbe 
can not be at least as competitive as those in other parts of the region. 
 
Competition between airlines is a key factor.  In 1999, when scheduled freight flights 
were being operated by British Airways, Sabena as well the two current scheduled 
operators, Air France and Egypt Air, fish freight rates came down to US$1.10 to 1.20/kg.  
Most fish is currently exported on charter flights but the imminent re-entry of British 
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Airways to the market may mark a return to significant competition among scheduled 
carriers. 
 
The CAA has been working hard to reduce the costs of using Entebbe airport for freight.  
For instance, runway lighting fees have been abolished, and landing and air-navigatio  
fees have been rationalised to make overall aeronautical charges significantly cheaper 
than in both Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (CAA 2002).  Unfortunately, the CAA has so far 
had less success in tackling three other constraints that inflate the cost of freight from 
Entebbe: 
 
The high cost of fuel:  Aviation fuel currently has to be piped from Mombasa to Kisumu 
and Eldoret in Kenya and then transported by road tanker to Entebbe.  The CAA believes 
that fuel costs can be reduced by up to 36% if Uganda can negotiate concessionary rates 
with the Kenya Pipeline Company11 and the fuel can be ferried on Lake Victoria directly 
to Entebbe. 
 
The high cost of airport handling:  Although the CAA has forced ENHAS (Entebbe’s 
principal handling agent) to reduce its handling charges, the rates are still uncompetitive 
with those in Nairobi.  Two freight consolidation companies currently hold licences from 
the CAA to handle their own cargo, but only ENHAS has a general freight handling 
licence.  This monopoly on general freight handling compares unfavourably with the 
situation in Nairobi, where six companies compete for busin ss and handling charges are 
substantially lower.  We recognise that there are political sensitivities involved in the 
potential liberalisation of the freight handling market in Entebbe. 
 
Empty space on inbound flights:  Air-freight operators nearly always have empty space 
on inbound flights.  To cover costs and maintain profits, airlines have to compensate for 
this by charging higher rates for outbound freight.  The CAA believes that this situation 
can be turned around if it can promote Entebbe as a r gion l freight hub for Central and 
Eastern Africa.  In part, this can be done through upgrading the second runway at 
Entebbe and encouraging the private sector to invest in new handling and storage 
facilities.  A reduction in imported freight handling charges would also help. 
 
The CAA’s plans have been on the drawing board for at least three years.  Although most 
of them would be reasonably cheap to implement, progress has been slow probably 
because of other priorities in the Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications (the 
CAA’s line ministry).   
 
We believe that valuable foreign exchange earnings are being lost to the country through 
inaction on reducing air-fre ght rates.  The CAA estimates that rates can come down by 
as much as 40%.  Even if they come down by just 33%, equivalent to US$0.50/kg of fish, 
a total of over US$7.5 million per year could be saved in freight charges on fish alone 
(substantially more would be saved on freight rates for flowers and fresh produce).  
Because of strong demand for ile perch in Europe, there is genuine reason to believe that 
a large proportion of the savings would remain in Uganda. 
                                         
11 Currently, each oil company negotiates on an individual basis. 
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Reducing international freight rates is a key element in enhancing Uganda’s export 
competitiveness.  We therefore suggest that the group of donors (EC, USAID, World 
Bank and DFID) who are currently involved in discussions with the Ugandan 
Government on its export competitiveness strategy, should meet representatives from the 
CAA, the Ministry of Works and MoFPED in order to investigate how the CAA’s plans 
could be implemented.   
 
4.8  Raising fishermen’s incomes 
 
There can be little doubt that some of the money released by the cost efficiencies and 
value addition described in the previous section would find its way into fishermen’s 
pockets.  However, fishermen’s lack of bargaining power limits the extent to which they 
can gain a greater share of export earnings.
 
The most enduring way to ensure that fishermen receive greater prices would be to 
encourage fishermen’s marketing organisations.  Not only would collective bargaining 
with traders allow fishermen to realise higher prices but the greater access to formal 
sector finance that legalised group structures tends to promote would also allow the 
organisations to gain greater access to ice and, in some cases, to integrate vertically into 
the transport boat business.   
 
All this sounds wonderful on paper but as noted in a previous section of this report, the 
history of primary producer organisation in Uganda and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is 
littered with failure.  This bitter experience has taught practitioners that groups must be 
self-selecting (i.e., not formed by external agencies) and must not be encouraged to 
undertake commercial operations that are beyond their capacities. 
 
With these simple rules in mind, we recommend that the Fisheries Department (or 
Agency), donors and NAADS should consider establishing a specialised unit that would 
promote the benefits of marketing associations to existing fishermen’s groupings and 
then to build commercial skills in those groups that volunteer for assistance.  Given 
DFID’s interest in sustainable livelihoods and artisanal fishing communities (through the 
Integrated Lake Management Project), we recommend that it should consider acting as a 
catalyst in this process.   
 
4.9  Summary of key findings  
 
· Insufficient information exists on domestic and regional trade in fresh and processed 
fish 
· Most fishermen are in weak bargaining positions due to their remote locations and 
inability to store fish. 
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· The only sustainable way of improving fishermen’s bargaining positions is to 
encourage marketing associations.  This must be done sensitively to avoid mistakes of 
the past. 
· Profits in the transport boat business are high, even when adjusted for risk.  This 
suggests the existence of anti-competitive practices at this level of the supply chain, 
although how practices are maintained is not clear. 
· Competition in other parts of the supply chain appears to be healthy. 
· Post harvest rejection rates for export are coming down a d are probably not as high 
as are generally perceived.  However, there is almost certainly still room for 
improvement at all levels of the supply chain in terms of fish handling and storage. 
· Several export processors are experimenting with ways of adding greater value to 
their outputs.  In time, all factories will have to adopt similar practices in order to 
remain competitive. 
· Large amounts of fish, flower and fresh produce export revenues are lost to Uganda 
because of uncompetitive air-freight rates.  Rates can be significantly reduced if 
competition between scheduled carriers can be increased and the cost structure at 
Entebbe can be reduced.   
 
4.10  Recommended Implementation Plans  
 
1. Information on domestic and regional fish marketing:  Although various analyses of 
domestic and regional marketing are supposed to have been conducted by three of the 
projects encountered during our fieldwork, in reality very little progress has been 
made.  We recommend that the donors that support these projects (DFID and the EC 
Delegation) ensure that appropriate research on trade flows, volumes, costs and 
margins is conducted.  The research should be designed to yield information that will 
inform policy decisions. 
 
2. Improving the bargaining position of fishermen:  We recommend that the Fisheries 
Department (or Agency, when it comes into existence), donors and NAADS should 
consider establishing a specialised unit that would promote the benefits of marketing 
associations to existing fishermen’s groupings and then build commercia  skills in 
those groups that volunteer for assistance.  Given DFID’s interest in sustainable 
livelihoods and artisanal fishing communities (through the Integrated Lake 
Management Project), we recommend that it should consider acting as a catalyst i 
this process.   
 
3. Reducing post harvest losses:   We suggest that the Fisheries Department (or the 
Agency) should investigate the possibility of introducing minimum standards for 
transport boats to ensure that rejection rates are kept to a minimum.  While existing 
transport boat operators appear well able to afford further investments, the 
introduction of standards would have to be handled carefully in order to ensure that 
competition between operators is not restricted by discouraging new entrants to the 
business. 
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4. Reducing post harvest losses:  W  recommend that the Fisheries Department (or the 
Agency) should approach large European nile perch importers to request 
contributions to a fund that will be used to teach fishermen, transport boat employees, 
and landing site labourers good practice in storing and handling fish.  Importers’ 
interest in ensuring maximum exports from the Lake Victoria Fishery should ensure a 
sympathetic hearing. 
 
5. Reducing air-f eight charges from Entebbe:  We recommend that the group of donors 
(EC, USAID, World Bank and DFID) who are currently involved in discussions with 
the Ugandan Government on its export competitiveness strategy, should meet 
representatives from the CAA, the Ministry of Works and MoFPED in order to 
investigate how the CAA’s plans for reducing air-freight rates could be implemented.   
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Section 5.  Maize 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This section addresses the specific issues relating to the transaction costs of maize 
marketing. 
 
On the advice of sector stakeholders, the following maize producing districts, exhibiting 
representative, yet contrasting, features of the country’s maize trade, were visited:  
 
Kapchorwa (Eastern Region): The district is relatively unique having only one main road 
link with the rest of the country and is one of the smallest districts in Uganda (about 1740 
sq,km in area) and is located at relatively high altitude (1200/2500 metres above sea 
level). It has one maize season (March/February), is a surplus maize producer and has a 
substantial trade with the rest of the country and nearby Kenya. 
 
Mbale (Eastern Region): The district produces a wide variety of agricultural crops and 
generally has a maize surplus. It has two maize seasons, viz, March/October and 
August/February, but despite being a large producer, trade outside the district is small, 
with much of its maize consumed locally. 
 
Iganga (Eastern Region): The district is one of the most populous areas in Uganda, 
grows a large variety of crops, and serves as a transit point for goods and services from 
both Eastern Uganda and Kenya, and Kampala, Jinja and southern Uganda. It is a major 
surplus maize producing district, with a substantial trade outside the district and two 
seasons, viz, March/October and August/March. 
 
Masindi (Western Region): A major surplus maize producing district, with a substantial 
trade outside the district and two seasons, March/October and August/March. Maize is 
the district’s main traded agricultural crop.  
 
Consultations were held with, farmers, farmers groups, roadside traders, village traders, 
urban traders, Kampala market traders, transporters, “posho” millers, DAO’s, NAARI, 
WFP, and UGT Ltd. 
 
Background to Production and Marketing 
 
Maize has been traditionally cultivated by Uganda’s small-sc le farmers as both a source 
of food and  income generation, and forms an import t part of the farming system, 
particularly in Eastern Uganda. In common with most African countries, post 
independence Uganda grain production and marketing was subject to State control. 
However, Government intervention through its parastatals, the Produce Marketing, and 
Food and Beverage Boards ceased in the 1990’s. The market is now completely 
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liberalised, however, it should be noted that Uganda does not have, as yet, a formal trade 
structure for the marketing of maize. 
 
Contribution to the Economy 
 
Maize is an important part of the agricultural sector, which in 1999/2000 accounted for 
41.6% of GDP. Maize also contributes, in most years, to foreign exchange earnings, 
being an important component of the non-traditi al export sector. As mentioned 
elsewhere in this report, export statistics are incomplete and monetary values doubtless 
considerably understated, as most export activity is informal trade with Kenya. However, 
the official value of maize exports in 2000 was stated as US dollars 2.43 million, and 
averaged about US dollars 12 million p.a in the period 1995/2000 inclusive. Maize export 
values have declined from a high of US dollars 20.617 million in 1995, to 2.43 million in 
2000. The decline is considered to be a result of the unavailability of ccurate export 
statistics covering the informal trade to Kenya. Our study illustrates that maize, given the 
development of a formal marketing structure, has the potential to develop into a 
significant export crop.  
 
Poverty Eradication 
 
Maize is a traditional annual crop grown in most regions of the country, almost 
exclusively by small-scale farmers, for both home food consumption and income 
generation. It is an important part of the country’s farming system being grown in pure 
stand, inter cropped and in association with other crops. 
 
Supporting Institutional Framework 
 
Following the liberalization of the cereals market during the 1990’s the key parastatal 
bodies controlling the maize trade, viz, The Produce Marketing Board and Food & 
Beverages Board, became defunct. According to leading sector stakeholders there are no 
major institutional and/or regulatory constraints to the development of Uganda’s maize 
sector. 
 
Under the PMA, the delivery of agricultural services to farmers is the responsibility of 
NAADS reporting to the MAAIF, and working closely with local governments. NAR0 
has a long standing Cereals Research Programme.  
 
The pivotal private sector organisation supporting the maize trade is Uganda Grain 
Traders Ltd (UGT), registered on 5th September 2001, whose shareholders comprise 
sixteen leading Uganda, based grain trading companies. UGT is representative of the 
majority of the trade, and only five trading companies declined to become shareholders. 
To a large extent, the UGT has replaced the Uganda Grain Exporters Association 
(UGEA) which is inactive. The UGT, as a representative trade organisation, has the 
advantage of being a limited company, rather than an association, which is a definite 
advantage in dealing with private financial institutions and other trade partners. 
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UGT interacts, and claims to be driving the agenda, with the following major public 
sector bodies in matters relating to the grain trade: 
 
· Ministry of Trade 
· Ministry of Agriculture 
· Ministry of Finance 
· Bank of Uganda 
· UEPB 
· UBS 
 
Sectoral Issues 
 
Given the free market in maize following the liberalisation of the sector, the main issues 
do not concern policy, institutional and regulatory matters, but relate to the lack of a 
formal maize marketing structure. This key issue affects all aspects of the marketing 
chain, and if resolved, could have a significant influence on the improvement of farmers’ 
incomes and their move towards commercial agriculture. Furthermore, the reform of 
maize sector, driven by private sector innovation and initiative, has the potential to 
contribute significantly to the country’s economy, in terms of rural and urban 
employment and incomes, poverty alleviation and foreign exchange earnings. Full details 
of the constraints facing maize sector reform and an implementation an for chieving 
this objective is contained elsewhere in this report. In summary, the main issues involved 
are: 
 
· Improved net prices to farmers to encourage production.
· National standardisation of maize quality and contracts. 
· Crop finance. 
· Finance for investment in storage and handling facilities. 
· The creation of authoritative maize price discovery mechanism, and the countrywide 
dissemination of market information. 
· The future of the informal export trade to Kenya. 
 
5.2  Maize Supply 
 
Maize is grown i all regions of Uganda, with the Eastern Region currently producing 
over 50% of annual output. 
 
The area planted to maize in 1999/2000 (two seasons) was stated by UBS (ref: Crop 
Survey Module) at 665,000 hectares, yielding 739,000 mt. 
 
Whilst production is influenced by climate patterns, farmers planting intentions, in excess 
of subsistence requirements, are largely influenced by price levels and overall output 
tends to fluctuate accordingly. For example, the 2001 first season’s (Jan/June) maize 
prices in Iganga District declined from almost Ushs 250 / kg at the beginning of the year 
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to around Ush 100 / kg by third quarter(source: NALG market information reports). 
Consequently, lower production for 2002 is being forecast.    
 
Comparative production for the 1995/1996 and 1999/2000 are given in the table below: 
 
 
   Table 5.1  Maize Production: 1995/96 – 1999/2000 
 
Seasonal Production in mt 
 
 
Region 
1995/96 
 
1999/2000 
 
Increase / (Decrease) 
Eastern 282,000 408,000 + 45 % 
Western 149,000 124,000 - (16 %) 
Central 46,000 151,000 + 228% 
Northern 61,000 57,000 - (3%) 
TOTAL 538,000 739,000 + 37% 
   (Source: UBS – Crop Survey Module, 1999/2000) 
 
Maize production data should be treated with caution as the crop is almost exclusively 
grown by small scale farmers with over half of the production area being mixed or 
associated stand. Official statistical data is based on figures given in survey samples, 
which are extrapolated to give national average farm sizes and yields. The reliability of 
the data collected under the UBS’s Crop Survey Module – 1999/2000, has been evaluated 
in terms of coefficients of variation (CV’s), defined as the percentage ratio of standard 
deviation to the mean, generally accepted by statisticians as a measure of relative 
variability. The overall national CV for 1999/2000 maize production was stated by the 
UBS to have been 4.57 %, a level considered acceptable. However, there are anomalies in 
the Crop Survey Module, as regional CV’s varied from a low of 6.6 % in the Central 
Region to 12.2 % in the Northern Region. 
 
5.3  Maize Demand 
 
It has been estimated that Uganda’s domestic market for maize is around 350/400,000-mt 
p.a (Source: UGT/IDEA Project). Whilst maize has long being a major annual crop for 
Uganda farmers, unlike neighbouring countries, such as Kenya, and Tanzania, it does not 
form the major part of the population’s traditional diet. Therefore, maize is mainly grown 
for income generation rather than food security. However, maize, eaten grilled or whole, 
or as porridge, is an element in, particularly, the urban diet. The main domestic market 
for maize is the institutions, such, as prisons, schools and hospitals. The increasing cost  
of the traditional staple, matooke may influence staple food consumption patterns, which 
may result in i creased domestic maize consumption.. 
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The main domestic maize market is Kampala, accounting for around 50% of formal 
trade. The main buying centre is the Kisenyi market, which is dominated by the Kisenyi 
Millers Association, a group of 88 “posho millers”.    
 
In normal production years, Uganda has surplus available for export. Traditionally, 
demand from Western Kenya has acted as a safety valve for the disposal of surplus maize 
from Uganda’s eastern region. This trade is almost entirely informal and accurate volume 
statistics do not exist. However, in good production years it is estimated by traders that 
around 100,000 mt of Ugandan maize is sold to Kenya. 
 
In 2001 the UGT exported 20,000 mt to Zambia, and the WFP purchased 30,000 mt, 
therefore, the formal export trade accounted for 50,000 mt, and the informal export trade, 
possibly, 100,000 mt. 
 
The UGT considers that the Kenya market, which in normal production years is usually 
in deficit, represents an opportunity for Ugandan exporters. Currently, the Kenya  deficit 
is satisfied by imports from, primarily, South Africa. 
 
The World Food Programme (WFP): In 2001 the WFP purchased around 50,000 mt of 
food under their aid programme including, 30,000mt of maize from Uganda traders. 
Maize is bought for delivery to their warehouses in Tororo (destined for distressed areas 
in North Eastern Uganda and Northern Kenya) and Kampala (destined for distressed 
areas in the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda). 
 
The WFP’s standard terms of purchase are as follows: 
 
(1) Contracts are usually for a minimum of 50 mt, and payment is in US Dollars. 
(2)  A performance bond of 5% of contract value, valid for 90 days, in favour of WFP 
is required. 
(3) Payment by the WFP is 30 days after presentation of documents. 
(4) Quality standards are currently: 
 
Moisture – 14% max / Insect damage – 3 % max / Broken – 2% max / 
Shriveled, Diseased, discoloured – 5 % max / Other coloured grains – 4 % 
max / Foreign matter – 0.5 % max / Total defective grains – 14 % / 
Aflotoxin – 10 ppb 
 
International traders have commented that the WFP’s quality standards are lower than 
those for internationally traded maize. However, the WFP stated during discussions that 
their purchases of Ugandan maize was, generally, of lower quality than that purchased 
from South Africa, the EU and the USA, due it being classified as, what they term 
“peasant maize.” They expressed interest in supporting any measures aimed at improving 
farmer’ maize quality, as they view Uganda as a regular source of maize supply to their 
food aid programme in the East African Region. However, it should be noted that the 
WFP operates its procurement policy on a commercial trading basis and will curtail its 
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Ugandan maize buying activity at import parity price levels, currently around Ush 200 / 
kg. 
 
The UGT Ltd: The UGT, was formed in September 2001 by sixteen major Ugandan 
grain trading companies with the objective of coordinating the sourcing, drying, cleaning 
and grading of maize for sale to the WFP, export markets (currently only Zambia), and 
the domestic market. Since formati n a major activity has been sourcing maize to fulfill 
the Zambian export contract, totaling 40,000 mt. It is unlikely that the contract volume 
will be fully met as domestic maize deficit is forecast by April/May/June, 2002. 
Probably, final shipments against the Zambian contract will be made in March 2002, 
resulting in around 60% fulfillment of the contact. The Zambian contract has highlighted 
a number of constraints in the marketing system, particularly, the inability to bid from 
stock, which needs adequate financing, poor quality, an inefficient regional transport 
system, and a lack of hedging facilities and timely market information.    
 
With regard to maize export quality standards, Unga Kenya Ltd’s, Kenya Bureau of 
Standards and Kenya NCPB quality p rameters are listed in Annexe II. This information 
was obtain in mid 2000, and may have changed, however it is included for reference 
purposes in the context of establishing Uganda national standards (Source: Feasibility 
Study on the Improvement of Grain Marketing Systems in Western Kenya – NRI, July 
2000) 
 
Price determination: There is no formal domestic price determination point, although 
the development of market information is growing through the activities of organisations 
such as the IITA-Foodnet MIS programme, and the recently introduced MTN market 
information service, using the medium of the mobile telephone. 
 
Global maize marketing information is available from the daily price information 
reported by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the South African Futures Exchange 
(SAFEX). Regional commodity exchanges, quoting maize prices, also exist in Zambia 
(ZIMACE) and Kenya (KACE), although they are not either future markets, or auctions. 
 
5.4  The Maize Marketing Chain 
 
The marketing chain for maize is illustrated diagrammatically below. The chain is based 
on that in the maize surplus areas of Kapchorwa and Iganga, both which have a 
substantial trade at district, intra regional and export (mainly informal trade to Kenya) 
level. 
 
Regional differences in the marketing chain are minimal in other maize surplus districts 
such as Masindi and Kasese. Districts, which normally have a deficit in maize 
production, such as Rakai and Masaka, have shorter marketing chains, usually 
terminating at district urban centre level.  
 
The various stages in the marketing chain are defined as follows: 
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Farm Gate: The farmer’s point of sale after harvest, involving no transport cost and 
rudimentary packing 
 
Agent/Trader: Various “middlemen, acting as agents for rural and urban market tr ders, 
or trading on their own account. They can be itinerants, usually bicyclists, or roadside 
store based traders. They are normally located near to farmers' homes in their 
“catchment” areas 
 
Rural Markets: Village markets, which can be either permanent or rotating, with 
different locations on different days of the week. 
 
Institutions: Primarily prisons, hospitals, schools and other public sector institutions, 
buying both maize to be contract milled, and maize flour. This sector represents the 
largest single domestic market for maize and maize products. 
 
Consumers: Buyers of maize for “posho milling”, and maize flour for household 
consumption. 
 
Posho Mills: Small millers at farm (rare), rural and urban level milling maize, on a toll or 
own account basis, into flour for food consumption and by-pro ucts, eg, maize bran / 
husks, for formulation into animal feed compounds.  
 
Feed Mills: Buyers of maize and maize milling by products for animal feed compound 
formulation. They can be located in rural, urban nd m jor centres, such as Kampala. 
 
Urban Markets: Usually major buying centres in district capitals, such as Iganga and 
Kapchorwa, in the regions surveyed, where there is a wider spectrum of market 
participants and greater trading activity. 
 
Neighbouring Districts: Buying centres for maize emanating outside the district, eg, 
Mbale buying from Kapchorwa, and, Kampala, buying from Iganga.  
 
Kampala / Tororo / Kenya / The Formal Export Market: This stage in the chain 
refers to (1) maize bought and assembled, stored and treated, for export through the 
formal market to, say, Zambia and WFP destinations (2) the informal market from 
Eastern Uganda to Kenya, particularly, Kitale and Bungoma, which appears to be a 
regular seasonal trading feature in this area.  
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Figure 5.1  Maize marketing flow diagram 
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5.5  Transactions 
 
The transactions involved in the marketing of maize are complex, and for the purposes of 
this study, four broad functional steps have been recognised in the maize marketing 
chain, viz, 
 
· From farm gate to agents/traders store/rural market in rural areas.
· From rural market to urban market. 
· From urban market to major buying centres outside the district of maize production. 
· The export market. 
 
The various stages in the supply/value chain are shown in the diagram and brief 
descriptions above; however, it must be noted that some of the elements making up the 
chain are by-passed. In reducing overall transaction costs market participants endeavour 
to shorten the chain by, for example, eliminating “middlemen”, either because they have 
no perceived economic role to play, or by po ling produce in order to achieve economies 
of scale. 
 
The pooling of produce and its sale though farmers marketing groups is the most 
important method of reducing transaction costs by achieving economies of scale, 
improved quality, minimizing losses and improving net prices to farmers. Farmers 
marketing groups are not widespread in the Uganda maize trade; however, three 
illustrative case studies are described hereunder. 
 
Further economies of scale have been achieved through the formation of the trading 
group, UGT, whose activities are described under “Demand” above, and the Kampala 
based “posho” millers group, the Kisenyi Millers Association. 
 
At the rural and urban trader level, innovations and developments to improve transaction 
efficiency include thgreater use of mobile phones to elicit market information, the trend 
towards younger, better educated traders, and the reduction of unit transport costs through 
a greater appreciation of the significance of “back cargoes” and the use of larger capacity 
vehicles.  
 
Farmers Groups – Case Studies 
 
Farmers groups have the potential to reduce overall transaction costs and to improve 
relative net prices to farmers. The following three case studies, which illustrate 
encouraging developments for the future of FCE's in Uganda, were analysed during the 
course of the assignment. 
 
(I) The Nakisenhe Adult Literacy Group (NALG) - Iganga 
 
Background: The NALG is farmers’ maize marketing group, located in Iganga. It 
developed from an adult literacy group formed in 1993, into a farmers group with the aim 
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of encouraging the pooling of their produce to improve marketing efficiency, quality and 
prices. NALG claim to be pioneers of a system, now in its fifth season which has 
transformed farmers into farmer /traders. NALG currently receives technical and 
financial support from the IDEA Project. 
 
The NALG currently has about 850 active members, all farmers, 60% of, which are 
women, drawn from the Iganga, Kamuli, Bugiri and Mayuge districts. The group’s 
organisation involves a management committee of seven members, a secretariat of six 
members and a general assembly of all members. 
 
In 2001 NALG sold a total of 1367 mt of maize (450 mt in season (1), and 917 mt in 
season (2)), and have a target of 2200 mt (1200mt + 1000 mt) in 2002.  
 
NALG -  Function & Services: NALG function as (1) a sales/commission agent for its 
members, (2) operate 16 (ex Cooperative) stores in the 4 districts from which 
membership is drawn, (3) provide training and advice on post harvest handling and 
quality standards, (4) provide agricultural inputs, (5) provide marketing information to 
farmers. 
 
Stores: are a standard 50ft x 150 ft (capacity – 300mt), and are rented at Ush 100,000 per 
season (6 months). When visited, the stores seemed to lack any security. 
Sales Commission: is currently Ushs 10 / kg, and is approximately 10 % of sales value 
(Nb; the current maize price is only about Ush 100 / kg, compared to Ush 200 to 250 / kg 
last year) 
Post Harvest Extension Services: are geared to meeting buyers’ quality standard 
requirements. 
Agricultural Inputs: are provided by making credit available, or in “kind” and are secured 
against the value of farmers’ maize in store. 
Marketing Information:  maize prices is provided weekly at NALG stores, and show 
levels at NALG store, Town and Village. 
 
NALG Operations: Farmers deliver maize to NALG stores, or NALG arranges collection. 
Maize is cleaned and checked for quality before storage is permitted. If the maize is of 
marginal quality NALG will clean it, but it is of poor quality and highly infested, it is 
rejected and usually sold to local Posho Millers. 
 
When a farmer’s maize has been accepted into a NALG store he/she is given an official 
storage certificate, issued by the Nakisenhe Produce Centre (NPC) which states: 
 
· Item (maize) 
· Grade (A or B – as tested before acceptance) 
· Quantity (minimum 1 bag of 100 kgs) 
· Received by (Store managers signature) 
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+ An authorisation by the owner (farmer) for the NPC to sell the certified produce at a 
minimum price, less deduction of fees which are as follows (current Ush rates in 
brackets): 
 
Drying (4 / kg) – from 18/20% to, say < 14% which usually takes 2 days at 2 / kg 
per day. 
Packing / stitching  (2 / kg)
Bagging (5 / kg) 
Storage (5 / kg) – no time limit / until sale is made.
Transfer (3 / kg) – transport from farm to store, if required. 
Sales Commission (10 / kg)
 
TOTAL COSTS = 29 / kg 
 
The maize is either sold by the NPC, or can be taken back by the certificate holder, after 
deduction of fees. The certificates are transferable, usually b tween farmers with the 
endorsement of the NPC. The system is a basic form of warehouse receipt system, but 
without credit availability – except for agricultural inputs where, apparently, the stored 
maize is used as collateral.  
 
Marketing & Sales: A primary aim of NALG is to obtain premium prices for its members 
by pooling quantities, improving and standardising quality, and contracting with larger 
buyers / traders, ie, eliminating certain of the middlemen in the marketing chain (eg, 
itinerant traders, roadside assemblers, village market operators). 
 
A main market is the World Food Programme (WFP), whose terms require delivery to a 
specified location, eg WFP Warehouse Tororo. Contracts are usually for a minimum of 
100 mt, and payment is in US Dollars. 
 
For obvious practical reasons NALG contracts with the WFP as principal, and not as 
agent on behalf of its farmer members. It would appear that farmer members are not 
aware of the margin made by the NALG between NALG store and delivered WFP store. 
There are costs involved in this aspect of the transaction, which were advised as follows: 
 
Cost of Performance bond in favour of WFP – 5% of contract value, valid for 90 
days 
Interest – payment by the WFP is 30 days after presentation of documents 
Inspection and certification charges (SGS) – Ush 1 / kg 
Fumigation certificate charges (MOA) – Ush 40,000 per contract 
Membership of Associations (ACC) – Ush 100 for each registration 
 
Notwithstanding the above costs, there be an additional profit margin over and above 
their sales commission, which may cause problems (lack of transparency / maybe not 
deliberate) in the future, as NALG expands volume. 
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Other markets are Kampala based traders, eg UGT Quality standards were not available, 
but believed to be higher than those ofe WFP. 
 
Conclusion: The NALG model is of great interest in view of its potential as a model for 
replication in maize production areas country wide, in other crop marketing systems, eg, 
beans and cassava, and for development as a genuine warehouse financing systems, 
benefiting small scale farmers. 
 
The key issue is whether NALG is a sustainable operation, without the financial and 
technical support currently being given by the IDEA Project  
 
(2) The Masindi Seed & Grain Growers Association – V lue Added Centre (MSGGA), 
Masindi. 
 
The MSGGA was originally formed in 1984, as a cooperative, but its current constitution 
dates only from 1995.It comprise about 100 farmer members (about 50 active members) 
located within a radius of approximately 50 kms from Masindi Town. Its objective is to 
buy, dry, clean and market maize with a view to adding value for the benefit of farmers. 
It also handles maize for third parties, eg, CBO’s and refugee groups, and operates in 
other commodities, primarily beans.
 
In 2001 the Association handled between 800 and 1000 mt of maize including volumes 
traded on its own account.  
 
Services: It provides agricultural extension and crop post harvest / storage training to 
farmers. 
 
Costs: The following were given: 
 
 Transport (Farm to Masindi Town central store) – Ush 10/kg 
 On-loading/weighing – Ush 2/kg (weighing at farm gate is discouraged) 
 Off-loading/stacking – Ush 3/kg 
Local taxes – Ush 2/kg 
Fumigation – Ush 3/kg per round, depending on level of infestation (say, once 
every 30 days) 
Drying – Ush 4/kg 
Cleaning & sorting – Ush 3/kg 
Rebagging/stitching & stacking – Ush 1.5/kg 
Cost of storage facility & management – Ush 5/kg 
MSGGA Commission – Ush 3.5/kg 
 
TOTAL – Ush 37.00/kg 
 
Maize is “pooled” and when economic quantities are available in store (say, 100 mt), 
sales are made to the WFP and UGT on a delivered Kampala and/or Tororo basis. 
Additionally, lorry loads (100 x 100kg bags – 10mt) are sold on an “off lorry" basis at the 
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Kampala Kisenyi market, and occasionally, sales are also made to traders (local and 
Kampala based) on an ex store Masindi town basis. 
 
The following tertiary marketing costs were given: 
 
Fumigation – Ush 3/kg (WFP & UGT sales) 
50 Kg WFP bagging expenses – Ush 13/kg 
Security – fixed cost/not given 
Transport – Ush 40/kg (to Tororo) & Ush 25 to 30/kg (to Kampala) 
Contingencies/taxes/losses/damage/administration – Ush 5/kg 
 
General comments: The following comments were made by the MSGGA management: 
 
· Farmers are not keen to invest in machinery and equipment to clean their maize, g, 
shalers and sticks for threshing. The threshing cost is estimated Ush 10/kg, including 
equipment, and farmers consider both the cost and labour involved to be prohibitive. 
· Farmers deliver their maize in trust and receive a storage (warehouse) receipt, which 
can be traded between members. 
· Farmers are not given credit. 
· Major constraints are: 
- The system is based on trust, which has been abused in the past (during the 
cooperative movement period). 
- There is no price differential according to farmer’s quality supplied (Nb: 
MSGGA will not accept sub standard maize into its central store) 
- Lack of affordable credit. 
- Poor infrastructure for intra-regional trade 
- The need for capacity building, particularly in marketing skills. 
- Lack of reliable, regular m rket information. 
 
Conclusions: As in the case of the NALG model, the MSGGA is of great interest in view 
of its potential as a model for replication in maize production areas country wide, and for 
development as a genuine warehouse financing system, benefiting small scale farmers. 
 
MSSGA appears to be a sustainable operation, but whether donor financial and technical 
support is being received was not revealed.  
 
(3) The Uganda National Farmers Association (UNFA) – Agribusiness Ltd (AL) 
 
AL has been established as the commercial wing of the UNFA and is a shareholder in 
UGT. In 2001 it purchased around 650 mt of maize from UNFA members, which it dried, 
cleaned and bagged as part of UGT’s export stock for the fulfillment of the Zambian 
contract. AL only pays its farmers for FAQ maize, therefore, unlike NALG and 
MAGGA, have not been trained to improve quality and have no access to premiums. 
AL’s volume operation is currently limited by limited access to trade finance. Despite its 
limitations, AL seems to havepotential to develop into a genuine farmers marketing, 
group, accruing benefits in terms of increased net incomes, at farm gate level. 
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(NB: Source: EU Commodity Market Information & Risk Management Report, Mandl & 
Mukhebi, February 2002) 
5.6  Marketing Cost Analysis 
       
In ascertaining marketing costs from farm gate to export market the methodology used by 
Vinlaw Associates Ltd in their report on “ Farm Gate to Export Market Study of Maize 
and Beans –March 1997,” for ADC/the IDEA Project has been adopted as a reference. 
 
The sources used for ascertaining unit costs/prices per kg of maize were, farmers, farmers 
groups, roadside traders, village traders, urban traders, transporters, “posho” millers, 
DAO’s and UGT Ltd. 
 
Time availability did not permit a comprehensive survey of rural, urban and tertiary 
markets and costs have been calculated on averages, estimates and previous studies. 
 
It should be noted that not all costs are incurred at each stage, and a degree of duplication 
is included in the costs. 
 
Primary Marketing Costs 
 
Primary marketing costs are defined as those incurred at first point of contact between the 
farmer and trader, which can be at farm gate, agents/buyers store or the nearest rural 
market. They comprise mainly, bagging, labour, transport and market operational costs.  
 
            Table 5.2  Primary Marketing Costs  
Unit Cost (Ushs per Kg)  
 
Kapchorwa Mbale Iganga Masindi 
Farm Gate Price (FGP) 50.00 65.00 60.00 60.00 
 
· Bagging materials 
· Labour costs (loading, sorting,  
· Weighing costs 
· Transport (Farm gate to primary 
market) 
· Market dues/local tax 
· Margins 
· Total 
 
1.00 
- 
- 
 
10.00 
- 
- 
4.00 
15.00 
 
1.00 
- 
- 
 
10.00 
 
- 
9.00 
20.00 
 
2.00 
- 
- 
 
10.00 
 
2.00 
6.00 
20.00 
 
5.00 
3.00 
- 
 
10.00 
 
2.00 
5.00 
26.00 
Primary 
Market Price 
(PMP) 
65.00 85.00 80.0 85.00 
 
Nb: 
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· Bagging material costs comprise the purchase of 100 kg bags and twine.  
· Transport costs comprise the estimated costs of bicycle and head loading, the usual 
means of carrying maize at this level. In some districts agents/traders also use pick up 
trucks. An average distance for transportation has been taken at 3 to 5 kms. 
· Much of the trade is into agent’s stores and market fees are only applicable where 
rural markets exist 
 
Secondary Marketing Costs 
 
Secondary marketing costs are defined as those involved in the movement of maize from 
primary market to urban centre (eg Kapchorwa, Mbale Iganga and Masindi towns) They 
comprise, mainly, bagging materials, labour, storage, transport, losses (in eight due to 
drying and cleaning), security and taxes/licens  fees. 
 
           Table 5.3  Secondary Marketing Costs) 
Unit Cost (Ushs per Kg)  
 
Kapchorwa Mbale Iganga Masindi 
Primary Market Price (PMP) 65.00 85.00 80.00 85.00 
 
· Bagging materials 
· Labour costs (loading, sorting, 
unloading /weighing costs) 
· Transport (rural to urban market) 
· Storage 
· Losses 
· Market dues/local tax 
· Trading Licence & security 
· Margin 
· Total 
 
- 
 
4.00 
10.00 
0.50 
2.00 
1.00 
 
- 
5.00 
22.50 
 
2.00 
 
5.00 
5.00 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
 
0.50 
3.50 
20.00 
 
2.00 
 
5.00 
5.00 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
 
0.50 
5.00 
21.50 
 
2.00 
 
4.00 
10.00 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
 
0.50 
4.50 
25.00 
Secondary 
Market Price 
(SMP) 
90.00 105.00 101.50 110.00 
 
Nb: 
· Bagging material costs are usually incurred at the primary market level. 
· Labour costs include the use of sub agent / loading and offloading. 
· Transport costs vary in accordance to the distance and type of vehicle used and 
averages for each district have been used. 
· Storage costs are incurred when traders rent stores, in some cases they store maize in 
their own homes at no cost. 
· Losses in weight occur during the process of drying, cleaning, and sorting. The most 
common causes of loss are due to:
- Moisture loss / chaff / insect damage / discolouration and shriveling of grains. 
 121
· The quoted SMP were lower at the time of the visit. 
· Examples of how transaction costs may be reduced through the operation of farmers 
groups pooling their produce are illustrated by the cost figures given by the two case 
studies above, viz, NALG, Iganga and MSGGA, Masindi. 
 
(1) NALG’s costs from farm gate to ex store, secondary market are Ush 29/kg and cover: 
 
Drying / Packing & stitching / Bagging / Storage / Transport from farm to store / 
Sales Commission  
 
(2) MSGGA’s costs from farm gate to ex store, secondary market are Ush 37/kg and 
cover: 
 
Transport / On-loading/weighing / Off-loading/stacking / Local taxes / 
Fumigation / Drying / Cleaning & sorting / Rebagging/stitching & stacking / Cost 
of storage facility & management / MSGGA Commission 
 
Whilst transaction cost comparisons in this context must be treated with caution, it is 
apparent that farmers marketing groups are able to reduce costs through greater 
efficiencies and economies of scale. 
 
Table 5.4  Tertiary Marketing Costs (transport costs only) 
Unit Cost (Ushs per K-g) 
 
  
Kapchorwa Mbale Iganga Masindi 
Secondary Market Costs (SMP) 90.00 105.00 101.50 110.00 
· Bagging materials 
· Labour costs (loading, sorting) 
· Weighing costs 
· Transport  
               Mbale 
                     Kampala 
                     Tororo 
                     Kenya 
· Market dues/local tax 
· Total 
- 
- 
- 
 
20.00 
45.00 
- 
25.00 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
20.00 
20.00 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
25.00 
40.00 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Tertiary 
market price 
(TMP) 
Mbale 
Kampala 
Kenya 
 
115.00 
120.00 
120.00  
   
 
Nb: 
· According to traders at Kampala’s Kisenyi market, transport cost could be 
considerably lower if they collected maize from urban centres with their own 
vehicles, carrying “back cargo”. 
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· Kampala traders commented that prices in urban centres are often not much lower 
than those in Kampala, therefore transport cost efficiency is the k y to successful 
trading. 
· Greater marketing information would assist in identifying suitable “back” cargoes.
 
Tertiary Market Costs 
 
Tertiary market costs are defined as the costs involved in the movement of maize from 
main urban buying centres within the District to locations outside the district, eg 
Kampala, Tororo. Only Kapchorwa, Iganga and Masindi, of the districts visited had 
substantial intra regional trade. The main cost elements in this operation are, transport, 
and labour for loading and unloading, storage, security and losses.
 
Processing Costs 
 
Large scale maize milling is not a feature of the sector and processing is mainly 
undertaken by small scale rural and urban based “posho” millers. Urban millers in 
Iganga, rural millers outside of Mbale, and the Kisenyi Millers Association, Kampala 
were visited. The basic maize milling process is as follows: 
 
· Drying & Threshing (cleaning)   
- loss 3 kg 
· Hulling – (grain is hulled more than once depending on final flour quality 
requirements) 
- loss 42 kg (27 kgs at first hulling / 15 kg at second hulling) 
- the discarded husks are sold as maize bran at Ush 50 per kg 
· Milling into flour 
- loss 10 kg 
 
Nb: above assumes losses from 100 kg maize entering the process. 
 
The ratio of maize to flour can vary according to des red quality and fineness of the flour 
required, however, the average quoted is 100kg maize = 45 kg maize flour. 
 
Urban millers charge Ush 40 / kg for toll milling a minimum of 100 kgs of maize. They 
also purchase maize on their own account, mill and sell the resultant flour and bran. Rural 
millers charge Ush 30 / kg, and will accept smaller quantities for toll milling. 
 
The actual milling costs were not revealed. The main complaint of millers is high power 
costs. 
 
Posho millers indicted that the milling bus ess was  a highly profitable with margins > 
50%. 
 
Kampala “posho” millers at Kisenyi market were buying maize at Ush 120/kg and selling 
maize flour, wholesale, at Ush 320/kg (super quality) Ush250/kg (1st quality) and Ush 
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210/kg (standard quality). Retailers at Owino market, Kampala, were selling “super” 
quality at Ush 400/kg.  
 
5.7  Constraints & Opportunities 
 
The following constraints and opportunities to increasing production, transaction, 
marketing and processing efficiency were identified during th  study.  
 
At the primary  and secondary market levels: (farm gate -  agents/traders store and /or 
village market – urban centre) 
 
Small farm units, a lack of credit for the purchase of inputs and the high unit cost of 
maize production, results in low profitability for farmers and discourages higher farm 
output, particularly in periods of low market prices. Poor quality at farm gate level due to 
maize being harvested at too high moisture levels (18% / 22% rather than the optimum of 
12% / 14%), and, generally, inadequate post harvest handling techniques result in lower 
prices to farmers. Additionally, poor quality results in a high percentage of rejection by 
traders sourcing for the WFP and export markets (Nb: the UGT claim to reject about 50 
% of the maize offered to them by urban based traders). Rejected maize at agents store / 
urban centre level is normally offered at lower prices to “posho mills,” which also 
influences, negatively, farm gate prices. 
 
There is poor, or non existent, market information at farm gate level, and an inadequate 
rural road network, resulting in some farms being inaccessible to traders, particularly in 
the rainy season. The lack of, or, inadequate storage facilities, particularly at farm and 
rural trading centre level also result in marketing inefficiencies. Farmers have limited 
trading opportunities and are inevitably price takers at farm gate level with little, or no, 
bargaining power to enable them to exploit competition amongst traders. 
 
Trader ability to expand volume purchases, thus increasing competition, is constrained by 
lack of working capital requirements. The microfinance movement and/or commerciasl 
banks should be encouraged to enter this sector, as has been seen in other countries (eg, 
cassava and maize traders in the Mwanza district of Northern Tanzania). 
 
At the tertiary market level :  
 
High transport costs, particularly from the Fort Portal and Kapchorwa areas to Kampala 
are particular constraint to improving transaction costs efficiencies. Distance, high fuel 
costs wear and tear on vehicles, time involved (driver occasional overnight 
accommodation and subsistence) and inadequate “back cargoes” are the major reasons. 
Traders in Kampala commented that if transport costs could be reduced they could 
increase substantially maize purchase from this region. They also mentioned intra - 
district taxes and dues and high electricity costs in the maize processing operation as 
being a burden on trading profitability, 
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These constraints are common to other sectors and are dealt with in th  section of the 
report covering “cross cutting” issues. 
 
The influence of the informal export market to Kenya which is uncontrolled and involves 
the sale of low and variable quality maize is a constraint to the penetration of the formal 
Kenya market represented by large millers, such as Unga (K) Ltd. Furthermore, Uganda 
lacks an authoritative price determination point, eg, a central commodity exchange or 
futures market, national maize quality standards, and a legal and regulatory framework 
covering rain warehousing and handling operations. These deficiencies, together with 
inadequate finance to enable the development of an efficient warehouse receipt financing 
system, constrain the holding of stocks, essential for the exploitation of, particularly, 
export marketing opportunities.  
 
The above constraints are interrelated and concern the need for a formal maize trading 
structure. The formation of the UGT, bringing together leading stakeholders in the maize 
sector, presents an opportunity to develop an fficient and formal grain marketing system. 
However, care should be exercised by the UGT t avoid exploiting its potential 
monopsony. 
 
5.8  Raising Farmers’ Incomes 
 
The poor profitability of maize at farm level is due, primarily to low yields, high post 
harvest losses, lack of, or inadequate, on farm storage, poor quality and prices. Raising 
farmers’ incomes and improving quality is absolutely essential to ensure the long term 
sustainability and growth of the sector. Farmers’ incomes must be raised through 
efficiencies within the production and marketing system. 
 
Both production and marketing efficiencies can be improved by encouraging farmers 
groups to enhance their ability to access input credit and improve net farm gate prices. 
Past experience in Africa and other developing regions of the world, particularly related 
to the cooperative movement, warrants caution in this regard. However, the formation 
and operation of groups such as NALG, Iganga, MSSGA, Masindi, and the Agribusiness 
Ltd venture of the UNFA offer encouraging signs for the replication and growth of 
farmers groups in Uganda. As in the cases of NALG and the MSSGA, successful farmers 
groups should be formed from within the farming community owned by farmers 
themselves have a clear objective and eschew commercial activities, which are beyond 
their capacity. Whilst external assistance is required as a catalyst to formation and 
capacity building, such outside involvement such be minimal with a view to 
disengagement when long term sustainability is achieved.
5.9  Related Topics 
 
The EU study on “Commodity Market Information and Risk Management: The case for a 
Commodity Exchange and Warehouse Receipt System for Uganda” – (Mandl & 
Mukhebi, February 2002) recommends the implementation of plans to introduce a 
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commodity exchange and a warehouse receipt financing system for the Uganda 
commodity sector. We concur with the findings of the report which address two of the 
key elements required for developing a formal maize marketing structure in Uganda.  
 
5.10  Summary of Key Findings  
 
· Whilst maize is not the traditional staple food crop for Uganda’s population, which is 
plantain, it plays an important part in the urban diet, and has the potential to become 
more popular.  
· The small scale of maize farming units, poor quality, low yields, unavailability of 
input credit, post harvest losses and low net farm gate prices relative to market levels, 
all contribute to the maize enterprise being of marginal profitability. This is 
particularly true in times of low prices, such as during the period of the study. 
· Although there is keen competition amongst traders for maize farmers are in a weak 
bargaining position due to inadequate economies of production scale and inadequate 
marketing information. 
· The poor rural road network in many areas results in farmers being unable to access 
markets regularly, particularly during the rainy season.  
· Encouraging signs of small and scattered, but active farmers groups, are evident in 
the surplus maize growing districts of Iganga and Masindi. 
· High transport costs due to high fuel prices and the cost of vehicle maintenance 
particularly hamper transaction cost inefficiency. 
· There is no large scale maize milling industry in Uganda, and processing into flour is 
mainly undertaken by “posho millers” at rural and urban level and in the Kisenyi 
market, Kampala. The “posho” milling operation can be highly profitable. 
· Following the liberalisation of the grain sector, there are no significant policy, 
regulatory or institutional constraints to the development of the sector. However, in 
order to realize the potential to develop a vibrant domestic and export market it will 
be necessary to institute a formal maize marketing structure. This will involve finance 
for investment and working capital, the establishment of national standards, and a 
suitable regulatory framework for the introduction of an authoritative price 
determination point, eg, a commodity exchange, and warehouse receipt financing 
techniques.   
 
5.11  Recommended Implementation Plan 
 
(1) The improvement of farm gate maize quality: We recommend that existing 
programmes be expanded and new programmes implementedto reduce farmers losses, 
through optimal crop post harvest handling techniques and on farm storage. We suggest 
that NAADS and the NAARI Cereal Programme are the most appropriate bodies to 
implement these initiatives. 
 
(2) The encouragement and capacity building of farmers groups: We recommend the 
encouragement of farmers groups as the key to improving maize growing profitability 
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and marketing efficiency. W e suggest that initiatives in this context are undertaken by 
the CDO / NAADS / MAAIF and that assistance is sought from DFID under their 
sustainable livelihoods programme.  
 
(3) The development of rural finance: We recommend the improvement of rural financial 
services to enable greater access to credit for agricultural inputs and trading working 
capital, and suggest that NGO’s and donors, such as World Bank, EU and DFID, together 
with the Bank of Uganda, are encouraged to assist with such initia ives. 
 
(4) The improvement of maize storage and handling facilities: W e recommend that 
adequate and efficient stores for maize be promoted at rural and urban level. Some  
facilities, formerly operated by the cooperative movement, are lying idle and the  should 
be rehabilitated and brought back into use by FCE's . We suggest that NGO’s and donors, 
such as the IDEA Project be encouraged to assist with such initiatives. 
 
(5) The promotion of marketing information at rural level: Current initiatives such as the 
IITA – Foodnet marketing information service (MIS) and the MTN mobile telephone 
marketing information service are disseminating maize prices at rural level. We suggest 
that teh PMA, NAADS, NGO’s and donors, such as the IDEA Project be encouraged to 
assist with such initiatives. 
 
(6) The development of a formal maize marketing structure: We propose that immediate 
steps are taken to initiate the required elements involved in developing a formal maize 
marketing structure, viz: 
· National quality and contractual standards. 
· Crop and trade (working capital) finance access. 
· A warehousing receipt financing regulatory framework.  
· A commodity Exchange. 
     
We propose that the UGT drive the agenda in cooperation with MTTI. MAAIF, MFPED, 
Bank of Uganda, UEPB and the UBS  
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Section 6.  Cassava 
6.1  Supply 
 
Eastern Region is the dominant cassava producing region in Uganda, followed by 
Northern and Western Regions.  The smallest amount produced comes from the Central 
Region.  Given its re ilience to drought conditions, cassava plays an important role for 
smallholders in the farming systems of the East and North of the country.   Table 6.1 
provides a summary of production figures comparing 1995/96 and 1999/2000.    
 
 
Table 6.1:  Production f Cassava by Region  (‘000 tonnes) 
 
 1995/96 1999/2000 
Eastern 1,659 1,213 
Northern 447 457 
Western 531 381 
Central 110 195 
TOTAL 2,747 2,246 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, January 2002 
 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, cassava production in Uganda suffered from the 
Cassava Mosaic Virus.  In response to this, around 12 new disease resistant varieties were 
introduced by extension and research services (e.g. NARO, IITA, NGOs), which, in turn, 
led to a renewed increase in production.  Low rainfall as the main reason for a lower 
level of output in 1999/2000.   
 
During the course of data collection for this study in January / February 2002, it was 
confirmed by traders and farmers alike that the most recent levels of production were 
very favourable.  In fact, the bumper harvest of cassava and other, ‘competing’, food 
crops in 2001 resulted in depressed market prices, and farmers complaining about lack of 
market outlets. 
 
As in most parts of Sub- aharan Africa, cassava is one of the staple food crops in Uganda 
and is predominantly traded in the form of fresh roots, and dried chips/flour.   During the 
period of the survey, Kampala was mainly supplied with dried cassava from the Eastern 
Region (e.g. Pallisa and Kumi Districts), and fresh roots from the West (e.g. Masindi, 
Kigumba, and Bweyale).   This was most certainly conditioned by seasonality (i.e. dry 
season) and, as already indicated, the recent bumper harvest.  Soroti, Apac and Lira are 
other supply centres for dried cassava reaching the Kampala market during ‘normal 
years’.  In addition, if there is scarcity of supply of chips in the capital, in particular 
during the wet season, supplies also arrive from Paidha in North West Uganda, Tanzania, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  As for the latte , owever, in early 2002 
it was reported that wholesale traders based in Jinja occasionally supply the North East of 
DRC via Arua due to high food prices in that region.  Another export route exists to 
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Kenya via Tororo, although very little exports were observed during the course of the 
survey.   
 
6.2  Demand 
 
Cassava flour consumption 
 
The bulk of the Ugandan cassava that is not consumed in fresh form (i.e. boiled) is peeled 
and sliced into pieces, usually referred to as chips.  The latter are milled into flour, which 
can be stored for several months.  Cassava flour is often mixed in high proportions with 
millet flour (a relatively expensive product) to produce a more nutritious and tasty food 
staple. 
 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 provide estimates of cassava flour consumption in 1997 (Collinson et 
al).  The figures were derived from data collected during the 1996/97 Uganda Household 
Monitoring Survey. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2  Rural/Urban Estimates of Cassava Flour Consumption 1997 
 
 Quantity  
purchased in 
1997 (tonnes) 
Per-capita 
quantity 
purchased in 
1997 (kg) 
Consumption 
from own 
production in 
1997 (tonnes) 
Per-capita 
consumption 
from own 
production in 
1997 (kg) 
Rural 75,200 4.38 90,600 5.28 
Urban 12,900 3.94 900 0.28 
Source:  Collinson et al, based on data from 1996/97 Uganda National Household Survey.
 
 
However, a warning must be attached to the estimates in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.  The 
Ugandan Household Surveys use a recall period of seven days and interview each 
household just once.  Furthermore, all interviews tend to occur within the same month.  
Estimating annual figures from such data therefore runs the risk of introducing bias due 
to seasonal variations in consumption.  
 
Nevertheless, while the absolute values of estimates should be treated with a degree of 
caution, their relative sizes should still represent an accurate picture of comparative levels 
of consumption between regions and between rural and urban areas.   
 
Table 6.2 reveals that per capita consumption of cassava flour is more important in rural 
than in urban areas, a reflection, no doubt, of the greater choice of foods available in most 
towns.  This does not indicate that cassava flour plays an insignificant role in urban diets.  
When measured on a calorific basis, it is among the cheapest carbohydrate ources, and 
therefore helps poor urban residents to eke out their food budgets.  As a consequence, 
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wealthier urban consumers often regard cassava flour as a poor person’s food, and prefer 
more expensive staples such as maize flour and rice. 
 
According to Table 6.3, consumers in Central Region are on average the least fond of 
cassava flour, a finding easily explained by the region’s traditional preference for 
matooke (a food staple prepared from bananas).  However, urban areas within the region 
have seen significant immigration from the war-affected Northern Region, where cassava 
consumption is more common.  Consequently, consumption in Central Region has almost 
certainly increased over the last decade and may still be rising. (Collinson et al, ibid). 
 
Eastern Region’s preference for cassava is evident.  While cassava is often seen as a 
food-security crop in Central and Western Regions, it is an important part of Eastern 
consumers’ regular diet.  The same is true of Northern diets, although the Region’s figure 
for “per-capita consumption from own production” gives the impression that this may not 
be true, particularly in view of cassava’s ability to thrive in the generally less fertile soils 
of the north.  An explanation may be the riskiness of producing one’s own food in an area 
where rebel raids on villages often target food.  If this explanation is valid, it highlights 
the important role that food trade has played in maintaining a degree of food security in 
the Region (note the high level of per capita cassva flour purchases). 
 
 
 
Table 6.3  Regional Estimates of Cassava Flour Consumption in 1997 
 
 Quantity  
purchased 
(tonnes) 
Per-capita 
quantity 
purchased (kg) 
Quantity 
consumed from 
own production 
(tonnes) 
Per-capita 
consumption 
from own 
production (kg) 
Central Region 14,700 2.55 7,500 1.31 
Eastern Region 34,000 6.61 45,900 8.93 
Western Region 17,500 3.09 26,900 4.77 
Northern region 21,900 5.64 11,200 2.88 
TOTAL  88,100 4.31 91,500 4.48 
 Source:  Collinson et al based on data from 1996/97 Uganda National Household Survey. 
 
 
Industrial utilisation of dried cassava 
 
Although cassava is a major raw material in a number of agro-industries in other parts of 
the world, very little dried or fresh cassava is industrially used in Uganda.   According to 
Graffham et al (November 2000), industries that can use cassava include: 
· Animal feed manufacturing 
· Plywood, paperboard & textile industries  
· Biscuits and bread production 
· Starch 
· Brewing 
· Sugar syrups 
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· Industrial alcohol 
· Industrial chemicals 
· Biodegradable plastics. 
 
According to Graffham et. al. (ibid), in 2000, locally made cassava flour was used as a 
substitute for imported starch by three out of six plywood, paperboard and textile 
factories in Uganda.  These industries consumed 216 tonnes of cassava, representing less 
than one percent of total dried cassava production. 
 
Cassava chips in animal feed is the sector with most potential for industrial utilisation in 
the near future (i.e. market is equivalent to about 20,000 tonnes of fresh roots).  The 
technology for production is quite simple and well suited to rural areas, and quality 
specifications should be relatively easy to meet.   At the same time, the major feed 
millers, some of whom have already used dried cassava in the past (i.e. early 1990s), 
provided the following reasons why it is not included in feed formulations nowadays: 
· Too expensive in view of ample supply of other starch based raw materials (e.g. 
maize, and milling by-products), 
· Unreliable supply, 
· The crop is considered a food crop for human consumption. 
 
In early 2002, Uganda Breweries reportedly planned to undertake cassava based brewing 
trials.  Follow-up visits to the brewery are required to obtain information about the results 
of the trials.   
 
Cassava flour and chip prices 
 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate ssava chip and flour prices observed in January / February 
2002.  The left-hand column of the table states the location and the operator in the 
marketing chain obtaining the price. 
 
 
Table 6.4  Cassava Chip Prices in January / February 2002 
 
Operators in the Marketing Chain 
/ Location 
Shilling / kg Source of Information 
Travelling traders, Kampala 120 - 140 Kampala wholesalers, who use 
custom mills and sell flour
Village Dealers in Kumi District 50 - 55 Wholesalers in Jinja 
Village Dealers in Soroti District 60 Wholesalers in Jinja 
Farmers in villages of Pallisa, Kumi 
or Soroti Districts 
40 - 50 DAO Pallisa, Farmers, Wholesalers in 
Jinja, Kumi, and Soroti, AO Kumi 
Farmers delivering chips at roadside 
markets in Kumi District 
50 - 60 Farmers, trader 
Farmers in Lira District 50 - 60 Wholesalers in Lira Town 
Village Dealers in Lira District 70 - 80 Wholesalers in Lira Town 
Wholesale price in Lira Town 110 - 120 Wholesalers in Lira Town 
Arua Market Approx. 200 Farmers in Bweyale 
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When comparing price trends for major staple foods at retail level in Kampala, Collinson 
et al (2000) observed that cassava flour prices have increased in real terms (i.e. adjusted 
for inflation) between 1989 and early 2000.  By comparison, matooke and millet flour 
prices howed no significant real long-term trend over that period.  For more detailed 
price information, please consult with the Bureau of Statistics and IITA / Foodnet. 
 
 
Table 6.5 Cassava Flour Prices in January / February 2002 
 
Operators in the Marketing Chain 
/ Location 
Shilling / 
kg 
Source of Information 
Kampala, Kisenyi market; 
Wholesalers 
180 
 
Kisenyi Market wholesalers, and 
Owino market retailers 
Kampala, Owino market; retailers 250 - 300 Owino market retailers 
Jinja Town, Wholesalers 
      Flour from Soroti (better quality) 
      Flour from Kumi, Pallisa 
 
110 
90-95 
Travelling traders / Wholesalers in Jinja
 
Kumi Town, Wholesalers 120 Wholesaler in Kumi 
Soroti Town, Wholesalers Appr. 100? Wholesalers in Soroti 
Lira Town 140 - 150  Wholesalers in Soroti 
Moroto 140 – 150 Wholesalers in Soroti 
 
 
6.3  Dried cassava marketing chain 
 
Figure 6.1, which is taken from Collinson et. al. (2000) reveals the complexity of dried 
cassava marketing. The number of links in the chain reflects the many services that re 
required to deliver cassava flour to consumers.  From harvest to purchase at the local 
store, cassava must be dried, bulked (in other words, assembled into tradable quantities), 
transported, stored, milled and finally retailed at convenient locations for consumer .  
The roles of each marketing chain participant, and a description of their relationships and 
transactions with other participants is given below. 
 
Farmers. Farmers harvest, peel and dry cassava roots.  They have several marketing 
options.  Using their own or hired  transport they can sell directly to rural retailers, rural 
consumers or, if they are near major district level towns, to wholesalers.  Alternatively 
they can sell to travelling traders (who provide links with major consumer markets) or 
village assemblers.  Farmers rarely extend credit to their customers, and will only do so 
for traders with whom they have built a long-s andi  trading relationship. 
 
Village assemblers.  These individuals typically have access to more capital than their 
village neighbours.  They use these financial resources and their local knowledge to bulk 
cassava chips from the surrounding area.  Customers (i.e. usually wholesalers from local 
towns or travelling traders) are willing to pay for this service because they would 
otherwise have to spend time and money assembling sufficient quantities of cassava chips 
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to justify the cost of transport to the next stage in the marketing chain.  The village 
assemblers also relieve their customers of the burden of quality contr lling the small 
quantities of chips typically offered by farmers.   
 
Figure 6.1:  The Dried Cassava Trading Chain 
 
Farmers 
Village assemblers 
District Level 
Wholesalers 
Urban Wholesalers 
Urban Retailers 
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To some extent, the assemblers also sort chips into a high quality white, well dried grad  
chips and a lower quality discoloured grade, sifting for extraneous matter in the process.  
Buyers often place orders with trusted village assemblers.  Once the required quantities 
have been gathered, the assemblers contact the buyers, who invariably arrange their own 
transport.  The assemblers often receive cash advances to fund their activities.   
 
District level wholesalers.  These traders, who operate in district level towns, serve 
retailers in their local area and to a limited extent also supply chips and flour to 
wholesalers in major consumer markets in cities such as Kampala and Jinja.  Their 
primary roles are to arrange the transformation of chips into flour (usually using the 
services of specialised millers), and to store the flour in volumes that are sufficient to 
enable their customers to purchase their requirements in a timely fashion.  In a lesser role, 
district level wholesalers provide another level of bulking between the farmer and the 
major consumer markets.   During the survey it could be observed that this type of 
wholesaler stores dried cassava in the form of chips or flour in moderate quantities at the 
end of the dry season, depending on their financial capacity (i.e. 50 – 300 bags).  This 
may have been influenced by seasonality (i.e. end of the dry season), and oversupply in 
consumption centres resulting in depressed prices. 
 
Few district wholesalers are specialised in dried cassava.  Typically they also deal in 
other food products such as maize, millet or oilseeds.  The more progressive wholesal r  
concentrate on cassava chips and flour in the wet season, when sourcing quality chips is a 
problem yet profits are highest.  The less ambitious traders sell more cassava flour during 
the dry season, when supplies are abundant. 
 
Few district wholesalers secure credit from their sellers.  On the contrary, it was reported 
that they provide assembly traders with cash advances when supply is short.  This 
practice is less common when there is ample supply of dried cassava.  When asked about 
their access to the Kampala market, Jinja based wholesalers indicated that traders in the 
capital would prevent them from directly selling to retailers in markets such as Owino.  
As a consequence, it tends to be travelling traders from Kampala who come to Jinja to 
buy chips or flour there.   No trade of dried cassava was observed between Jinja town and 
Kampala in February 2002. 
 
Travelling traders. These traders supply the majority of cassava flour to large urban 
consumer markets.  They turn over their capital rapidly by minimising the length of time 
between purchase and sale.  By avoiding storage, they both limit the risk that prices will 
move against them and avoid significant overhead costs.  Most commonly, such traders 
buy from several village assemblers in one trip, a d hire vehicles to transport the chips to 
the urban centres, where they pay for milling and sell flour to wholesalers.  Travelling 
traders tend to specialise in just one food product. 
 
Urban wholesalers.  Urban wholesalers share most of the characteristics of their district 
level counterparts.  The major differences are location and scale.  The former distinction 
is obvious, yet it is the urban wholesalers’ location within major markets that allow them 
to operate on a larger scale.  Whereas district level wholesalers may trade between five 
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and fifteen 100kg sacks of cassava flour in one week, urban wholesalers commonly sell 
between fifty and one hundred sacks. 
 
Miller/Wholesalers.  A number of specialist businesses in major towns like Jinja, Lira 
and Kampala combine cassava flour milling with wholesaling.  These efficiently run 
operations purchase either directly from village assemblers via agents or from travelling 
traders.  Their average weekly turnover is usually in the range of 10 to 15 tonnes and 
milling losses reportedly amount to no more than 2%. 
 
Service millers.  Such businesses do not engage in trade but merely provide milling 
services.  In rural areas and the smaller district towns, millers often use small petrol or 
diesel powered mills, and do not specialise in milling any one commodity.  In larger 
towns, millers are often specialised and run electrically powered mills. 
 
Urban Retailers.  The majority of food retailing in urban areas is characterised by a 
large number of small, non-specialised stores, which sell small quantities of numerous 
products, often trading food alongside manufactured goods such as pens and razor blades.  
Nevertheless, there are signs that some retail traders in urban centres are able to increase 
the scale of their business.  For example, in Owino market in Kampala, food retailers 
have been encountered, who have ten or more bags of flour (i.e. of maize, cassava, or 
peas) on display, each worth Ush25,000 to Ush60,000 (in February 2002). 
 
6.4  Marketing and Processing Costs 
 
The following costs have been identified:  
· Transport,  
· Milling, 
· Handling,  
· Packaging, and dressing of bags,  
· Storage 
· Capital Costs 
· Taxes, levies, and fees, which may change depending on Local Authorities. 
 
 
Transport.  This is one of the most significant cost elements in the commodity chain.  It 
varies according to factors such as mode of transport, distance, road conditions, and 
season.   
 
Usually, the following stages of transport can be distinguished in the cassava marketing 
chain: 
· Local transport f om the farm to the village collection centre;  
· Transport from village to town; 
· Transport from town to another district, Kampala, or export; 
· Local transport at destination point, i.e. mostly inner-urban. 
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Head-loading and bicycle are the predominant modes of transport in the village.  In 
particular, head-loading which is almost exclusively done by women is an inefficient 
mode of transport.  Aside from health implications, it is very expensive due to the 
opportunity costs of time involved, limited carrying capacity, and limited distance that 
can be covered.  The use of animal pulled carts or tractor-trailers does only occur on a 
very limited scale. 
 
The use of pick-up trucks plays an important role in the transport of agricultural produce 
from the village to smaller towns.  At the same time, larger wholesale traders based in 
urban centres such as Kampala or Jinja also hire trucks to go directly to rural areas where 
they buy from village dealers who have assembled relatively large quantities of produce. 
 
Transport between urban centres is undertaken by trucks and lorries of varying sizes (i.e. 
most commonly 10 tonnes).  It was pointed out that the carrying capacity of the vehicle 
influences the transport cost, i.e. the use of larger lorries leads to economies of scale 
resulting in lower per unit transport charges.  Other factors highlighted as influencing 
transport costs are the level of fuel prices, and the fact that vehicles often have to travel 
empty to the more remote areas to collect agricultural produce.   
 
Inner-urban transport is characterised by a multitude of modes of transportation reflecting 
usually congested market places.  They include, often in combinations:
· Humans carrying goods on their heads or backs; 
· Intermediate means of transportation such as push- art , or wheelbarrows; 
· Motorised transport such as mini-buses and taxis. 
 
According to the survey, transport costs including loading and off-loading represent 
approximately 20 – 30% of the final selling price of dried cassava, when transported from 
village to a major urban centre. 
 
Milling.  So-called posho mills are generally used for milling of both maize and cassava.  
They are common in the main trading centres, where they are based on electricity.  
Village mills, which are much smaller in scale, are either powered by diesel or petrol 
engines. 
 
The milling sector appears to be dynamic in that in particular in the main district towns 
there is a multitude of milling enterprises.   On the one hand, new milling enterprises are 
starting business (e.g. Kumi), on the other hand established ones face closure due to 
strong competition (e.g. Jinja). 
 
At the same time, high electricity costs were repeatedly mentioned as one of the main 
constraints of milling operations.  Calculations in Appendix A5 provide an indication of 
the extent of electricity charges as part of total milling costs.  Assuming that the miller 
charges Ush20 per kg of flour, and 750 bags are milled per month, then the milling 
business is likely to operate at a loss.   This is based on the assumption that milling one 
bag of cassava flour would attract Ush1,280 of electricity charges (i.e. according to 
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millers in Kisenyi market, Kampala).  Profits only appear to be possible if other cost 
items such as depreciation and management costs are not fully t k n into account. 
 
 
 
Table 6.6  Transport Costs for Dried Cassava Products 
 
Locations Product Transport 
Cost, Sh/kg 
Mode of Transport 
Village in Soroti District – 
Jinja, 
Chips 25 Jinja Wholesalers,  
Truck 
Village in Kamuli District to 
Jinja 
Chips 15 = // = 
Village in Iganga District – 
Jinja 
Chips 15 = // = 
Jinja – Kampala Flour 15 = // = 
Jinja – Masaka Flour 18 = // = 
Jinja  - Arua Flour 65-70 = // = 
Jinja  - Kasese Flour 45 = // = 
Jinja – Kabale Flour 40 = // = 
Village in Iganga District to 
Iganga town 
Chips 10 Bicycle or pick-up truck 
Village in Kumi District to 
Kumi Town 
Chips 10 Pick-up 
Kumi Town to Kampala Flour 20 Truck  
Kumi Town to Tororo Flour 10 = // = 
Village in Kumi District to 
Tororo 
Flour 15 = // = 
Village in Soroti Distric  to 
Soroti Town , 20 km  
Chips 15 Pick-up 
Soroti Town – Lira  Flour 15 Cotton trucks 
Soroti Town to Arua Flour 60 - 70 Lorries 
Soroti Town to Moroto Flour 30 Lorries, pick-ups 
Soroti Town to Kotido Flour 40 = // = 
Village in Lira District – Lira 
town 
Chips 10 Pick-ups 
Lira Town – Arua Flour 50 - 60 Lorries 
Lira – Kampala Flour 30 = // = 
Lira – Kotido Flour 50 = // = 
Paidha – Kampala Chips 40 - 45 = // = 
 
 
In addition, in some parts of the country (e.g. Kumi) millers complained about high costs 
to become connected to the electricity grid12.   The fact that most millers charge between 
Ush10-20 per kg of flour may be an indication that, due to stiff competition, the recent 
increase of electricity charges (i.e. at the end of 2001) has not been passed on to 
                                         
12 The cost for a 3-phase connection not requiring a new pole is of the order of Ush822,000 – 
Ush1,100,000, irrespective of the location.  
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customers, as yet, or that they are able to avoid paying the full charges.   However, in the 
longer-term, an increase of milling charges and further closures of less dynamic 
businesses can be expected. 
  
Handling.  In the majority of cases this consi ts of Ush200 each for loading and off-
loading.  In cases where the same persons are involved in these operations, charges may 
be combined to Ush300 per bag. 
 
Packaging material.  Polyethylene bags costing Ush 450 – 500 are generally used to 
transport cass va on trucks and for storage.  Nevertheless, cases were reported where 
dried chips were transported in loose form on trucks from villages in Kumi or Soroti 
Districts to Jinja town.  Dressing of bags includes stitching and strings, costing together 
of the order of Ush300 per bag.
 
 
 
Table 6.7  Milling Costs of Dried Cassava 
 
Location Shilling / kg Observation 
Kampala 20 Sh20 per kg of flour 
Jinja 13 Sh1,300 per 100kg bag of flour 
Kumi 10  
Soroti 10  
Lira 20 Milling cost includes transport of chips 
from wholesale market to mill 
Source: wholesalers in Lira 
 
 
Storage costs.   Rental costs of stores obviously depends on location and type of building.  
It was reported that monthly rent of a store with a capacity of holding 200 bags was of the 
order of Ush200,000.  Building of new stores can be relatively inexpensive in District 
towns (e.g. Ush1,500,000 in Kumi).  In addition, the opportunity cost of capital tied up in 
the merchandise stored needs to be taken into account (see section below on capital 
costs).  
 
Taxes, levies, and market fees. These are mostly fees determined by the Local 
Authorities.  They can vary from District to District.  For example, fees in a village 
market are likely to be of the order of Ush200 per bag leaving the sub-cou ty.   
As for DDF contributions (i.e. District Development Fund), for a travelling trader from 
Jinja, these may be of the order of Ush15,000 per 10 tonne truck, Ush5,000 in Kamuli 
District, and no contributions in Iganga.  Wholesalers indicated that the DDF charge was
Sh400 per bag in Lira.  Generally, no DDF contributions are paid if the produce is moved 
within a District. 
 
Also, licensed traders who are based in a certain market are not expected to pay any 
additional market fees there whereas farmers and traders coming from outside are likely 
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to incur a market fee.  Parking fees in District towns are of the order of Ush3000 per 
truck of 100 bags. 
 
Although, during the course of the survey, few complaints were heard about the size of 
these marketing related fees, in some instances it was indicated that the amount and types 
of taxes incurred by millers was confusing.  For example, it was felt that millers in Jinja 
were doubly taxed (i.e. by being obliged to hold a processing license, and a trading 
license).  Although it was not possible to confirm details of this, it indicated that there is a 
need for more transparency and provision of information at Local Government level.  
 
Capital Costs.  It was confirmed during the course of the survey that operators in the 
cassava marketing chain hardly ever obtain credit through the formal banking sector.  
Most transactions are cash based with little banking services involved.  To a large extent 
traders rely on their equity capital when undertaking their marketing activities.  It is 
estimated that a medium-sized wholesaler dealing in 50 bags of cassava chips per week 
requires a working capital of the order of Ush 500,000 to Ush1,000,000 to undertake 
purchasing and selling activities and pay for transport. 
 
If traders require additional capital to ‘top up’ their equity they would try to obtain it 
from friends/family or on the informal credit market, where they reportedly have to pay 
up to 10% interest per week.   This indicates the extent of opportunity cost of capital 
associated with private trading businesses largely operating in the informal sector. 
 
Margins 
 
Overall, trader margins do not point to excessive profits by individuals in the marketing 
chain of dried cassava.  On the contrary, some of the travelling traders and wholesalers 
appear to operate only on a relatively small profit basis, bearing in mind that they tend to 
have comparatively large turnovers.  However, the ‘length’ and relatively complicated 
structure of the dried cassava marketing chain is noteworthy.  The involvement of
numerous players, especially if the produce is transported to Kampala, leads to a high 
total marketing margin.  As a consequence, the farmers’ share of the final price tends to 
be low.  In particular, this is the case when there is a glut on the market following a 
bumper harvest (i.e. situation in early 2002).  In Feb. 2002, farmgate prices for dried 
cassava in villages of cassava producing Districts such as Kumi are only about 15 – 20% 
of the retail price of flour in Kampala. 
 
This points to the ned to identify measures to reduce the overall length of the marketing 
chain and to create economies of scale both at the production and retail levels.  (More on 
this below in Sections on Constraints and Opportunities). 
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Table 6.8  Dried Cassava Trading Costs and Margins.   
Case Study: Kampala based traders buying in villages of Paidha,  
Kumi or Pallisa Districts. 
 Ush/ 
100kg 
% of selling price 
Farmer    
Selling price, chips 4,000   
    
Village assembler    
Purchase price 4,000   
Selling price 6,000   
Gross margin 2,000 33%  
    
Costs    
Transport 1,000   
Market dues  200   
Capital costs (@ 3% of all costs) 36   
    
Net margin 764 13%  
    
Travelling trader, Kampala based    
Purchase price 6000   
Selling price 13,000   
Gross margin 7,000 54%  
    
Costs    
Miscellaneous labour 700   
Transport (average of several Districts) 3,500   
Packaging 500   
DDF ‘contribution’, District 200   
Market levy, Kampala 500   
Capital costs (@ 3% of all costs) 162   
TOTAL COSTS 5,562   
    
Net margin** 1,438 11%  
    
Urban Wholesaler    
Purchase price, chips 13,000   
Selling price, flour* 18,000   
Gross margin 5,000 28%  
    
Costs    
Various labour charges 500   
Milling 2,000   
Capital costs (@ 3% of all costs) 75   
TOTAL COSTS 2,575   
    
Net margin** 2,425 13%  
    
Urban Retailer    
Purchase price 18,000   
Selling price 27,000   
Gross margin 9,000 33%  
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Costs    
Store costs 3,300   
Miscellaneous. incl. labour 1,500   
Capital costs (@ 3% of all costs) 144   
    
TOTAL COSTS 4,944   
    
Net margin** 4,056 15%  
    
*  Equivalent flour price after adjusting for 2% milling losses 
**  Before income tax and payment of trading licence 
 
 
Table 6.9  Dried Cassava Trading Costs and Margins.   
Case Study: Jinja based traders buying in villages of Soroti,  
Kumi, or Kamuli  Districts, in order to mill and sell in Jinja. 
 
 Ush/ 
100kg 
% of selling price 
Farmer    
Selling price, chips 4,000   
    
Village assembler    
Purchase price 4,000   
Selling price 6,000   
Gross margin 2,000 33%  
    
Costs    
Transport 1,000   
Market dues 200   
Capital costs (@ 3% of all costs) 36   
    
Net margin 764 13%  
    
Travelling trader, Jinja based    
Purchase price, chips 6000   
Selling price, flour* 11,000   
Gross margin 5,000 45%  
    
Costs    
Loading and off-loading 300   
Transport 2,000   
DDF ‘contribution’, Soroti and Jinja 250   
Milling 1,300   
Packaging 400   
Capital costs (@ 3% of all costs) 128   
TOTAL COSTS 4,378   
    
Net margin** 622 6%  
*  Equivalent flour price after adjusting for 2% milling losses 
**  Before income tax and payment of trading licence 
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6.5  Fresh Cassava 
 
Fresh cassava consumption and prices 
 
According to Collinson et al (2000), the data source that yielded consumption data for 
dried cassav  could not be used to provide a similar insight to fresh cassava consumption.  
While the source (the 96/87 Ugandan Household Survey) records fresh cassava purchases 
and consumption from own production, it uses heaps of unspecified weight as the most 
common unit of measurement.  Heaps vary in size between urban and rural areas, and 
also according to region and season.  We could find no credible conversion factors to 
transform heaps into weights, and therefore are unable to provide fresh cassava 
consumption figures. 
 
Fieldwork among fresh cassava traders revealed that urban consumers tend to prefer 
sweet flavoured, medium sized cassava roots.  Many of the new mosaic disease resistant 
varieties are reportedly unpopular due to their bitter taste.  From the traders’ point of 
view, roots that perish least quickly are preferable.  Several traders expressed preference 
for roots with an outer bark-like skin that peels away easily to reveal a thick, often 
reddish, inner skin. 
 
Based on data of fresh cassava from Septe ber 1989 to January 2000, according to 
Collinson et al (ibid), there is clearly a positive long-term price trend in Kampala (i.e. 
cassava prices a increasing in real terms).  Although a definite reason for this could not 
be provided, increased demand cause by urbanisation is almost certainly a factor.  
Perhaps more importantly, anecdotal evidence gathered from traders suggests that 
reserves of fresh cassava cultivated nearest to Kampala have been over-exploit d.  
Supplies are now sourced from further afield, thereby adding to transport costs and hence 
the retail price of fresh cassava. 
 
 
 
Table 6.10: Fresh Cassava Prices in January / February 2002 
 
Operators in the Marketing Chain 
/ Location 
Shilling / 
bag of 
150kg 
Source of Information 
Farmers selling ‘standing-crop’, 
Masindi District 
4,000 Kalerwe Market wholesaler 
Farmers selling up-rooted fresh 
cassava, Bweyale 
6,000 Bweyale farmers / traders 
Kampala, Kalerwe wholesale market 
 
18,000 
 
Kalerwe Market wholesaler,  
Owino market retailers,  
Bweyale farmers / traders 
Kampala Owino retail market, 
cassava sold in 3kg heaps costing 
Ush500 each 
20,000 –
25,000 
 
Owino Market retailers 
Kalerwe Market wholesalers 
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Table 6.10 indicates the prices for fresh cassava observed between Masindi District and 
Kampala during the course of the survey.  More detailed price information on cassava 
roots can be obtained from the IITA / Foodnet and the Bureau of Statistics. 
 
Fresh cassava marketing chain:  players and transactions 
 
As indicated in Figure 2, fresh cassava trading is highly streamlined by comparison with 
dried cassava trading.  It is driven by the perishability of cassava roots, which 
necessitates swift movement from the farm to the consumer, with a minimal number of 
transactions.  Traders are forced to discount their prices heavily if the cassava reaches the 
market two to three days after harvest.  After five days, the roots are unsaleable. 
 
Figure 2 indicates the key players of the trading chain.  The role of farmers is restricted to 
growing the cassava and negotiating a price either with travelling traders or their agents.  
If travelling traders use local agents, they contact them before arriving and give 
instructions to find suitable supplies of cassava.  Local agents merely provide a service 
and at no point do they take possession of the cassava.  Once contacted with news that 
their agents have complied with their instructions, the travelling traders hire transport, 
often from Kampala or the other major consumer towns, and travel to the farms.  Once 
there, the traders hire labour to harvest and load the cassava on to the hired truck.  Many 
traders follow traditional practices by negotiating to buy whole gardens before the 
cassava has been up-rooted.  Despite sampling for yield, traders clearly take a 
considerable risk that the number and size of harvested tubers will be smaller than 
expected when the original price was struck.  More progressive traders have adopted the 
practice of agreeing a price once the roots have been harvested.   
 
Roots are either loaded loosely nto the trucks, or in some cases, medium sized roots (the 
most marketable size) are bagged before loading.  After payment of a local levy, the 
traders travel with the cassava to the urban market, usually preferring to travel at night to 
avoid police road-blocks.  
 
Traders arrive at the Kampala markets as early as 2am, at which time a crowd of retailers 
has already gathered.  (The fact that traders and retailers are willing to keep such 
inconvenient hours is perhaps an indication of the profitability of fresh cassava trading).  
Travelling traders usually hand responsibility for selling the cassava to commission 
agents, who, in return for a fee, use their knowledge of local market conditions to 
negotiate sales to retailers.  The latter sell to the public ei r within the confines of the 
market in which the cassava has arrived, or transport the roots to outlets scattered 
throughout the city. 
 
Fresh cassava prices vary on a daily basis.  While demand is usually constant, the arrival 
of a large number of travelling traders in a particular Kampala market can drive down 
prices.  Conversely, a lower than average number of travelling traders will cause prices to 
rise.  This daily variation creates price risk for traders, who cannot predict market prices 
when they negotiate purchase prices with farmers.  Another problem that unpredictable 
market conditions create for travelling traders is uncertainty over the ability to sell before 
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the cassava spoils.  If many traders arrive at a market, several will be obliged to find 
alternative markets within Kampala.  This increases both the cost of transport and the 
possibility that the trader will be forced to discount his sales due to root deterioration.  
 
Marketing Costs 
 
As already indicated, fresh cassava marketing is much more streamlined in comparison to 
the marketing chain of dried cassava.  This is a reflection of the perishability of the crop.  
Given that several of the key cost elements were dealt with above in the Section on dry 
cassava, the following summarises only those elements where differences are likely to 
occur. 
 
Transport.  As with dried cassava, this is one of the most important cost elements in the 
marketing chain of fresh cassava.  In addition, the bulkiness and weight of fresh roots and 
the requirement that the perishable crop is moved within a short period of time, 
compound the transport cost factor.  This starts at farm level where transport costs can be 
very high if no adequate means for bulk transport are available.  Lorries are used for 
longer distance transport.  In addition, urban transport from the wholesale to the retail 
markets either requires porters, bicycles or taxis, all adding an additional transport cost 
element.  Depending on the form of marketing arrangement, total transport costs 
including on-loading and off-loading represent 30 – 4 % of the final retail price. 
 
In February 2002, the transport of one bag of fresh cassava (i.e. approx. 150kg) cost 
Ush5,000 between Masindi or Bweyale to Kampala.  Compared to this, the transport 
between farm and roadside can cost about Ush2,000 for the same amount of fresh cassava 
if undertaken by bike.  This points to the need of economies of scale and means of bulk 
transport at village level.  Travelling traders from Kampala overcome this problem by 
travelling directly to villages known for high levels of supply, where they often buy the 
standing crop.  Not only reduces this the total transport cost but also transaction costs. 
 
Commission agents.  Travelling traders who are based in the producing areas 
complained about the need to go through an intermediary (i.e. Commission agent) if they 
want to sell their produce in Kampala markets such as Kalerwe.  As outsiders they feel 
prevented from entering the market and dealing directly with the retailers of the Capital. 
 
Other Costs.  These are similar to the ones dealt with above in the Section on dried 
cassava.  They include items such as market dues, capital costs, and packaging material.  
Traders avoid physical losses by adjusting selling prices accordingly; i.e. even if it means 
selling the roots at a very low price. 
 
Margins 
 
The two case studies below for fresh cassava marketing highlight the importance of 
economies of scale in the trade.  By travelling directly with a lorry to villages where 
substantial quantities of cassava are produced, the Kampala based trader is in a position 
to reduce his marketing costs.  In addition, given that he himself is based in Kalerwe 
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market, he is not obliged to go through a commission agent reducing his margin.   As a 
consequence he is able to achieve a much higher net margin (i.e. 20%) than small-scale 
itinerant traders based in Districts where cassava is produced (4%).  Obviously, capital 
endowment plays a major role as to the type and size of transactions a trader can 
undertake.  The travelling trader based in Kalerwe market has a working capital of 
approximately Ush0.5million whereas his colleague coming from Bweyale sub-county 
has a capital base of about Ush50,000. 
 
Although the retailer’s margin may appear to be on the high side it needs to be taken into 
account that she only sells about one bag of roots per day. 
 
Figure 6.2:  The Fresh Cassava Trading Chain 
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Costs and Margins 
 
Table 6.11   Costs and Margins within the Fresh Cassava Trading 
Chain 
Case Study: Trader based in Kalerwe market buying directly from 
farmer’s field in Masindi District           
    
 USh/ 
Bag of 150kg 
% of selling price 
Farmer    
Selling price (standing crop) 4,000   
    
Travelling trader, based in Kalerwe 
Market, Kampala 
   
Purchase price  4,000   
Selling price* 18,000   
Gross margin 14,000 78%  
    
Costs     
Miscellaneous labour (incl. Ush 2,000 for 
uprooting of cassava) 
4,000   
Transport 5,000   
Packaging material 500   
Market dues 500   
Capital costs (@3% of all costs) 420   
TOTAL COSTS 10,420   
    
Net margin* 3,580 20%  
    
Urban Retailer    
Purchase price* 18,000   
Selling price* 23,000   
Gross margin 5,000 22%  
    
Various Costs and Charges (incl. 
transport) 
1,000   
    
Net margin 4,000 17%  
    
*  Before income tax and payment of trading licence   
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Table 6.12   Costs and Margins within the Fresh Cassava Trading 
Chain 
Case Study: Trader based in Bweyale buying roots from local farmer and 
selling them in Kalerwe Market of Kamp la          
    
 USh/ 
Bag of 150kg 
% of selling price 
Farmer    
Selling price (standing crop) 6,000   
    
Travelling trader, based in Bweyale    
Purchase price  6,000   
Selling price* 18,000   
Gross margin 12,000 67%  
    
Costs    
    
Transport from village to roadside, bicycle 2,000   
Miscellaneous labour (incl. loading and 
unloading) 
2,000   
Transport to Kampala 5,000   
Packaging material 500   
Market dues, Kalerwe 500   
Commission agent fee, Kalerwe  1000   
Capital costs (@3% of all costs) 330   
TOTAL COSTS 11,330   
    
Net margin 670 4%  
    
Urban Retailer    
Purchase price* 18,000   
Selling price* 23,000   
Gross margin 5,000 22%  
    
Various Costs and Charges (incl. transport 
to market) 
1,000   
    
Net margin 4,000 17%  
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6.6  Constraints and Opportunities 
 
The following constraints and opportunities to increasing cassava production, transaction, 
marketing and processing efficiency were identified during the study.  
 
· For a start, agricultural marketing and transaction costs cannot be seen independently 
from production and final demand.  During the course of the survey, constraints 
related to cassava production and demand seemed equally if not more important than 
the actual trading activities in determining farmers’ income.   The glut of food 
commodities on the domestic market and limitations to increase demand has led to 
very low current farmgate prices for food commodities.  These constraints are 
common to other sectors and are dealt with in the section of the rep rt covering 
“cross cutting” issues. 
 
· Small farm units, low yields, and the high unit cost of cassava production, results in 
low profitability for farmers and discourages higher farm output, particularly in 
periods of low market prices. Poor quality at farm gate level and, generally, 
inadequate post harvest handling techniques result in lower prices to farmers.  
 
· Although matters are improving, there is often poor, or non-existent, market 
information at farm gate level, and an inadequate rural road network, resulting in 
some farms being inaccessible to traders, particularly in the rainy season. Farmers 
have limited trading opportunities and are inevitably price takers at farm gate level 
with little, or no, bargaining power to enable them to exploit competiti n amongst 
traders. 
 
· Production and marketing efficiencies may be improved by the development of the 
farmer group movement.  In particular, this should lead to a shorter commodity chain 
and economies of scale, resulting, in turn, in lower trading costs.  
 
· Some of the major wholesale markets in Kampala such as Kalerwe and Kisenyi are 
notoriously congested.  In addition, operators in the marketing chain who are based in 
other Districts complain about lack of access to these markets because they feel 
obliged to go through local middlemen.  New wholesale market facilities are required 
allowing better access to producers and traders from other parts of the country. 
 
· Trader ability to expand volume purchases, thus increasing competition, is 
constrained bylack of working capital.  The microfinance movement should be 
encouraged to enter this sector, as has been seen in other countries (eg, cassava 
traders in the Mwanza district of Northern Tanzania). 
 
· High transport costs from rural areas to Kampala are a particular constraint to 
improving transaction cost efficiencies. Distance, high vehicle operation costs, and 
inadequate “back cargoes” are the major reasons. Processors mentioned high 
electricity costs in the cassava milling operations as being a burden on profitability. 
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· The difficulty in improving production, processing and marketing efficiencies to the 
benefit of the farmer is hampered by many farming communities being; innately 
conservative, reluctant to take up new village level processing technology i view of 
perceived costs and time/labour constraints, reluctant to appreciate the benefits of 
forming themselves into marketing groups and processing cassava into flour for 
income generation.   
 
· During the course of the survey, it became apparent that the link between potential 
industrial users of cassava and farming communities is missing.  As a consequence, 
building of this link is important for a future cassava economy not only producing for 
human consumption but also for the industrial sector (e.g. domestic and regional 
animal feed or starch manufacturers).  In addition, cassava producers and small 
traders are not sufficiently aware of alternative uses of dried and fresh cassava. 
 
6.7  Raising Farmers’ Incomes 
 
The poor profitability of cassava at farm level is due, primarily, to low yields, scattered 
production, inadequate processing technology, and poor prices due to lack of market 
outlets and farmer bargaining power.  Farmers’ incomes must be raised through 
efficiencies within the internal production and marketing system, and through the 
identification of alternative market outlets. 
 
Both production and marketing efficiencies can be improved by encouraging farmers 
groups to enhance their ability to access input credit and improve net farm gate prices. 
Past experience in Africa and other developing countries, particularly related to the 
cooperative movement, warrants caution in this regard. Successful farmers groups should 
be formed from within the farming community owned by farmers themselves, have a 
clear objective and eschew commercial activities, which are beyond their capacity. 
Whilst external assistance is required as a catalyst to formation and capacity building, 
such outside involvement should be minimal with a view to disengagement when long 
term sustainability is to be achieved. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, DFID has a 
particular interest in sustainable livelihoods in the rural sector and should be 
recommended to act as a catalyst in this context. NAADS also have a key role in 
facilitating the formation and building the capacity of farmers groups. 
  
6.8  Summary of Key Findings  
 
· Cassava, consumed primarily fresh or as flour made into a porridge, plays an 
important part in the rural and urban diet.  
· The small scale of cassava farming units, low yields, inadequate post-harvest 
handling and processing technologies, and low net farm gate prices relative to market 
levels, all contribute to the cassava growing being of marginal profitability. This is 
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particularly true in times of low and stagnant prices, such as during the period of the 
study. 
· Although there is keen competition amongst traders for cassava, farmers are in a 
weak bargaining position due to inadequate economies of production scale and 
inadequate marketing information and bargaining power. 
· The poor rural road network in many areas results in farmers being unable to access 
markets regularly, particularly during the rainy season.  
· High transport costs due to, amongst other things, high fuel prices, lack of ‘back-
cargo’, and the cost of vehicle maintenance particularly hamper transaction cost 
inefficiency. 
· Encouraging signs of small and scattered, but active farmers groups, are evident in 
some surplus maize growing districts which have lessons for cassava farmers and the 
potential for replication. 
· Cassava processing into flour is mainly undertaken by “posho millers” at rural and 
urban level, with electricity being a major cost factor in milling operations.  
 
6.8  Recommended Implementation Plan 
 
1. The improvement of farm gate cassava quality: We recommend that existing 
programmes be expanded and new programmes implementedto reduce farmers 
losses, through optimal crop post harvest handling techniques and on farm storage. 
We suggest that NAADS and the NARO Cassava Programme are the most 
appropriate bodies to implement these initiatives. 
 
2. The encouragement and capacity building of farmers groups: We recommend the 
encouragement of farmers groups as the key to improving maize growing profitability 
and marketing efficiency. W e suggest that initiatives i  this context are undertaken 
by the CDO / NAADS / MAAIF and that assistance is sought from DFID under their 
sustainable livelihoods programme. 
 
3. The development of rural finance: We r commend the improvement of rural financial 
services, particularly microfinance to enable greater access to credit for agricultural 
inputs and trading working capital, and suggest that NGO’s and donors, such as 
DFID, together with the Bank of Uganda, are encouraged to assist with such 
initiatives. 
 
4. The promotion of marketing information at rural level: Current initiatives such as the      
IITA – Foodnet marketing information service (MIS) and the MTN mobile telephone 
marketing information service are disseminating cassava  prices at rural level. We 
suggest that NGO’s and donors be encouraged to assist with such initiatives.  
 
5. Improved markets in Kampala allowing better access for farmers and traders from 
other parts of the country. We recommend that improved wholesale market facilities, 
preferably located at the outskirts of the city, be planned and constructed by Kampala 
City authorities in consultation with trader associations. 
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6. Improved linkages between farming communities and agro-industries.  It is 
recommended that these linkages be established through the dissemination of
information (e.g. workshops), supply of adequate samples of raw material to 
industries interested in trials (e.g. poultry feeding industry), and identification of 
viable options establishing the link between cassava producing communities and 
industrial end-users (e.g. contract farming).  We suggest that NAADS, research 
organisations (e.g. NARO and IITA), and NGOs facilitate such initiatives.  If after 
trials there are clear signs that cassava is not preferred as a raw material by agro-
industries, then farmers should be encouraged to produce alternative, commercial, 
crops.  
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Section 7.  Dairy 
7.1  Introduction 
 
The current structure of the dairy industry has its origins in the creation of the parastatal 
Dairy Corporation in the late sixties and the subsequent removal of its monopoly milk 
marketing powers in the early to mid nineties.  Dairy Corp, as it is widely known, was 
established to regulate the dairy industry and to process and market dairy products.  As a 
government monopoly, one of its tasks was to ensure that dairy farmers in traditional 
milk producing areas were able to sell their milk into the consumer markets, principally 
in Kampala.  In periods when war did not intervene, the Dairy Corp achieved this task 
effectively, albeit with considerable state subsidy and donor support.  However, in-so-
doing, it could be argued that the Dairy Corp encouraged the perpetuation of a sub-
optimal geographical pattern of commercial production.  Today, one of the principal 
districts supplying milk to Kampala is Mbarara, whose milk producing areas lie 200 to 
300km from the capital.  Even in temperate climates, milk is a highly perishable product.  
In tropical climates, problems of spoilage are compounded and the logistical costs of 
collecting small quantities of milk from scattered locations and then transporting it 
quickly to market in bulk, and preferably through a cold chain, are very high.  A high 
proportion of spoilage is nevertheless difficult to avoid and adds to the costs.  In such 
circumstances, locating production near to consumption makes good sense. 
 
When Ugandan milk marketing was deregulated in the early ineties, the private sector 
saw an opportunity to out-c mpete the Dairy Corp, which they saw as bureaucratic and 
inefficient.  Over the course of the next few years, thirteen private processing factories 
were installed.  What the owners of these factories did not foresee was the rise of the 
informal milk marketing sector.  By avoiding substantial capital expenditure and 
adulterating milk with water and chemical preservatives, the informal sector has been 
able to out-bid the formal sector in the raw milk market.  Today, of all marketed milk, at 
least 80% is sold in loose form by the informal sector.  The inability to source sufficient 
milk has created severe financial problems for the formal processing sector.  Of the 
thirteen original private sector processing factories only five are still operating. 
 
In the late nineties, Dairy Corp’s regulatory and development roles were removed and 
invested in a new industry body, the Dairy Development Authority (DDA).  Although the 
Authority is mainly funded by government and is tasked with implementing government 
dairy policy, its board contains members from the farming, processing and informal 
marketing industries.  Important DDA roles of particular relevance to this study are the 
regulation of dairy marketing for health safety and the promotion of dairy consumption. 
 
Other industry stakeholders are the Uganda National Dairy Traders’ Association, which 
represents the interests of the informal milk marketing sector, and the Uganda National 
Dairy Farmers’ Association, which is receiving substantial support from the DDA to 
assist the organisation of dairy farmers. 
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The Dairy Corp is now being prepared for privatisation and the offer for sale will be  
issued by the end of this year.  A 70% stake in the core assets will b sold o a single 
buyer.  What will happen to the assets after the sale is not clear, although a certain 
amount of rationalisation is bound to occur, particularly in milk collection, which is 
generally regarded to be the least efficient part of the business. 
 
Of the donors, DANIDA has patiently provided support to Dairy Corp over recent years, 
and GTZ, SNV, USAID and Assistance Francaise have been supporting various aspects 
of dairy production.  Assistance Francaise is about to launch a new project that will 
support farmer organisations, and strengthen dairy statutory and technical environments. 
 
The dairy sector’s contribution to the economy is difficult to state.  Marketed milk is 
estimated by the DDA to be 30 to 50% of production.  Estimates provided by the private 
sector suggest that the lower estimate might be closer to the truth.  Assuming that annual 
production is correctly estimated at 700 million litres, and that the retail value of milk is 
USh500/litre, the value of domestically marketed milk to the economy is about USh100 
billion (US$58 million).  Including the subsistence production (valued by us, somewhat 
arbitrarily, at USh200/litre), the contribution to the economy might be as much as 
USh200 billion (US$116 million).  From a foreign exchange perspective, approximately 
US$3 million was earned through UHT exports to Rwanda and Kenya in 2001 (King 
2002) 
 
Only about 10% of the marketed milk is pasteurised.  We could find no figures that relate 
the incidence of diseases such TB and brucellosis to raw m lk consumption.  However, in 
Uganda, milk is often consumed as a major constituent of tea and consequently brewing 
temperatures are likely to kill harmful bacteria contained in milk.  Perhaps a more serious 
health concern is the widespread practice employed in the informal sector of adding 
chemical preservatives such as hydrogen peroxide and caustic soda.  
 
7.2  Supply 
 
According to DDA figures approximately 52% (360 million litres per annum) of 
Uganda’s milk comes from 12 Districts in the south-w st of the country, with Mbarara 
alone producing 15% (105 million litres) of the national total.  The only other region of 
the country that contributes significantly to production is the north-ea t, where Kotido 
and Moroto’s nomadic cattle herders produce an estimated 16% (112 million litres) of 
national milk output.  The proportion of this milk that is marketed is probably low. 
 
Milk is produced from an estimated 5.9 million cows, of which only 0.278 million cows 
(4.7% of the total) are exotic and cross-breed .  These aggregate figures suggest an 
average daily milk yield per cow of just over 3 litres of milk per day, which indicates the 
low input, low output nature of dairy production.  By comparison, milk production per 
cow among the most productive herds in Uganda is between 18 and 20 litres per day 
during lactation.   
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Uganda’s dairy markets are also supplied by Kenyan products, chiefly UHT milk but also 
cheese and flavoured milks.  We are not aware of the quantities involved but believe that 
sales have declined over recent years because of the poor performance of the Kenyan 
dairy industry. 
 
7.3  Demand 
 
The domestic market 
 
By far the largest market in Uganda is Kampala.  During our fieldwork, a private sector 
source estimated that Kampala’s daily milk requirement is 300,000 litres.  Of this total, 
the formal processing sector probably supplies less than 60,000 litres; the remainder of 
demand is satisfied by the informal sector.   
 
In general, the market for fresh milk is driven by price and convenience much more than 
by quality.  The informal milk marketing sector has realised this and supplies cheap 
(albeit often adulterated) milk directly to urban consumers’ dwellings.  
 
Limited demand also exists for yoghurt, butter, ghee and flavoured milk.  The continued 
growth of one particular dairy processing company, which specialises in selling high 
quality dairy products through supermarkets, suggests that middle class urban demand for 
well presented products is not yet fully satisfied.  Despite this, demand for these products 
only amounts to a few thousand litres raw milk equivalent per day.  
 
The potential for growth in the domestic market is substantial.  Averaged across the 
whole country, milk consumption per capita is only about 30 litres per year.  Average per 
capita consumption in Kampala is probably between 120 and 140 litres per year. By 
comparison, the World Health Organisation recommends an annual consumption of 200 
litres.  Providing that incomes continue to rise and that the DDA promotes consumption 
adequately, there is every reason to believe that domestic demand for dairy products can 
rise substantially. 
 
The export market 
 
Opportunities for Ugandan UHT milk are already being exploited in Rwanda and Kenya, 
and there is some possibility of markets emerging in Suda  and Tanzania.  In 2001, 
Uganda’s two UHT milk factories exported approximately US$3 million of milk to 
Kenya and Rwanda.  Both countries once had healthy dairy sectors that supplied the 
majority of their needs.  However, civil war in Rwanda, and climatic and institutional 
problems in Kenya have left these markets in deficit.  While domestic supply of dairy 
products will probably recover in Kenya and Rwanda in the long run, the current deficits 
will provide Uganda with a export opportunity for several years. 
 
Currently Dairy Corp is packaging 20 to 30,000 litres of UHT milk per week for a 
Rwandan dairy, and is also collaborating with Sunshine Dairy in Kisumu to expand sales 
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in western Kenya.  GBK, Uganda’s other UHT producer, has registered companies in 
Kenya and Rwanda and is currently expanding its sales.  
 
7.4  Marketing chains  
 
Figure 7.1  Milk marketing flow diagram 
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From the farm, milk is either taken directly by the farmer to a roadside collection point or 
purchased by a rural trader, who then takes the milk, usually by bicycle, to a collection 
point.  Most collection points have no facilities.  Those run by Dairy Corp and a few that 
are operated by farmer associations in towns, have electric milk cooling tanks.   
 
Two types of buyer come to the collection points – employees of milk processing 
factories, and informal sector traders.  Milk purchased by private sector factories is 
transported by pick-up in plastic milk churns to the factory, where it is cooled, 
pasteurised, usually homogenised and then packaged.  Dairy Corp milk waits at the 
collection point until a corporation vehicle can collect it and take it to a bulking centre in 
a major town.  From here the milk is transported by refrigerated tanker to the processing 
factory in Kampala. 
 
Once private factories have processed their milk, it is taken overnight to depots in 
Kampala from where most of it is distributed early in the morning to retail outlets.  
During our fieldwork we discovered  a few instances of formal sector milk being sold 
from depots to informal sector distributors (the “bicycle men”). 
 
Competition in the formal processing sector has been intense, not only between factories 
but also with the informal sector.  The evidence for this lies both in the number of 
factories that have closed down and in the dire financial position of some of the factories 
that remain in operation (section 7.6 gives more evidence of this).   
 
Informal sector milk is purchased from the rural collection centres by two types of trader.  
The first type merely collects milk in a rented pick-up (usually shared with two other 
traders because of working capital constraints) and then transports it in 20 litre jerry cans 
to a wholesale market in Kampala.  Here, providing that the milk is still in a fresh state, it 
is sold directly to “bicycle men” for distribution to households.  Milk that is left unsold 
after a certain time of day is boiled over wood fires to lengthen its shelf life. 
 
The second type of informal sector trader collects milk in his own pick-up a d then 
transports it to his cooling facility in Kampala, from where he sells it to “bicycle men” 
distributors and, on occasion, directly to consumers.  In 2001, the DDA registered 
approximately 160 such milk cooling facilities in Kampala, an increase of 60 over the 
previous year.  Assuming that the average daily turnover of one of these operators is 1000 
litres, this group of businesses supplies approximately 160,000 litres of milk to Kampala 
each day.  If true, this would represent a very substantial proportion of the Kampala 
wholesale milk market.  It is quite possible that either our estimate of average daily 
turnover is too high13 or that our estimate of the size of the milk market in Kampala 
(300,000 litres per day) is too low.  However, despite these doubts, it is quite clear that 
this section of the informal milk trade is capturing a large and growing proportion of the 
market.  
 
                                         
13 However, most pick-ups have a capacity of 1800 litres, and trips to milk producing areas are usually 
made on a daily basis. 
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Its rise to prominence must partially be the result of failures in the oth r section of the 
informal trade, where cooling is not practised.  While on paper, this less sophisticated 
form of trade looks profitable, in many instances, and particularly during the dry season, 
the problem of milk spoilage becomes so severethat traders lose money.  The high entry 
and exit rate of participants in the trade gives further evidence of the losses.  
 
In an attempt to maintain profitability, informal sector traders who don’t have access to 
milk coolers have turned to boiling and to readily available chemical preservatives such 
as soap and hydrogen peroxide to reduce spoilage.  Traders also add water to milk in an 
attempt to increase revenue.  Precisely where these practices occur in the informal sector 
supply chain is not clear.  Milk wholesalers tend to blame the bicycle men but there are 
incentives for sellers to adulterate milk at all levels of the supply chain, so in reality the 
problem is probably widespread. 
 
The “bicycle men” buy milk from wholesale markets or milk cooling facilities a d
transport it to urban homes in plastic containers and metal milk churns.  They sell loose 
milk in approximately half litre measures to householders.  
 
All evidence suggests that competition within the informal sector is intense.  Further 
evidence is provided in section 7.6 of this report, where the profitability of various types 
of informal sector trader is analysed. 
 
7.5  Transactions 
 
In the main, transactions in milk supply chains are conducted on a spot cash basis, 
thereby minimising transaction costs for sellers.  Another feature of this type of instant 
transaction is that risk (particularly that of spoilage) is transferred at each link of the 
chain.  During our fieldwork we heard anecdotal evidence of some informal sector traders 
buying from farmers on credit.  One allegation concerned traders who offer substantially 
higher prices to farmers but who, after the third or fourth successfully completed 
transaction, do not return to pay the farmer.  We were unable to verify either the 
existence or prevalence of this practice.  However, farmers, particularly those located far 
from milk collection points, are in a particularly weak bargaining position and are 
vulnerable to cheating. 
 
The only other dubious transaction in the chain is between informal sector “bicycle men” 
distributors and household consumers, who may not be aware that they are purchasing 
adulterated milk.    
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7.6  Marketing chain players’ costs and margins  
 
Farmers 
 
In the south-west, prices that farmers receive for their milk can ange sig ificantly 
depending on distance from collection centres and on the season.  In the dry seasons, 
when a lack of forage reduces milk supply, prices offered by informal sector traders at 
milk collection points can be as high as USh300/litre.  In the wet seasons, informal sector 
prices drop to between USh200 and 220.  Of course, unless farmers can deliver their own 
milk to the collection points, these are not the prices that they receive.  In the most 
extreme cases, where farmers are far away from collection points, farmers receive as little 
as USh100/litre. 
 
Formal sector buyers in south-west Uganda pay between USh200 and 220/litre, 
regardless of the season.  Farmers and rural traders therefore generally prefer to sell to 
informal sector traders, although the factories have the advantage of being cash buyers 
who can be depended on to buy milk regularly.  By comparison, farmers lucky enough to 
be located near to Kampala are able to sell their milk to formal and informal sector at 
between USh300 and 400/litre, depending on quality and season.  
 
Farmer association milk collecting points 
 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 give actual examples of two milk collecting centres operated by 
farmers’ associations in South-West Uganda.  Example “number 1” runs a 2,500 litre 
capacity milk cooler, while “number 2” runs two 5,000 litre capacity units.  Both 
associations only accept milk from members and sell either to local traders or take milk 
to Mbarara for sale to processing factories.  All assumptions and workings appear in 
appendix A6. 
 
For example number 1, profits are zero.  This is entirely in keeping with the nature of the 
business, which works on a cost recovery basis, thereby passing all financial benefits 
immediately on to members.  Example number 2 makes a substantial loss because of poor 
cost management and low throughput. 
 
Although both associations are urban located (necessary for access to power), they are 
nevertheless remote from formal sector processors and major urban markets.  Their 
success, or otherwise, rests on their ability to give higher prices to members than if 
members sold directly to traders.  They achieve this by providing buyers with bulk 
quantities of fresh chilled milk.  This reduces buyers’ costs in two ways:  Firstly, buyers 
do not have to travel so far to collect sufficient quantities of milk, and secondly, the milk 
is likely to remain fresher for longer.    
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Table 7.1 – Farmer association milk collecting point (number 1) 
 
 USh per annum USh per 
litre of 
product 
US$ per 
annum 
US$ per 
litre of 
product 
% of costs 
Operating costs – variable:      
  Raw material          191,100,000             210           110,462           0.12 83% 
  Energy              1,800,000                2               1,040           0.00 1% 
  Direct labour              1,620,000                2                  936           0.00 1% 
  Fuel            16,632,000               18               9,614           0.01 7% 
Sub-total variable costs          211,152,000             232           122,053           0.13 92% 
Operating costs – fixed:      
  Management              3,840,000                4               2,220           0.00 2% 
  Water              1,500,000                2                  867           0.00 1% 
  Rent              1,800,000                 2               1,040           0.00 1% 
  Licence                 200,000                0                  116           0.00 0% 
  Fixed asset maintenance              1,456,000                2                842            0.00 1% 
Sub-total fixed costs              8,796,000               10               5,084           0.01 4% 
      
Sub-total operating costs          219,948,000             242           127,138           0.14 96% 
Contingency - 1% (miscellaneous)              2,199,480                2               1,271           0.00 1% 
Total operating costs          222,147,480             244           128,409           0.14 97% 
Capital costs              7,907,307                9               4,571           0.01 3% 
Total annual costs          230,054,787             253           132,980           0.15 100% 
      
Annual revenue          229,950,000             253           132,919           0.15 100% 
      
Profit (loss) before tax (104,787) (0) (61) (0.00)  
Source:  Authors’ fieldwork 
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Table 7.2 – Farmer association milk collecting point (number 2) 
 
 USh per annum USh per 
litre of 
product 
US$ per 
annum 
US$ per 
litre of 
product 
% of costs 
Operating costs – variable:      
  Raw material          288,943,200             189           167,019           0.11 80% 
  Energy              3,600,000                2               2,081           0.00 1% 
  Direct labour              1,560,000                 1                  902           0.00 0% 
  Fuel            16,632,000               11               9,614           0.01 5% 
Sub-total variable costs          310,735,200             203           179,616         0.12 86% 
Operating costs – fixed:      
  Management              3,840,000                3               2,220           0.00 1% 
  Water              1,500,000                1                  867           0.00 0% 
  Rent              1,200,000                 1                  694           0.00 0% 
  Licence                 200,000                0                  116           0.00 0% 
  Fixed asset maintenance              6,496,000                4               3,755            0.00 2% 
Sub-total fixed costs            13,236,000                9               7,651           0.01 4% 
      
Sub-total operating costs          323,971,200             212           187,267           0.12 90% 
Contingency - 1% (miscellaneous)              3,239,712                2               1,873           0.00 1% 
Total operating costs          327,210,912             214           189,139           0.12 91% 
Capital costs            32,290,601               21             18,665           0.01 9% 
Total annual costs          359,501,513             235           207,804           0.14 100% 
      
Annual revenue          328,500,000             215           189,884           0.12  
      
Profit (loss) before tax (31,001,513) (20) (17,920) (0.01)  
Source:  Authors’s fieldwork 
 
Formal sector milk processors 
 
Table 7.3 gives the costs and margins for a typical medium scale fresh milk processor 
(pasteurisation, homogenisation and packaging) based in South-West Uganda.  All 
assumptions and workings appear in appendix A6. 
 
The most obvious feature of table 7.3 is that the factory is making a substantial loss.  In 
fact it only continues to operate by eating into its private equity.  Over recent years, costs 
have been reduced to an absolute minimum, yet profitability remains elusive.  The 
principal reason is that the factory is operating at only 20 to 25% of capacity.  In fact, the 
factory would have to double its current output in order to break even.  At full capacity, 
the factory would become a reasonably profitable enterprise, earning approximately 
USh670 million (US$350,000) per year (or 4 cents per litre of output).  At this level of 
output, the factory could afford to pay more for its raw material.  But here is the essential 
catch:  At its current level of throughput, the factory can not afford to pay more for milk 
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but at the same time, it can not increase its throughput unless it does pay more for milk, 
thereby attracting greater quantities from farmers and rural traders. 
 
 
Table 7.3  Medium scale fresh milk processor costs and margins 
 
 
USh per annum 
USh per 
litre of 
product 
US$ per annum US$ per litre of product % of costs 
Operating costs - variable:      
  Raw material          596,996,400             234               345,085              0.14 37% 
  Energy            96,000,000              38                 55,491              0.02 6% 
  Direct labour            33,000,000              13                 19,075            0.01 2% 
  Packaging          122,304,000              48                 70,696              0.03 8% 
  Fuel          120,000,000              47                 69,364              0.03 8% 
Sub-total variable costs          968,300,400            380               559,711              0.22 61% 
Operating costs - fixed:      
  Management            51,900,000              20                 30,000              0.01 3% 
  Water             15,000,000                6                 8,671              0.00 1% 
  Fixed asset maintenance            40,000,000              16                 23,121              0.01 3% 
Sub-total fixed costs          106,900,000              42                 61,792              0.02 7% 
      
Sub-total operating costs       1,075,200,400            422               621,503              0.24 67% 
Miscellaneous            53,760,020              21                 31,075              0.01 3% 
Total operating costs       1,128,960,420             443               652,578              0.26 71% 
Capital costs          466,603,674            183               269,713              0.11 29% 
Total costs       1,595,564,094            626               922,291              0.36 100% 
      
Revenue       1,274,000,000            500               736,416              0.29  
      
Profit (loss) before tax (321,564,094) (126) (185,875)  (0.07)  
Source:  Authors’ fieldwork 
 
Two of the major contributors to the busin ss’s high costs are milk collection and 
distribution.  These costs are embedded in table 7.3.  However, stated explicitly, the costs 
are as follows:  To collect a litre of milk costs the factory on average USh50.  Once 
processed, the milk is transported t  Kampala at a cost of USh50/litre and then 
distributed to retail outlets at a cost of USh55 to 60/litre.  The milk is sold to retail outlets 
at USh500/litre.  The total cost of collection and distribution is therefore approximately 
31% of the factory’s revenue. 
 
Collection costs are so high because of the distances involved.  Round trips range from 
20 to 100 km and often involve distances travelled on unsealed roads.  Unless the factory 
could afford to pay higher prices for milk and therefore expect to b  abl  to collect from 
less remote areas, there is little prospect for reducing collection costs. 
 
The cost of transporting milk to Kampala is unavoidable but the cost of distribution to 
consumers once it arrives could possibly be reduced by adopting an alternative strategy 
which does not involve retail outlets.  Such an alternative is considered in section X. 
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The cost of packaging is also a significant component of overall costs (8%), one that the 
informal sector avoids entirely.  The cost presented in table X is based on a polythene 
sachet.  The cost of packaging in a Tetra-Pak carton is at least twice as high. 
 
Fresh milk retailers 
 
Having purchased milk at USh500/litre, retailers in Kampala typically add USh200 to 
300 as their margin.  Retail margins tend to be so high because, in most cases, the 
volumes traded are low and the risk of spoilage is high. 
 
UHT milk processors  
 
 
Table 7.4  UHT processor costs and margins 
 
 USh per annum 
USh per litre 
of product US$ per annum 
US$ per 
litre of 
product 
% of costs 
Operating costs - variable:      
  Raw material             1,783,236,000        245           1,024,848           0.14 30% 
  Energy                240,000,000          33              137,931           0.02 4% 
  Direct labour               145,600,000          20                83,678           0.01 2% 
  Packaging                873,600,000        120              502,069           0.07 15% 
Fuel                380,000,000          52              218,391           0.3 6% 
Sub-total variable costs             3,422,436,000        470           1,966,917           0.27 57% 
Operating costs - fixed:      
  Management                105,000,000          14                60,345           0.01 2% 
  Office expenses                  90,000,000          12                51,724           0.01 2% 
  Fixed asset maintenance                171,200,000          24                98,391           0.01 3% 
  Miscellaneous                325,717,000             45              187,194           0.03 5% 
Sub-total fixed costs                547,424,000          75.20              314,611           0.04 9% 
      
Total operating costs             4,168,353,000        573           2,395,605          0.33 70% 
Capital costs             1,817,789,863        250           1,044,707            0.14 30% 
Total costs             5,986,142,863        822           3,440,312           0.47 100% 
      
Revenue             4,004,000,000        550           2,301,149           0.32  
      
Profit (loss) before tax  (1,982,142,863) (272) (1,139,163) (0.16)  
Source:  Authors’ fieldwork 
 
Table 7.4 gives our estimated costs for a large UHT milk producer based in South-We t 
Uganda (assumptions and workings appear in appendix A6).  The factory is clearly 
sustaining large losses, some of which can be attributed to poor cost management.  
However, at 20% utilisation, low throughput is a crippling problem (as suggested by the 
39% share that fixed costs contribute to total costs).  If the plant could run at maximum 
capacity, then it would become reasonably profitable (estimated at US$740,000 per year).  
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The UHT plant faces the same milk collection costs as experienced by the fresh milk 
processor an lysed above.  However, the much lower perishability of the product means 
that distribution costs should be considerably lower, at least in theory. 
 
The Dairy Corporation 
 
Figures provided by Dairy Corp show that its production costs, at current levels of 
throughput, are considerably larger than those experienced by the private sector operators 
analysed above.  The ex-factory cost of one litre of Dairy Corp pasteurised fresh milk is 
USh855, compared with USh520 for the private sector company.  For UHT milk the 
comparison is USh1,050 versus USh710.  A large part of these differences is due to Dairy 
Corp’s huge milk collection costs.  Whereas the private sector firms14 pay the equivalent 
of USh100/litre, Dairy Corp’s collection costs are USh231.  Dairy Corp management 
believe that the reason for this difference is that Corporation investments in milk 
collecting assets are commercially unviable and its cost controls are poor.   
 
Informal sector traders 
 
 
Table 7.5  Type 1 informal trader costs and margins 
  
 
USh per day 
USh per 
litre of 
product 
US$ per 
day 
US$ per 
litre of 
product 
%  of costs 
Operating costs – variable:      
  Raw material                 441,563            245        255.24            0.14 69% 
  Consumables                     2,430                1            1.40            0.00 0% 
  District tax                   31,500              18          18.21            0.01 5% 
  Association levy                     9,000                5            5.20            0.00 1% 
  Kampala district levy                     9,000                5            5.20            0.00 1% 
  Milk preservation (half of milk purchased)                   22,500              13          13.01            0.01 3% 
Sub-total variable costs                 515,993            287        298.26            0.17 80% 
Operating costs - fixed:      
  Vehicle hire (including driver)                   57,500              32          33.24            0.02 9% 
  Fuel                   70,000               39          40.46            0.02 11% 
Sub-total fixed costs                 127,500              71          73.70            0.04 20% 
      
Total operating costs                 643,493            357        371.96          0.21 100% 
      
Revenue                 628,875            349        363.51            0.20  
      
Profit (loss)  (14,618) (8) (8.45) (0.00)  
Source:  Authors’ fieldwork 
 
                                         
14 This takes into account the leg from farm to Mbarara and from Mbarara to Kampala.  In reality this 
second leg is part of product distribution but counts as collection in this analysis because the Dairy Corp 
factory is located in Kampala. 
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Table 7.5 gives costs and margins for what we have chosen to call a “type 1” informal 
trader, who is characterised by not having his own milk cooling facilities.  Assumptions 
and workings appear in appendix A6 but the chief assumptions are that the trader15 buys 
1800 litres of milk per trip at an average price of USh245/litre and sel s at an average of 
USh356/litre (both buying and selling prices have been estimated to represent a weighted 
average yearly price).       
 
The most obvious feature of table 7.5 is that the trader is not making any money.  The 
principal reasons are the high rate of milk spoilage in transit and the costs of preserving 
milk in Kampala.  Hardly any wonder then that informal sector traders resort to adding 
water and chemical preservatives to milk in order to make a profit.  The catch is that if 
everyone does it, the market will automatically discount the selling price and no one is 
better off.  The existence of losses is also supported by evidence of the high turnover rate 
of traders who enter the business thinking that there is much money to be made a d often 
soon quit realising that they are making losses. 
 
 
Table 7.6  Type 2 informal sector trader costs and margins
 
 USh per year USh per 
litre of 
product 
US$ per year US$ per litre 
of product 
%  of costs 
Operating costs – variable:      
  Raw material          137,767,500            284         79,634            0.16 74% 
  Consumables                 758,160                2              438            0.00 0% 
  District tax              9,828,000              20           5,681            0.01 5% 
Sub-total variable costs          148,353,660            306         85,754            0.18 79% 
Operating costs – fixed:      
  Labour               4,200,000                9           2,428            0.01 2% 
  Fuel            24,960,000               52         14,428            0.03 13% 
  Rent              1,200,000                2              694            0.00 1% 
  Electricity                 900,000                2              520            0.00 0% 
  Water                 288,000                1              166            0.00 0% 
  Traders' licence                   75,000                0                43            0.00 0% 
  Council tax                   50,000                0                29            0.00 0% 
Sub-total fixed costs            31,673,000              65         18,308            0.04 17% 
      
Total operating costs          180,026,660            372       104,062            0.21 96% 
Capital costs              7,012,190              14           4,053            0.01 4% 
Total costs          187,038,850            386       108,115            0.22 100% 
      
Revenue          196,209,000            405       113,416            0.23  
      
Profit (loss)              9,170,150              19           5,301            0.01  
Source:  Authors’ fieldwork 
 
                                         
15 In reality, the costs and revenues of one trip are likely to be shared by two or three traders. 
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Table 7.6 gives the costs and margins for a “type 2” trader, who is distinguished by 
owning a milk cooling facility in Kampal .  The data used in the analysis that produced 
table 7.6 was taken from several Kampala based milk cooler owners.  All assumptions 
and workings appear in appendix A6.  The important assumptions are that the trader pays 
and receives the same prices as th type 1 trader and makes six buying trips per week, 
collecting 1800 litres per trip.  
 
Table 7.6 demonstrates that milk cooling can be a profitable business.  However, some 
caution should be given the interpretation of profits.  In this instance, the “profi s” 
include remuneration to the owner as the manager of the business.  
 
The “bicycle men” milk distributors  
 
These vital links in the informal milk sector buy milk at wholesale markets and urban 
milk cooling centres at an average price of about USh360/litre (weighted annual average) 
and sell to consumers at about USh500/litre.  Typically they will only be able to carry 
about 50 litres on their bicycles and so the maximum profit from one trip is about 
USh7,000.  However, some of the milk may become unsellable due to spoilage, thereby 
reducing profits. 
 
Adulteration with water 
 
As noted above, there are incentives for sellers at each level of the informal sector supply 
chain to adulterate milk with water.  The problem becomes worse in dry seasons when 
the price of milk at the farm gate rises because of scarcity, yet the consumer price does 
not rise to the same degree.  The prices used in the informal sector analyses above have 
been manipulated to represent weighted average annual prices and therefore mask 
seasonal differences.  However, in the height of dry seasons rural collection points in 
South-West Uganda prices are as much as USh300/litre, while urban wholesale prices are 
about USh450/litre.  This compares with wet season prices of USh220 and USh300 
respectively.  Consumer prices remain at about USh500/litre throughout the year and so 
the incentive to adulterate milk is higher in the dry season. 
 
7.7  Constraints and opportunities 
 
High collection costs 
 
Collection costs for milk processed by the formal processing sector can range from 
USh50/litre to USh231/litre in the most extreme case16.  These high costs are a reflection 
of the scattered, remote and low output nature of dairy production.  Short of relocating 
dairy farming closer to consumer markets and increasing its production intensity, only a 
limited amount can be done to reduce costs.  However, one such approach would be to 
encourage farmer associations to bulk and cool milk in locations with good access to 
                                         
16 However, the distances involved in this extreme case are at least twice as great. 
 166
main roads and to the mains electricity (the Dairy Corp has once and for all proved that 
milk cooling centres that rely too heavily on generators are unprofitable!).  This should 
not only raise farmers’ incomes but will also reduce the costs that processing factories 
incur in terms of transport and milk spoilage. 
 
Low or negative processor profitability  
 
The Dairy Development Authority blames poor management, weak marketing strategies 
and stiff competition with informal sector traders for the profitability problems faced by 
the dairy processing industry.  Our own experience suggests that competition with the 
informal sector is by far the largest constraint.  Processors argue that the competition is 
unfair because the informal sector has not been regulated by the DDA and can 
consequently get away with lowering costs through adulterating milk (it would be 
interesting to discover whether dairy farmers, who generally get higher prices from the 
informal sector, believe that the competition is unfair!).   
 
To some extent, the unfairness will soon come to an end when the DDA starts regulating 
the informal sector for milk quality and food safety.  However, the DDA believes that it 
will never be able to regulate unsafe milk out of the market because as soon as it closes 
down one unhygienic raw milk operation ano her will spring up somewhere else.  The 
problem comes down to resources – the DDA can’t be everywhere all the time.  Despite 
this, we believe that the worst offenders, those informal sector traders who have not 
invested in milk coolers, could be persuaded to leave the business providing enough 
pressure is applied.  After all, profits from this type of trade are negligible if not negative.  
This would leave demand for informal sector milk serviced by the growing number of 
milk cooling businesses that have an invested stake in the future of the industry.  
Regulating these businesses should be a much more simple task.   
 
However, it will not necessarily solve the chief problem that faces the processing 
industry; that of severely under- tilised capacity.  Ideally, this problem could be solved 
by forging links between the milk processors and the informal sector milk cooling 
centres.  At least this way, the DDA could be sure that the majority of milk entering 
Kampala is clean and healthy, even if milk is adulterated aft r it arrives.  The processors 
would be able to sell more milk and hence bring down their per unit costs of production.   
 
However, the chief constraint would be cost.  Currently, the lowest price at which loose 
processed milk could be sold at a reasonable profit in Mbarara is about USh340/litre.  
Providing milk cooling centre operators in Kampala collected the milk from the 
processing factories in Mbarara, transport costs would probably be about USh60/litre.  
The milk cooling centre owner’s operating m rgin (costs and profit) is about USh40/litre.  
The selling price at the milk cooler would therefore be USh440/litre.  Once the “bicycle 
men” have delivered the milk to households, the price would be approximately 
USh580/litre:  In other words, consumers would be paying at least USh80/litre more than 
they currently do.  They would however stand a much better chance of getting clean, 
fresh, healthy milk at a price that would be substantially less than if they bought 
packaged milk in a retail outlet at USh700 to 800/litre.  Unfortunately the bottom line is 
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that the majority of consumers would be unlikely to pay more for a product that is 
ostensibly the same as another, cheaper product:  Product differentiation between the 
processed and raw milk would not always be obvious. 
 
Packaging 
 
Perhaps one way of overcoming the product differentiation problem would be to sell 
packaged milk directly to urban households.  This would give discerning householders 
confidence that their milk is unlikely to be adulterated and woul  also help to keep the 
DDA milk quality inspectors happy.  However, unless a very cost-effective yet secure 
form of packaging can be found, cost might again be a problem.  Polythene packaged 
milk could probably be sold from formal sector milk depots in Kampala at approximately 
USh440 (the current cost of packaging is at least USh45/litre).  Once the bicycle men 
have added their margin, the price to householders would be approximately USh580.  
Little is currently known about the majority of consumers’ attitud s to packaged milk and 
their willingness to pay extra for it.  During our fieldwork we heard some anecdotal 
evidence that some consumers believe that processed milk is not “the real thing”17 and 
has been adulterated by the factories (a rumour that is almost certainly not denied by 
informal sector traders!).  
 
Low consumption levels and the role of promotion 
 
If such fears are widespread, they could be allayed by promotional campaigns that 
contain consumer educational messages.  If handled correctly, promotion could also 
stimulate consumer demand to grow from its current low per-capita lev ls.  The DDA is 
currently preparing promotional campaigns along these lines.  If dairy production and 
consumption in Uganda are to have a long term future, we can not over-stress the 
importance of these campaigns.  However, our impression is that much is surmised about 
Ugandan milk consumers but very little is actually known.  We therefore recommend that 
the DDA, perhaps with support from a donor that has traditionally supported the sector, 
should commission consumer market research on quantities consumed, product 
preferences, consumer perceptions and willingness to pay.  Such information will be 
crucial in planning promotional campaigns for dairy products.  It will also provide useful 
guidance to dairy processors on product development. 
 
Value addition 
 
One formal sector dairy processor located near to Kampala has made a considerable 
success of selling high quality dairy products such as yoghurt and butter to relatively 
affluent consumers through supermarket outlets.  However, the manager of this business 
concedes that this niche market is limited by the number of people in the required income 
bracket.  Although consumer incomes are rising in Uganda, there is clearlya constraint 
on the number of companies that can profitably supply this market. 
 
                                         
17 Interestingly such consumers are often willing to pay equivalent prices for Coca-Cola, the real “real 
thing”. 
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Whether a substantial market exists for lower value factory processed non-milk dairy 
products is a moot point.  Ghee is already sold but quantities are unknown and according 
to a private sector processor, profit margins are extremely low.  Once again, careful 
consumer market research would provide useful insights. 
 
Export 
 
The chief constraints to exporting UHT milk are technical.  Regional export markets are 
stringent about qality standards and Uganda’s UHT milk processors have had problems 
in this regard.   Raw milk entering the UHT process has to be extremely fresh in order to 
produce a first rate product.  Delays in collecting milk, particularly in the south-west of 
the country, and problems in the cold-chain often mean that raw milk is not as fresh as it 
should be.  Other problems exist in packaging.  Because both of Uganda’s factories are 
running at fractions of their full capacities and are therefore suffering substantial financial 
losses, money available for routine maintenance of packaging machines is not always 
available.  Consequently, the integrity of UHT packs coming from the factories is 
occasionally poor.  One way to solve these problems is through greater investment.  
Unfortunately this can not be done sustainably unless factory throughput increases and 
profits can be made.  
 
7.8  Raising dairy farmer incomes 
 
There is an argument that says that regulating the milk market will reduce farmer prices:  
If enforcing quality standards drives informal sector traders out of the market, then there 
will be less competition for farmers’ milk.  As a counter to this argument, in the new 
regulated environment, formal sector processors will probably be able to secure larger 
supplies of milk for their factories, thereby giving them the opportunity to return to 
profitability.  If this is achieved, the factories will be able to pay higher prices for raw 
milk. 
 
This analysis is certainly not meant to be an argument against market regulation.  In fact, 
we believe that the long term future of the industry depends on it.  In the long run, a 
healthy dairy processing sector is the best guarantee of sustainable incomes for dairy 
farmers. 
 
As for raising farmers’ incomes, the best route is probably through farmer marketing 
associations that bulk and cool milk.  The two contrasting examples of such organisations 
presented in this report point to the potential and pitfalls of this approach.  The lessons 
are also fully in line with those learned about successful farmer controlled enterprises 
both in Uganda and throughout Sub-Saharan Africa:  Firstly, group cohesion requires that 
farmer controlled enterprises must be self-sel cting.  In other words, individual farmers 
should not be grouped together by external interests.  Secondly, technical and managerial 
functions should be kept simple in order not to over-stretch farmer capacities or their 
locally appointed managers.  There is also a danger that if associations become too 
complicated, farmers lose control over them. 
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In the specific case of milk collection centres run by farmer associations, there are 
geographical constraints on where they can successfully operate.  Firstly, they must be 
near reliable mains electricity sources – the cost of running milk coolers on generators is 
prohibitive and the financial consequences of losing a whole batch of milk due to 
spoilage would be serious.  Secondly, a sufficient number of farmers must be within easy 
distance of the cooling facility – the commercial advantages of cooling milk are lost if 
milk arrives in a poor state.  Thirdly, milk cooling facilities have to be sufficiently near 
all-weather roads to attract buyers on a regular basis.  Unfortunately, these three 
conditions for success rule out the creation of f rmer controlled bulking and cooling 
centres in many rural locations.  Many dairy farmers will therefore not be able to 
participate.  
 
The DDA is currently considering the creation of vertically integrated dairy farmer 
marketing associations that would use the services of dairy factories to process their milk.  
The associations would then distribute milk to consumers.  One of DDA’s chief reasons 
for promoting this idea is that regulating a single “farm to doorstep” organisation would 
be much more simple for DDA than regulating a series of specialist organisations.  
Although DDA has yet to complete a feasibility study, we advise extreme caution in 
considering moves to implement the idea.  We say this for two reasons.  Firstly, such 
organisations would be complicated to run and would therefore require specialist 
management.  In most cases, farmers would lose control over decision making and 
opportunities for employees to cheat would be rife.  Secondly, trading such a perishable 
product is a risky venture and is best handled by different specialist enterprises at each 
stage of the supply chain.  Such specialists have much better control over physical losses. 
 
7.9  Summary of findings 
 
· With one or possibly two exceptions, Uganda’s formal dairy processing factories are 
currently unprofitable 
 
· A return to profitability in this sector is dependent on increasing the utilised capacity 
of processing factories. 
 
· For milk arriving from Kampala’s chief area of supply, the south-west, c llection and 
distribution costs account for a large part of the value of processed milk marketed in 
Kampala. 
 
· The informal sector’s distribution costs are considerably lower than those experienced 
by the formal sector.  Lessons can be learned by the formal sector in this regard. 
 
· Profitability in the informal milk wholesaling sector is restricted to those operators 
who have invested in urban based milk cooling facilities. 
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· Little is known with certainty about dairy consumption in terms of volumes, 
consumer preferences, perceptions and willing ess to pay for value added products. 
 
· The export of Ugandan UHT milk is constrained by quality problems, which are 
mainly caused by company financial losses and the consequent inability to maintain 
standards. 
 
· Farmer associations that bulk and cool milk can be financially viable in certain 
geographic locations. 
 
7.10  Recommended Implementation Plans 
 
1. Regulation of milk marketing:  We commend DDA actions to regulate the dairy 
market for quality and health safety, and recommend continued government support 
to this initiative until such time as revenues collected from a revived dairy processing 
and distribution industry can finance the regulation. 
 
2. The promotion of dairy product consumption:  We commend DDA initiatives to 
promote the consumption of high quality milk.  The anticipated effect will be to 
increase consumption of processed milk and other dairy products, thereby assisting 
the return to profitability in the formal processing industry.  However, to be fully 
effective we believe that such promotional campaigns should be informed by a better 
understanding of consumers.  We therefore recommend that the DDA, with assistance 
from donors that have traditionally supported the sector, should commission 
consumer market research on quantities of dairy products consumed, product 
preferences, consumer perceptions and willingness to pay for value added products.  
Apart from assisting promotional campaigns, this information will also provide useful 
guidance to dairy processors on product development. 
 
3. Exploiting efficiencies in milk distribution:  We recommend that the formal milk 
processing sector explores links with the informal milk wholesaling and distribution 
sectors.  In a few instances, links have already been made.  However, findings in this 
report suggest that closer links with urban based milk cooling facility operators might 
allow milk processors to increase their sales.  The success of the initiative will depend 
on the ability to sell milk directly to urban households at a price that is competitive 
with today’s informal sector milk. 
 
4. Support to farmer associations:  We recommend that the DDA, NAADS, the Uganda 
National Dairy Farmers’ Association, the Agricultural Council of Uganda and 
interested donors should collaborate to provide appropriate support to farmer milk
collection associations.  We believe that “appropriate support” means promoting the 
benefits of farmer milk collection associations to existing dairy farmer groupings and 
then building commercial skills in those groups that volunteer for assistance.  In view 
of its current interest in this field, we believe that Assistance Francaise is well placed 
to be the donor participant in this initiative. 
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5. Caution where caution is due: We recommend that the DDA invites external expert 
scrutiny of its plans for vertically integrated farmer controlled milk collection and 
distribution enterprises.  
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APPENDICES  
A1.  Coffee Appendices 
 
Coffee trader (buying kiboko, selling rough hulled green bean)   
      
 Ush     
US$1 =  1730     
      
Working capital budget:      
Assumed annual cost of capital  15%     
Assumed daily cost of capital 0.04%     
Price for Kiboko (Ush/kg)                        364     
Cost of working capital (USh/kg)                       0.15     
      
Raw material budget:      
Out-turn 55%     
Price for Kiboko                        200     
Equivalent green been price                        364     
      
      
Analysis of profitability   USh per kg of 
green bean 
US$/kg of green 
bean 
%  of costs 
Cost of sales      
Raw material                        
364 
    0.21 85% 
Consumables  450 per 140kg 
kiboko 
                         
6 
0.00 1% 
Total cost of sales                        
369 
    0.21 87% 
Trading costs      
Local taxes                          
-   
        - 0% 
Processing fee                          
25 
  0.01 6% 
Transport 1250 per 70kg 
kiboko 
                       
32 
  0.02 8% 
Total trading costs         
57 
                  0.03 13% 
Cost of working capital                         
0.1 
   0.00 0% 
      
Total costs                        
427 
    0.25 100% 
      
Revenue                        
450 
   0.26  
      
Profit (loss)                         
23 
   0.01  
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Coffee mill        
        
 Ush       
US$1 =  1730       
        
        
Capital cost budget - total investment and annualised cost:       
        
Assumed real weighted cost of capital 15% per annum      
        
Fixed capital costs Ush Years Annualised cost     
Hullers (x2)          12,000,000 10         2,391,025     
Building            2,500,000              20            399,404     
Land            4,500,000             99            675,001     
Total          19,000,000          3,465,429     
        
Working capital costs:        
  Working capital required (USh)                         -       
  Annual cost of working capital (USh)                         -       
Total capital investment (USh)          19,000,000       
Total annualised capital cost (USh)            3,465,429       
        
Revenue budget:        
Quantity rough-hulled green bean milled per day (kg)                10,000       
Number of days operated per week 6       
Number of operating weeks in a year 25       
Quantity milled in one year (kg)            1,500,000       
Average milling service charge (USh/kg)                        23       
Total revenue per annum (USh)          33,750,000       
        
        
Analysis of profitability  Ush  USh per year USh per kg 
of green 
bean 
US$ per year US$ per kg 
of green 
bean 
%  of costs 
Operating costs - fixed:        
Management and labour              600,000 per month         3,000,000                 2          1,734          0.001 30% 
Electricity               280,000 per month         1,400,000            0.93             809          0.001 14% 
Repairs and maintenance           1,300,000            0.87             751          0.001 13% 
UCDA levy              150,000            0.10               87          0.000 1% 
Council tax              150,000            0.10               87          0.000 1% 
Revenue authority              300,000            0.20             173          0.000 3% 
Sub-total fixed costs           6,300,000            4.20          3,642          0.002 62% 
Miscellaneous  5%             315,000            0.21             182          0.000 3% 
        
Total operating costs           6,615,000           4.41           3,824         0.003 66% 
Capital costs           3,465,429           2.31           2,003         0.001 34% 
Total costs         10,080,429          6.72           5,827         0.004 100% 
        
Revenue         33,750,000         22.50         19,509         0.013  
        
Profit (loss)         23,669,571         15.78         13,682         0.009  
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A2.  Cotton Appendices 
Example of Smallholder Indicative Price Payment Formulas  
 
Oil Palm Products - PNG 
 
Acronyms 
 
CIF – Cost, Insurance & freight 
CPO - Crude palm oil
FFB – Fresh fruit bunches 
FOB – Free on board 
Kina – PNG national currency 
OPIC – Oil Palm Industry Council (PNG body monitoring smallholder affairs) 
OPRA – Oil Palm Research Authority 
PK – Palm kernels 
PKE – Palm kernel expellers 
PKO – Palm kernel oil
Sexava – An oil palm pest 
 
FFB Formula, September 2001
MILLING COMPANIES  
A B C D 
 
 
FORMULA COMPONENT 
In US$ In US$ In US$ In US$ 
US $ price for CPO, CIF Rotterdam 362.00 362.00 362.00 362.00 
Less sales costs to equate to FOB 278.00 272.00 267.00 283.51 
US$ price for PK, CIF Rotterdam N/A 134.50 134.50 N/A 
Less sales costs to equate to FOB N/A 64.50 64.50 N/A 
US$ price for PKO, CIF Rotterdam 363.00 N/A N/A 363.00 
Less sales costs to equate to FOB 279.00 N/A N/A 284.51 
US$ price for PKE, CIF Australia 22.70 N/A N/A 22.70 
Less sales costs to equate to FOB 15.68 N/A N/A 15.68 
Palm Product Value of 1 mt of FFB     
Standard extraction rate for CPO (22.88%) 63.61 62.23 61.10 64.87 
Standard extraction rate for PK (4.97%) N/A 3.21 3.21 N/A 
Standard extraction rate for PKO (2.33%) 6.50 N/A N/A 8.63 
Standard extraction rates for PKE (3.10%) 0.49 N/A N/A 0.49 
US $ Palm Product Value of 1 mt of FFB 70.60 65.44 64.31 71.98 
Exchange rate US$ to Kina (0.2955)     
Exchange rate A $ to Kina (0.528)     
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 Kina Kina Kina Kina 
Kina Palm Product Value of 1 mt of FFB 238.89 221.45 217.63 243.60 
Farmers pay out ratio at 55% 131.39 121.80 119.70 133.98 
Add 1% VAT 1.31 1.22 1.20 1.34 
Less OPRA levy 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Less Sexava levy N/A N/A N/A 1.00 
Less OPIC levy 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Less VAT at 10% on OPIC levy 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
* Mill Gate Price 127.95 118.27 117.05 129.57 
Less FFB transport costs 18.00 12.50 N/A 17.34 
* Farm Gate Price 109.95 105.77 N/A 112.22 
Source: OPIC & PNG Oil Milling Companies 
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A3.  Fish Appendices 
Assumptions and workings 
 
Large transport boat operator     
     
 Ush    
US$1 =  1730    
     
Capital cost budget - total investment and annualised cost:     
     
Assumed real weighted cost of capital 15% per annum   
     
Fixed capital costs Ush Years  Annualised cost 
Boat (6 tonne capacity)                    3,500,000 6                 924,829 
Outboard engine (40hp)                    6,000,000 8               1,337,101 
Total                    9,500,000                2,261,930 
     
Working capital costs:     
  Working capital required (USh)                    5,752, 00    
  Annual cost of working capital (USh)                       862,875    
Total capital investment (USh)                  15,252,500    
Total annualised capital cost (USh)                    3,124,805    
     
     
Raw material budget:     
Quantity purchased per trip (kg) 3835    
Trips per week 1.5    
Operating weeks per year 52    
Total annual purchase (kg)                       299,130    
Average price paid to fishermen (Ush/kg)                           1,500    
Total annual raw material cost                448,695,000    
     
     
Revenue budget:     
Quantity purchased per annum (kg)                       299,130    
Spoilage (unsaleable to export factory) 1.3%    
Total sold to export factory (kg)                       295,241    
Total sold into local market (kg)                           3,889    
Landing site price for export quality (Ush/litre)                           1,800    
Landing site price for local market (kg)                              650    
Total annual revenue (USh)                533,962,007    
     
     
Labour budget:     
Number of crew                               3.5    
Wages per crew member per trip                         30,000    
Labour per trip                       105,000    
Annual labour budget                    8,190,000    
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Fuel and oil budget:     
Fuel utilised per trip (litres)                              100    
Oil utilisation per trip at 20:1 (litres)                                  5    
Cost of fuel (Ush/litre)                           1,480    
Cost of oil (Ush/litre)                           3,500    
Annual cost of fuel and oil                  12,909,000    
     
     
Analysis of profitability USh per year USh per kg of fish US$ per kg of fish %  of costs 
Operating costs - variable:     
Raw material           448,695,000                    1,500                      0.87 95% 
Sub-total variable costs 448,695,000                    1,500                      0.87 95% 
Operating costs - fixed:     
Labour                    8,190,000                         27                      0.02 2% 
Fuel and oil                  12,909,000                         43                      0.02 3% 
Repair and maintenance                    500,000                            2                      0.00 0% 
Licence                       500,000                           2                      0.00 0% 
Sub-total fixed costs                  22,099,000                         74                       0.04 5% 
     
Total operating costs                470,794,000                    1,574                      0.91 99% 
Capital costs                    3,124,805                         10                      0.01 1% 
     
Total costs                473,918,805                    1,584                      0.92 100% 
     
Revenue                533,962,007                    1,785                      1.03  
     
Profit (loss) before tax                  60,043,202                        201                      0.12  
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Fish processing plant        
        
 Ush       
US$1 =  1725       
        
        
Output budget:        
Export sales (kg per month)                       
163,150 
     
Local sales (kg per month)                      244,725       
  Operating months per year 12.0       
Annual export output (kg)                   1,957,800       
Annual local output (kg)                   2,936,700       
        
        
Raw material budget:        
Annual fresh fish requirement (kg)                   4,894,500       
Cost of fresh fish at landing site -  Ush/kg                          1,800       
Annual raw material budget (Ush)            8,810,100,000       
        
        
Revenue budget:        
Annual export output (kg)                   1,957,800       
Annual other output (kg)                   2,936,700       
Revenue per kg FOB delivered Entebbe 
(USh) 
                         6,003       
Average revenue per kg other sales (Ush)                             351       
Total annual revenue (USh)          12,783,147,447       
        
        
Labour budget:        
Direct labour cost at 163150kg/exp 
output/mth (Ush/yr) 
              289,314,600       
Change factor (for output not equalling 
163150kg/mth ) 
0.00       
Total direct labour cost               289,314,600       
        
        
Energy budget:        
Energy cost at 163150kg/export/mth 
(Ush/yr) 
              360,000,000       
Change factor (for output not equalling 
163150 kg/mth) 
0.00       
Total energy cost               360,000,000       
        
        
Fuel budget:        
Energy cost at 163150kg/export/mth 
(Ush/yr) 
                44,201,028       
Change factor (for output not equalling 
163150kg/mth) 
0.00       
Total energy cost                 44,201,028       
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Analysis of profitability  Ush  USh per annum USh per kg 
of fillet 
US$ per annum US$ per kg 
of fillet 
% of total 
costs 
Operating costs - variable:        
Raw material             8,810,100,000     4,500         5,107,304            2.61 76% 
Packaging 259 per kg              506,580,750        259            293,670            0.15 4% 
Energy                360,000,000       184            208,696           0.11 3% 
Direct labour                289,314,600        148            167,719            0.09 2% 
Fuel                  44,201,028           23              25,624            0.01 0% 
Sub-total variable costs           10,010,196,378    5,113         5,803,012           2.96 86% 
Operating costs - fixed:        
Management                 23,000,000 per month              276,000,000      141            160,000            0.08 2% 
Lab expenses                 11,600,000 per month              139,200,000        71              80,696            0.04 1% 
Admin expenses                 14,800,000 per month              177,600,000        91            102,957            0.05 2% 
Fixed asset maintenance                   5,600,000 per month                67,200,000       34              38,957            0.02 1% 
Capital costs (interest and depreciation)                 45,800,000 per month              549,600,000     281            318,609            0.16 5% 
Sub-total fixed costs             1,209,600,000     618            701,217           0.36 10% 
        
Sub-total operating costs           11,219,796,378 5,731         6,504,230            3.32 96% 
Miscellaneous 3.5%               415,492,873    212            240,865            0.12 4% 
Total operating costs           11,635,289,251  5,943         6,745,095           3.45 100% 
        
Annual revenue*           12,783,147,447  6,529         7,410,520           3.79  
        
Profit (loss) before tax             1,147,858,196 586            665,425           0.34  
        
* Includes revenue from fillet and fish 
parts 
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Ugandan trader selling fresh fish in Kigali   
     
 Ush    
US$1 =  1730    
Rwandan Franc 3.2    
     
Raw material budget:     
Quantity purchased per trip (kg)                     4,500    
Average price at landing site (Ush/kg) 850    
Total raw material cost per trip              3,825,000    
     
     
Revenue budget:     
Quantity sold (kg)                     4,500    
Average price in Kigali (Ush/kg)                     1,280    
Total revenue per pick-up load (USh)              5,760,000    
     
     
Analysis of profitability USh per trip USh per kg of  fish US$ per kg of fish %  of costs 
Operating costs - variable:     
Raw material              3,825,000                        850                       0.49 68% 
Sub-total variable costs              3,825,000                        850                       0.49 68% 
Operating costs - fixed:     
Vehicle hire (including driver)                 600,000                        133                       0.08 11% 
Fuel                 520,000                        116                       0.07 9% 
Labour                 100,000                          22                       0.01 2% 
Local Ugandan taxes                   50,000                          11                       0.01 1% 
Ice                 350,000                          78                       0.04 6% 
Import duties                 160,000                          36                       0.02 3% 
Sub-total fixed costs              1,780,000                        396                       0.23 32% 
     
Total operating costs            5,605,000                     1,246                       0.72 100% 
     
Revenue              5,760,000                     1,280                       0.74  
     
Profit (loss) before tax                 155,000                          34                       0.02  
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A4.  Maize Appendices 
Kenya Maize Quality Standards 
 
(A) UNGA LTD 
 
1. The maize shall be free from foreign odour, moulds, rat droppings and other 
extraneous material. 
 
The maize shall be clean and dry. 
 
The maize shall be free from infestation. 
GRADING 
 
Moisture content  14.0% maximum if direct for milling 
    13.5% maximum if destined for storage
Foreign matter   1% maximum 
(includes sand, earth, stones) 
Broken grains   3% maximum 
Pest damaged grains  4% maximum 
Other coloured grains  3% maximum 
Discoloured grains  3% maximum 
Diseased grains  2% maximum 
Infestation   absent 
Mouldy grains   absent 
Aflatoxin (total)  10 ppb  
Total defects   15% 
 
(B) Kenya Standard Specification for Dry Shelled Maize
(Extract from Kenya Bureau of Standards KS 01-42: 1977, amended October 1979) 
 
Quality Requirements 
 
Shelled maize shall be free from foreign odours, moulds, live pests, rat droppings and 
other injurious contaminants. 
 
Shelled maize shall not contain levels of chemical residues higher than t ose 
recommended by the Crop Storage Technical Committee of the National Agricultural 
Laboratories of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
Shelled maize shall have a white or yellow colour and may be dent or flint variety. 
 
Shelled maize shall be clean and dry 
 
Grades 
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Shelled maize shall be classified as grade K1, K2, K3 or K4. 
 
In addition to the quality requirements prescribed above, shelled maize shall meet the 
purity standards shown below when the shelled maize is samples and analysed according 
to prescribed methods. 
   
   
GRADE REQUIREMENTS (per cent by weight, maximum  
K1 K2 K3 K4 
Foreign Matter 1 1 1 1 
Broken Grains 2 3 4 6 
Pest Damaged Grains 4 7 10 15 
Other Coloured Grains 2 3 4 8 
Total Defective Grains 10 13 20 30 
 
Reject Maize - Shelled maize which has any commercially objectionable faulty odour or 
taste or which is otherwise of distinctly low quality shall be classified as reject maize and 
shall be regarded as unfit for human consumption. 
Undergrade Maize - Shelled maize which does not come within the requirements of 
grades K1 - K4 and is not reject shall be termed undergrade. 
 
(C) KENYA NCPB FAQ GRADING SYSTEM 
 
This system stipulates that maize can only be purchased if it complies with a single set of 
quality criteria.  These are: 
 
Moisture content   13.5% (maximum) 
Foreign matter   1% maximum by weight 
Broken grain   2% maximum by weight 
Insect damage   3% maximum by weight 
Other coloured grains  1% maximum by weight 
Discoloured grains  2% maximum by weight 
 
None of the parameters for defining these categories could be obtained.  However, on the 
assumption that they are the same as those described for the Kenya standard then this 
single grade appears to approximate to somewhere between K1 and K2. 
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A5.  Cassava Appendices 
 
Costs and Profitability of Cassava Chip Milling 
Investment:  motor and mill  2,000,000 Ush 
Life of equipment:  10 Years 
Opportunity cost of capital:  20%  
Final Value:  0 Ush 
Annualised capital cost; equipment 477,046 Ush 
    
Connection to electricity grid:  1,000,000 Ush 
Duration  30 Years 
Capital cost:  20%  
Final Value:  0 Ush 
Annualised capital cost; grid connection 200,846 Ush 
    
Working capital  500,000 Ush 
Opportunity cost of capital:  20%  
Cost of working capital  100,000 Ush 
    
Fixed Costs (annual)    
Capital costs (mill, engine, grid conn., working capital) 677,892 Ush 
Management costs (1 person Sh150,000 per month) 1,800,000 Ush 
Rent for building (Sh200,000)  2,400,000 Ush 
Processing license  180,000 Ush 
Revenue tax  150,000 Ush 
Total fixed costs p.a.  5,207,892 Ush 
    
Variable Costs (based on 750 bags of throughput per month)   
Electricity, per month  960,000 Ush 
Spare parts, per month  50,000 Ush 
Lubricants, per month  20,000 Ush 
Casual labour, per month           150,000 Ush 
Monthly variable costs  1,180,000 Ush 
Total variable costs p.a.     14,160,000 Ush 
    
Total Costs per annum       19,367,892 Ush 
Income p.a. (9000 bags, milled at Ush 2000 per bag)      18,000,000  Ush 
Profit per annum  (1,367,892) Ush 
    
*  This is based on the assumption that electricity costs of milling one bag of dried cassava chips 
correspond to Sh1,280.  Source of information: Wholesaler / miller in Kisenyi market, Kampala. 
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A6.  Dairy Appendices 
Assumptions and workings 
2,500 litre capacity milk collection centre       
        
 Ush       
US$1 =  1730       
        
Capital cost budget - total investment 
and annualised cost: 
       
        
Assumed real weighted cost of capital 10% per annum      
        
Fixed capital costs Ush Years Annualised cost     
Plant and machinery                  18,000,000 10              2,929,417     
Genset                    6,000,000 5              1,582,785     
Vehicle                   10,000,000                            
5 
             2,637,9 5     
Carriage cans                    2,400,000                            
4 
                757,130     
Total                  36,400,000               7,907,307     
        
Working capital costs:        
  Working capital required (USh)                                -       
  Annual cost of working capital (USh)                                 -       
Total capital investment (USh)                  36,400,000       
Total annualised capital cost (USh)                    7,907,307       
        
        
Output budget:        
  Utilised capacity (litres/day)                           2,500       
  Operating days per week 7.0       
  Operating weeks per year 52.0       
Annual output of milk (litres)                       910,00       
        
        
Raw material budget:        
Spoilage 5.0%       
Annual raw milk requirement (litres)                       955,500       
Cost of raw milk -  Ush/l 200       
Annual raw material budget (Ush)                191,100,000       
        
        
Revenue budget:        
Annual output of processed milk (litres) 910000       
Revenue per litre sold ex-store 220       
Quantity sold ex-store (litres/day) 900       
Revenue per litre delivered Mbarara 
(USh) 
                             270       
Quantity sold Mbarara (litres/day)                           1,600       
Total annual revenue (USh)                229,950,000       
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Analysis of profitability  Ush  USh per annum USh per litre of 
product 
US$ per 
annum 
US$ per 
litre of 
product 
% of costs 
Operating costs - variable:        
  Raw material            191,100,000             210           110,462            0.12 83% 
  Energy                       150,000 per month              1,800,000                 2               1,040            0.00 1% 
  Direct labour                       135,000 per month              1,620,000                 2                  936            0.00 1% 
Fuel                    1,386,000 per month            16,632,000               18               9,614            0.01 7% 
Sub-total variable costs            211,152,000             232          122,053           0.13 92% 
Operating costs - fixed:        
  Management                       320,000 per month              3,840,000                 4               2,220            0.00 2% 
Water                       125,000 per month              1,500,000                 2                  867            0.00 1% 
Rent                       150,000 per month              1,800,000                 2               1,040            0.00 1% 
Licence                   200,000                 0                  116            0.00 0% 
Fixed asset maintenance 4% cptl value              1,456,000                 2                 842            0.00 1% 
Sub-total fixed costs                8,796,000               10              5,084           0.01 4% 
        
Sub-total operating costs            219,948,000             242           127,138           0.14 96% 
Contingency - 1% (miscellaneous)                2,199,480                 2               1,271            0.00 1% 
Total operating costs            222,147,480             244           128,409            0.14 97% 
Capital costs                7,907,307                 9              4,571           0.01 3% 
Total annual costs            230,054,787             253          132,980           0.15 100% 
        
Annual revenue            229,950,000             253           132,919           0.15 100% 
        
Profit (loss) before tax   -               104,787 -               0 -                  61 -         0.00  
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10,000 litre capacity milk collection centre       
        
 Ush       
US$1 =  1730       
        
Capital cost budget - total investment and annualised cost:       
        
Assumed real weighted cost of capital 10% per annum      
        
Fixed capital costs Ush Years Annualised cost     
Plant and machinery                  70,0 0,000 10            11,392,178     
Building                  24,000,000 50              2,420,620     
Genset                  34,000,000 5              8,969,114     
Vehicle                   26,000,000                            
5 
           6,858,735     
Carriage cans                    8,400,000                            
4 
             2,649,955     
Total                162,400,000             32,290,601     
        
Working capital costs:        
  No of days operating costs required                                 -       
  Total annual operating costs (see below) 
(Ush)) 
               327,210,912       
  Working capital required (USh)                                 -       
  Annual cost of working capital (USh)                                -       
Total capital investment (USh)                162,400,000       
Total annualised capital cost (USh)                  32,290,601       
        
        
Output budget:        
  Utilised capacity (litres/day)                          4,200       
  Operating days per week 7.0       
  Operating weeks per year 52.0       
Annual output of milk (litres)                    1,528,800       
        
        
Raw material budget:        
Spoilage 5.0%       
Annual raw milk requirement (litres)                    1,605,240       
Cost of raw milk -  Ush/l 180       
Annual raw material budget (Ush)                288,943,200       
        
        
Revenue budget:        
Annual output of processed milk (litres) 1528800       
Revenue per litre sold ex-store 200       
Quantity sold ex-store (litres/day) 3000       
Revenue per litre delivered Mbarara (USh)                              250       
Quantity sold Mbarara (litres/day)                           1,200       
Total annual revenue (USh)                328,500,000       
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Analysis of profitability  Ush  USh per annum USh per 
litre of 
product 
US$ per 
annum 
US$ per liter of 
product 
% of 
costs 
Operating costs - variable:        
  Raw material            288,943,200             189          167,019            0.11 80% 
  Energy                       300,000 per month              3,600,000                 2              2,081            0.00 1% 
  Direct labour                    130,000 per month              1,560,000                 1                 902            0.00 0% 
Fuel                    1,386,000 per month            16,632,000               11              9,614            0.01 5% 
Sub-total variable costs            310,735,200            203          179,616            0.12 86% 
Operating costs - fixed:        
  Management                       320,000 per month              3,840,000                 3              2,220            0.00 1% 
Water                       125,000 per month              1,500,000                 1                 867            0.00 0% 
Rent                       100,000 per month              1,200,000                 1                 694          0.00 0% 
Licence                   200,000                 0                 116            0.00 0% 
Fixed asset maintenance 4% cptl value              6,496,000                 4              3,755            0.00 2% 
Sub-total fixed costs              13,236,000                9               7,651            0.01 4% 
        
Sub-total operating costs            323,971,200             212          187,267            0.12 90% 
Miscellaneous - 1% (miscellaneous)                3,239,712                 2              1,873            0.00 1% 
Total operating costs            327,210,912            214          189,139            0.12 91% 
Capital costs              32,290,601              21             18,665          0.01 9% 
Total annual costs            359,501,513            235          207,804            0.14 100% 
        
Annual revenue            328,500,000            215          189,884            0.12  
        
Profit (loss) before tax   -          31,001,513 -             20 -           17,920 -          0.01  
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30,000 Litre/day Milk Pasteurising and Homogenising Processing Plant  
        
 Ush       
US$1 =  1730       
        
Capital cost budget - total investment and annualised cost:     
        
Assumed real weighted cost of capital 15% per annum      
        
Fixed capital costs Ush Years Annualised cost    
Building            300,000,000 20        47,928,441     
Machinery            900,000,000 10       179,326,856     
Utilities           800,000,000                            
5 
      238,652,442     
Total       2,000,000,000        465,907,739     
        
Working capital costs:        
  No of days operating costs required                           1.5       
  Total annual operating costs (see below) 
(Ush)) 
        3,464,731,500       
  Working capital required (USh)              14,238,623       
  Annual cost of working capital (USh)                2,135,793       
Total capital investment (USh)        2,014,238,623       
Total annualised capital cost (USh)            468,043,533       
        
        
Output budget:        
  Utilised capacity (litres/day)                     25,000       
  Operating days per week 7.0       
  Operating weeks per year 52.0       
Annual output of processed milk (litres)               9,100,000       
        
        
Raw material budget:        
Spoilage 6.5%       
Annual raw milk requirement (litres)                    
9,691,500 
     
Cost of raw milk at collection point -  Ush/l 220       
Annual raw material budget (Ush)         2,132,130,000       
        
        
Revenue budget:        
Annual output of processed milk (litres) 9100000       
Revenue per litre delivered Kampala (USh)                  
500 
      
Total annual revenue (USh)         4,550,000,000       
        
        
Labour budget:        
Direct labour cost at 7000 litres/day 
(Ush/yr) 
             33,000,000       
Incremental factor (for output above 7000 
l/day) 
0.51       
Total direct labour cost              49,971,429       
        
        
Energy budget:        
Energy cost at 7000 litres/day (Ush/yr)              96,000,000       
Incremental factor (for output above 7000 
l/day) 
0.51       
Total energy cost            145,371,429       
        
        
Fuel budget:        
Energy cost at 7000 litres/day (Ush/yr)            120,000,000       
Incremental factor (for output above 7000 
l/day) 
2.57       
Total energy cost            428,571,429       
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Analysis of profitability  Ush  USh per annum USh per litre 
of product 
US$ per annum US$ per litre of 
product 
% of costs 
Operating costs - variable:        
  Raw material         2,132,130,000             234           1,232,445            0.14 54% 
  Energy            145,371,429               16                84,030              0.01 4% 
  Direct labour              49,971,429                 5                28,885              0.00 1% 
  Packaging 48 per litre          436,800,000               48              252,486              0.03 11% 
Fuel            428,571,429               47              247,729              0.03 11% 
Sub-total variable costs         3,192,844,286            351           1,845,575              0.20 81% 
Operating costs - fixed:        
  Management                4,325,000 per month            51,900,000                 6                30,000              0.00 1% 
Water (Ush1.25 million per month)              15,000,000                 2                  8,671              0.00 0% 
Fixed asset maintenance 2% cptl value            40,000,000                 4                23,121              0.00 1% 
Sub-total fixed costs            106,900,000              12                 61,792              0.01 3% 
        
Sub-total operating costs         3,299,744,286             363           1,907,367              0.21 84% 
Contingency - 5% (miscellaneous)            164,987,214               18                95,368              0.01 4% 
Total operating costs         3,464,731,500            381           2,002,735              0.22 88% 
Capital costs            468,043,533              51               270,545              0.03 12% 
Total annual costs         3,932,775,033            432           2,273,280              0.25 100% 
        
Annual revenue         4,550,000,000            500           2,630,058              0.29 116% 
        
Profit (loss) before tax            617,224,967               68               356,777              0.04  
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UHT Processing Plant        
        
 Ush       
US$1 =  1740       
        
Capital cost budget - total investment and annualised cost:       
        
Assumed real weighted cost of capital 15% per 
annum 
     
        
Fixed capital costs Ush Years Annualised cost     
Building   1,810,000,000 100                271,500,231     
Plant & Machinery   5,170,000,000 10             1,030,133,163     
Motor Vehicles     850,000,000 5                253,568,220     
Furniture and fittings       10,000,000 8                    2,228,501     
Office equipment       30,000,000 8                    6,685,503     
Carriage cans      690,000,000                            
4 
       241,683,093     
Total   8,560,000,000              1,805,798,710     
        
Working capital costs:        
  No of days operating costs required                  7.0       
  Total annual operating costs (see below) 
(Ush)) 
4,168,353,000       
  Working capital required (USh)       79,941,016       
  Annual cost of working capital (USh)        11,991,152       
Total capital investment (USh)   8,639,941,016       
Total annualised capital cost (USh)  1,817,789,863       
        
        
Output budget:        
  Utilised capacity (litres/day)               20,000       
  Operating days per week 7.0       
  Operating weeks per year 52.0       
Annual output of processed milk (litres)          7,280,000       
        
        
Raw material budget:        
Spoilage 6.5%       
Annual raw milk requirement (litres)          7,753,200       
Cost of raw milk at collection point -  Ush/l 230       
Annual raw material budget (Ush)   1,783,236,000       
        
        
Revenue budget:        
Annual output of processed milk (litres)         7,280,000       
Revenue per litre delivered Kampala (USh)                    550       
Total annual revenue (USh)  4,004,000,000       
        
        
Labour budget:        
Direct labour cost at 20000 litres/day 
(Ush/yr) 
    145,600,000       
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Incremental factor (for output above 20000 
l/day) 
0.00       
Total direct labour cost      145,600,000       
        
        
Energy budget:        
Energy cost at 20000 litres/day (Ush/yr)     240,000,000       
Incremental factor (for output above 20000 
l/day) 
0.00       
Total energy cost     240,000,000       
        
        
Fuel budget:        
Energy cost at 20000 litres/day (Ush/yr)      380,000,000       
Incremental factor (for output above 20000 
l/day) 
0.00       
Total energy cost      380,000,000       
        
        
Analysis of profitability  Ush  USh per annum USh per litre 
of product 
US$ per annum US$ per litre 
of product 
% of 
costs 
Operating costs - variable:        
  Raw material               1,783,236,000            245           1,024,848           0.14 30% 
  Energy                  240,000,000              33              137,931           0.02 4% 
  Direct labour                  145,600,000            20                83,678           0.01 2% 
  Packaging 120 per 
litre 
               873,600,000            120              502,069           0.07 15% 
Fuel                  380,000,000              52              218,391           0.03 6% 
Sub-total variable costs               3,422,436,000             470           1,966,917           0.27 57% 
Operating costs - fixed:        
  Management                  105,000,000              14                60,345           0.01 2% 
Office expenses                    90,000,000              12                51,724           0.01 2% 
Water                    54,000,000                7                31,034           0.00 1% 
Security                    47,224,000               6                27,140           0.00 1% 
Depot rent                    25,000,000                3                14,368           0.00 0% 
Insurance                    30,000,000                4                17,241         0.00 1% 
Promotion                    25,000,000                3                14,368           0.00 0% 
Fixed asset maintenance 2% cptl 
value 
               171,200,000              24                98,391           0.01 3% 
Sub-total fixed costs                  547,424,000              75              314,611           0.04 9% 
        
Sub-total operating costs               3,969,860,000            545           2,281,529           0.31 66% 
Contingency - 5% (miscellaneous)                  198,493,000              27              114,076           0.02 3% 
Total operating costs               4,168,353,000             573           2,395,605           0.33 70% 
Capital costs               1,817,789,863           250           1,044,707           0.14 30% 
Total annual costs               5,986,142,863             822           3,440,312           0.47 100% 
        
Annual revenue               4,004,000,000             550           2,301,149          0.32 67% 
        
Profit (loss) before tax   -           1,982,142,863 -           272 -         1,139,163 -          0.16  
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Informal wholesaler        
        
 Ush       
US$1 =  1730       
        
        
Raw material budget:        
Quantity purchased per trip (litres) 1800       
Average price at collection point (Ush/litre) 245       
Total raw material cost per trip            441,563       
        
        
Revenue budget:        
Quantity purchased (litres)                1,800       
Spoilage 13.75%       
Total sold as fresh milk (litres)                1,553       
Total sold as spoiled milk (litres)                   248       
Average wholesale price for fresh milk (Ush/litre)                   356       
Average wholesale price for spoiled milk (Ush/litre)                   306       
Total revenue per pick-up load (USh)            628,875       
        
        
Analysis of profitability  Ush  USh per day USh per 
litre of 
product 
US$ per 
day 
US$ per 
litre of 
product 
%  of 
costs 
Operating costs - variable:        
Raw material                   441,563            245       255.24           0.14 69% 
Consumables                     27 per 20 litres                     2,430                1           1.40            0.00 0% 
District tax 350 per 20 litres                   31,500              18         18.21           0.01 5% 
Association levy 100 per 20 litres                     9,000                5           5.20           0.00 1% 
Kampala district levy 100 per 20 litres                     9,000                5           5.20           0.00 1% 
Milk preservation (half of milk purchased)                       500 per 20 litres                   22,500              13        13.01           0.01 3% 
Sub-total variable costs                   515,993            287       298.26            0.17 80% 
Operating costs - fixed:        
Vehicle hire (including driver)                     57,500              32        33.24            0.02 9% 
Fuel                     70,000              39         40.46           0.02 11% 
Sub-total fixed costs                   127,500              71         73.70            0.04 20% 
        
Total operating costs                   643,493            357       371.96            0.21 100% 
        
Revenue                   628,875            349       363.51            0.20  
        
Profit (loss) before tax   -                 14,618 -              8 -          8.45 -          0.00  
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Informal sector Kampala milk cooling 
centre 
      
        
 Ush       
US$1 =  1730       
        
        
Capital cost budget - total investment and annualised cost:      
        
Assumed real weighted cost of capital 20% per annum      
        
Fixed capital costs Ush Years Annualised cost     
Cooler                    8,000,000 10              1,908,182     
Vehicle                  15,000,000                            
5 
5,015,696     
Total                  23,000,000               6,923,878     
        
Working capital costs:        
  Working capital required (USh)                       441,563       
  Annual cost of working capital (USh)                         88,313       
Total capital investment (USh)                  23,441,563       
Total annualised capital cost (USh)                    7,012,190       
        
        
Raw material budget:        
Number of trips per year 312       
Quantity purchased per trip (litres) 1800       
Quantity purchased per year (litres)                       561,600       
Average price at collection point (Ush/litre) 245       
Total annual raw material cost                137,767,500       
        
        
Revenue budget:        
Quantiy purchased (litres)                       561,600       
Spoilage 13.75%       
Total sold as fresh milk (litres) 484380       
Total sold as spoiled milk (litres) 77220       
Average wholesale price for fresh milk (Ush/litre)                              356       
Average wholesale price for spoiled milk 
(Ush/litre) 
                             306       
Total revenue per annum (USh)                196,209,000       
        
        
Fuel budget:        
Number of trips per year                          312       
Fuel used per trip (Ush)                         80,000       
Annual cost of fuel                  24,960,000       
        
        
Analysis of profitability  Ush  USh per year USh per 
litre of 
product 
US$ per year US$ per 
litre of 
product 
%  of 
costs 
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Operating costs - variable:        
Raw material            137,767,500            284        79,634            0.16 74% 
Consumables                                27 per 20 
litres 
                758,160              2              438            0.00 0% 
District tax 350 per 20 
litres 
             9,828,000              20          5,681            0.01 5% 
Sub-total variable costs            148,353,660            306         85,754           0.18 79% 
Operating costs - fixed:        
Labour                        350,000 per month              4,200,000                9          2,428            0.01 2% 
Fuel              24,960,000              52        14,428            0.03 13% 
Rent 100000 per month              1,200,000                2             694            0.00 1% 
Electricity 75000 per month                 900,000                2             520            0.00 0% 
Water 24000 per month                 288,000                 1             166            0.00 0% 
Traders' licence                     75,000                0               43            0.00 0% 
Council tax                     50,000                0               29            0.00 0% 
Sub-total fixed costs              31,673,000              65         18,308           0.04 17% 
        
Total operating costs            180,026,660            372      104,062            0.21 96% 
Capital costs                7,012,190               14          4,053            0.01 4% 
Total costs            187,038,850            386      108,115           0.22 100% 
        
Revenue            196,209,000            405      113,416           0.23  
        
Profit (loss)                9,170,150              19           5,301           0.01  
 
 
 
 
 
